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Petitioners submit this Reply Brief in response to the joint brief filed on behalf of 
Respondent, Payette County (the "County"), and the Intervenor, Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc. 
("AEHI"). AEHI and the County ( collectively "Respondents") have asked the Court to excuse 
the many procedural defects and substantive errors in the County's approval of AEHI's 
conditional rezone and uphold the County's improper actions. Their arguments lack merit. 
Under the facts and the applicable law, it is clear that the Petitioners have standing to pursue this 




A. Petitioners Have Standing to Pursue Their Petition for Judicial Review. 
Respondents persist in their argument that the Petitioners lack standing to pursue their 
Petition for Judicial Review. In pressing that argument, Respondents seek to have this Court 
impose a standard different than that adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in land use cases such 
as this one. The Idaho Supreme Court has made the standard to gain standing in a land use case 
perfectly clear: 
"To have standing in a land use case, the petitioner needs to allege, not prove, 
only that the development could potentially harm his or her real estate interests." 
Hawkins v. Bonneville County Board of Commissioners, 151 Idaho 228, 231, 254 P.3d 1224, 
1227 (2011). See also, Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84 (2003) (the existence of 
real or potential harm is sufficient to challenge a land use decision). This standard has been 
applied to confer standing on nearby property owners and residents on a number of occasions 
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where the potential harm to the neighboring property owners is not nearly as significant or severe 
as is the case here. 1 
In this case, Petitioners have alleged that their properties all lie within the ten mile 
"Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone" the ("EPZ") of the approved power plant 
as determined by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency. R. p. 3467-3482; 3666-3667. The EPZ is defined as the area for which 
planning is needed to assure that prompt and effective action can be taken to protect the public in 
the event of an accident. 10 CFR 50, Appendix E; "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of 
Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants", 
NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, Rev.1, November 1980. For those within the EPZ, protection is 
needed from exposure to radiation from the passing plume from a release resulting from an 
accident at a nuclear power plant. Id The significance of having one's property located within 
the EPZ is aptly illustrated by the requirement, among many others, imposed on nuclear power 
plant operators to assure the actual availability of medical service providers in the vicinity of the 
nuclear power plant capable of and qualified to treat residents of the EPZ for exposure to nuclear 
radiation, a mere list of existing medical facilities being insufficient. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(12); 
GUARD v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 753 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir 1984). In 
the EPZ the requirement to seek shelter and/or evacuate are considered the principle immediate 
protective actions recommended for the general public. 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Thus, as 
pointed out in Petitioners' opening brief, in the event of an accident at the approved plant, the 
1 Taylor v. Canyon County Board of Commissioners, 147 Idaho 424, 210 P.3d 532 (2009) (adjacent landowner 
objecting to conditional rezone is an affected person); Johnson v. Blaine County, 146 Idaho 916, 204 P.3d 1127 
(2009) (adjoining property owner affected by increased housing density is viewed an affected person); Cowan v. 
Board of Commissioners of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 (2006) (landowners affected by adjacent 
subdivision development); Davisco Foods International, Inc. v. Gooding County, 141 Idaho 784, 118 P.3d 116 
(2005) (petitioners affected because they might smell proposed wastewater treatment plant over three miles distant). 
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individual Petitioners may be required to evacuate their homes, leaving their possessions and 
animals, including livestock, behind. Those individuals in the EPZ, at the same time they were 
given an evacuation notice, would have to deal with making arrangements for farm animals and 
will have the impossible task of trying to put all of their livestock under shelter and then feed 
them only covered, stored feed and provide water only from protected containers. Id. 
In addition to the harm to their real estate interests as a result of being located within the 
EPZ, the Petitioners have alleged that they will suffer injury and harm from the routine emissions 
of radioactive water from the approved nuclear reactor, exposing the Petitioners to radioactive 
materials which are recognized carcinogens. R. p. 3660-3667. These discharges occur as a part 
of the routine, allowed operation of nuclear power plants in the United States, above any 
naturally occurring amounts and apart from accidents or leaks. Nuclear facilities are allowed to 
emit radioactive substances as a part of normal operation not because such emissions carry no 
risks, but because they are unavoidable. R. p. 3692. 
Moreover, Petitioners have alleged that they will suffer immediate economic harm due to 
the diminished value of their properties caused by the mere possibility that a nuclear power plant 
may be built in their community. That economic harm will persist for at least the 20-year term 
of the development agreement and, if the development agreement is extended in accordance with 
its terms, or if the nuclear power plant is actually built, the economic hann will persist longer, 
and possibly, indefinitely. June 6, 2011, Tr. p. 98-101. In addition, Petitioners have alleged that 
approval of the power plant will interfere with the established business, commercial and 
agricultural operations and uses of their properties. R. p. 3647-3661. These allegations of harm 
certainly meet and exceed the standards set forth in the cases cited above and are clearly 
sufficient to confer standing on the Petitioners. 
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Citing to, In The Matter of the Jerome County Board of Commissioners, 153 Idaho 298, 
281 P.3d 1076 (2012), Respondents argue that the test for standing to pursue a petition for 
judicial review quoted above incorporates the general constitutional requirements for standing, 
requiring a showing of a distinct palpable injury and fairly traceable causal connection between 
the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. While the court In The Matter of the Jerome 
County Board of Commissioners, supra, did make passing reference to several basic propositions 
regarding standing, it nevertheless proceeded to analyze the various standing issues raised in that 
case under the provisions of LC. § 67-6521, nowhere suggesting that the standards contained in 
that statute were insufficient, incomplete or improper, saying: 
"Next, we find that the record contains sufficient allegations that the LCO 
could potentially harm the individual property owners' real estate and health 
interests. See Hawkins v. Bonneville Cnty. Bd. Of Com 'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 231, 
254 P.3d 1224, 1227 (2011) (citing Evans v. Teton Cnty., 139 Idaho 71, 76, 73 
P.3d 84, 89 (2003)); see also Davisco Foods Int'!, Inc. v. Gooding Cnty., 141 
Idaho 784, 787, 118 P.3d 116, 119 (2005) (finding property interest adversely 
affected by possibility to smell odors on property sufficient for standing in special 
use permit proceeding). Evidence was presented to the Board regarding probable 
compromised resale value of existing homes in the area, odors, and possible 
health concerns. These could each be categorized as threatened harm." 
281 P .3d at 1087. The allegations made by Petitioners here are no less significant than those 
found to be sufficient in that case. 
The Petitioners have, nevertheless, alleged a sufficiently particularized harm to be 
pennitted to pursue this action even if the non-LLUPA standard promoted by Respondents is 
adopted. The Idaho Supreme Court in Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 
(1989) adopted the following criterion for standing in a declaratory judgment case: 
[T]he essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking 
to invoke the court's jurisdiction has "alleged such a personal stake 
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete 
adversariness which sharpens the presentation upon which the 
court so depends for illumination of difficult constitutional 
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questions." As refined by subsequent reformation, this requirement 
of "personal stake" has come to be understood to require not only a 
"distinct palpable injury" to the plaintiff, but also a "fairly 
traceable" causal connection between the claimed injury and the 
challenged conduct. 
Id at 641, 778 P.2d at 76 (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 
U.S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978)) (citations omitted). In lvfiles, the plaintiff, 
Miles, brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of certain 
legislation enacted pursuant to an agreement between Idaho Power and the State, the effect of 
which would force ratepayers to pay for equipment that was rendered useless under the 
agreement. Id at 638, 778 P.2d at 760. The Idaho Supreme Court determined that Miles had 
standing because the ratepayers injured by the legislation did not constitute the entirety of Idaho 
citizens or taxpayers. Id at 642, 778 P.2d at 764. The Supreme Court explained that: 
This is more than a generalized grievance. It is a specialized and 
peculiar injury, although it may affect a large class of 
individuals. The political process obviously will be more unkind 
to injured ratepayers seeking to change legislation affecting the 
whole state of Idaho than to injured citizens and taxpayers. When 
the impact of legislation is not felt by the entire populace, but 
only by a selected class of citizens, the standing doctrine should 
not be evoked to usurp the right to challenge the alleged denial 
of constitutional rights in a judicial forum. (Emphasis added.) 
Id Accordingly, even if the legislation harms a large class of individuals, that harm can still be 
particularized. 
When the alleged grievance relates to the party's status as a landowner "it is the quality 
or magnitude of the injury suffered which must differentiate a plaintiff from the citizenry at large 
in order to confer standing." Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. Payette County, 125 Idaho 824, 
827, 875 P.2d 236,239 (1994). In that regard, the situs of property is relevant to standing to the 
extent the property's location exposes the landowner to peculiarized harm. Id at 828, 875 P.2d at 
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240. This criterion was applied in Butters v. Hauser, 131 Idaho 498, 499, 960 P.2d 181, 182 
(1998). Butters sought a declaratory judgment that a newly enacted zoning ordinance was void. 
Id. Under the newly enacted ordinance, a neighbor, Hauser, was granted a conditional use 
permit that allowed him to build a radio transmission control tower. Id. Butters complained that 
the tower loomed over her land and required her to install an expensive new telephone system in 
order to eliminate the radio tower's electrical interference. Id. at 501, 960 P.2d at 184. The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Hauser, finding that Butters' injuries were 
not unique to her. Id. at 500, 960 P.2d at 183. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed holding that 
"[a]lthough the location of [Butters'] property alone does not confer standing, the location does 
expose her to peculiarized harm." Id. at 501, 960 P.2d at 184. The Supreme Court concluded 
that Butters had "shown a peculiarized harm as a result of the conditional use permit" and 
therefore, that she had "standing to pursue a declaratory judgment action regarding the validity 
of the ordinance amendment." Id. 
In Martin v. Camas County, 150 Idaho 508, 516, 248 P.3d 1243, 1251 (2011), the Idaho 
Supreme Court recognized that "a party whose property had been downzoned by the 2008 zoning 
amendments would unquestionably have standing to bring this action, as would a property owner 
who could show a specific palpable harm that he would incur from the imminent development of 
an upzoned neighboring property." Similarly in Ciszek v. Kootenai County Board of 
Commissioners, 151 Idaho 123, 128, 254 P.3d 24, 29 (2011), Kootenai County argued that the 
plaintiff, Ciszek, lacked standing to bring a declaratory judgment action arguing that Ciszek 
failed to alleged "particularized harm." Id. Ciszek alleged that "her property is adjacent to the 
new mining rezone and that that there will be 'detrimental dust, noise and traffic created' by new 
mining activity taking place adjacent to her prope1iy. She also alleges that her property values 
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will decrease by over $10,000 as a result of the rezones." Id. The Idaho Supreme Comi 
determined, based on these allegations, that Ciszek had standing, finding that "Ciszek' s 
allegations of interference with the use and enjoyment of her prope1iy, as well as decreased 
property values, are sufficient to demonstrate a particularized harm." Id. 
Therefore, according the above-cited cases, an injury can be particularized even if 
suffered by a large class of individuals as long as it is not a grievance suffered by the general 
populace. Furthermore, even though situs of a property alone does not confer standing, 
proximity can be used to demonstrate a particularized injury. Moreover, allegations of 
interference with the use and enjoyment of property, as well as decreased property values, are 
sufficient to demonstrate a particularized harm. 
As summarized above, the Petitioners have alleged that the location of their properties in 
relation to the approved nuclear power plant exposes them to particularized harm. For example, 
each of the Petitioners owns and/or resides upon property within the ten mile EPZ wherein they 
constitute the population most subject to risk of exposure to radiation from an accidental release 
from the power plant. See, NUREG-0654, supra. 2 Petitioners have also alleged that the 
locations of their properties in relation to the approved nuclear power plant exposes them to 
routine emissions of radioactive water, a known carcinogen, a risk not shared by those owning 
properties and residing more distant from the power plant. R. p. 3665-3666. In addition, the 
Petitioners have alleged that the approved nuclear power plant will otherwise interfere with the 
use and enjoyment of their properties. For example, Jeffrey Weber alleges that the dog kennel 
and training business he operates on his property will no longer be a viable use (R. p. 3657), and 
H-Hook alleges that the construction and operation of the approved nuclear power plant would 
2 Although somewhat large in area, the teu mile diameter Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone does 
not encompass the entirety of Payette County but only a portion thereof. See, R. p. 13. 
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interfere with the normal ranching operations on its lands which are immediately adjacent to the 
subject site. R. p. 3662-3665. 
The Petitioners have also alleged that increased traffic along Big Willow, Stone Quarry 
and Little Willow Roads3 and the associated noise and dust both during and after construction of 
the plant will disrupt and interfere with the normal agricultural and commercial activities 
conducted on their properties. Id. To be clear, Petitioners do not, as AEHI seems to believe, 
demand the exclusive right to use those roads. Petitioners' objection is to the adverse impact on, 
and interference with, Petitioners established uses resulting from the new, different and excessive 
uses of those roads in connection with the construction and operation of AEHI's power plant.4 
As a result of these immediate and future adverse impacts, Petitioners have alleged that 
the marketability of their properties has been negatively impacted and that the values of their 
properties have been diminished. Id. The diminution in value of some of the Petitioners 
properties is measured in the tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of dollars.5 The 
particularized harms shown by the Petitioners in this case are much greater than was found to be 
sufficient in Miles, Butters, Martin and Ciszek. 
3 Respondents claim that the County's approval of the nuclear power plant was made conditioned on AEHI not 
using Little Willow Road. However, use of that road is far from foreclosed. The 20 year Development Agreement, 
at Condition No. 11 does seek to restrict use of Little Willow Road by contractors and subcontractors, but leaves 
enforcement of the restriction to be accomplished entirely by AEHI by "making the concept clear in its contractual 
arrangements with construction contractors", an enforcement mechanism of dubious value. And, the same condition 
reopens the door to use of Little Willow Road as an "emergency access", the nature and enforcement of which is 
undefined. 
4 Moreover, although these are public roads, they exist within prescriptive easements on Petitioners' properties. 
Change in the nature and extent of the uses of those roads will, especially when AEHI' s uses interfere with the 
established uses by Petitioners, clearly injure Petitioners' real estate interests. 
5 See Affidavits of John W. Buriiie, Jeffrey G. Weber, Thomas F. Pence, Clifford D. Morgan, James S. Underwood, 
Michael Humphreys, Tom Roland, Pat Thacker and Mark Richey, discussed more fully in Section II. I. of this reply 
brief, below, all of which have been filed in the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State ofldaho and 
for the County of Payette in a case entitled John W. Burlile, et al vs. Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc., et al, Case 
No.CV-2012-364. The Petitioners request the Comito take judicial notice of those affidavits pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Evidence 201. Copies of the Affidavits are attached in Appendix A to this brief for the Court's 
convenience. 
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Finally, like they did in connection with the County's approval of the related variance, 
attempts to argue that the Petitioners may not rely on the potential harm to their persons 
and properties arising out of the radiological risks associated with property ownership adjacent to 
or in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant to establish the requisite adverse impact for them to 
have standing to contest the county's approval of the conditional rezone because safety and 
health effects of nuclear power are matters preempted by Federal law. Respondents still 
misperceive the Petitioners' position in respect to these harms. By pointing out the risks 
associated with nuclear power plants and the potential harm that may befall neighboring property 
owners if those risks are realized, the Petitioners do not suggest that the County should enter the 
field of regulating the safety of nuclear power plants. Rather, Petitioners simply intend to 
establish that they have the requisite standing to contest the County's land use decisions which 
are certainly within the County's purview. 
As pointed out above, to have standing in a land use case, the Petitioners need to allege 
that the development could potentially harm their real estate interests. Among the harms the 
nuclear power plant may visit upon the Petitioners includes both the potential of a nuclear 
accident and also the immediate impact on the value and marketability of their properties 
resulting from the threat of such an accident. Consideration of these effects are not preempted 
by Federal law. As pointed out by the United States Supreme Court in Pacific Gas and Electric 
Company v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190, 
103 S.Ct. 1713, (1983): 
"Congress has preserved the dual regulation of nuclear powered electricity 
generation: The Federal government maintains complete control of the safety and 
'nuclear' aspects of energy generation; the states exercise their traditional 
authority over the need for additional generating capacity, the type of generating 
facilities to be licensed, land use, rate making and the like." 
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461 U.S. at 211-212. 
Both of the cases cited by AEHI in support of its preemption argument6 recognize the 
dual role created by Congress providing for federal control over nuclear safety but reserving to 
states their traditional authority over matters such as land use. Moreover, the United States 
Supreme Court in Silkwood v. Kerr-AfcGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 104 S.Ct. 615, 78 L.Ed.2d. 443 
(1984) made it clear that while the federal government has exclusive control over safety 
standards applicable to nuclear plants, state law remedies for injuries caused by nuclear incidents 
were not preempted. 464 U.S. at 256, 104 S.Ct. at 625-626. The issue here is similar. Petitioners 
do not ask the County to enter the field of regulating the safety of nuclear power plants. 
Petitioners simply rely, in part, on the risk of injury to their persons and property from the 
routine operation of a nuclear power plant and/or a nuclear incident in order to make the showing 
of harm required by state law in order for them to contest the land use action taken by the 
County. The Petitioners are only seeking their state law remedies made available by judicial 
review. 
Certainly, this Court in being called upon to dete1mine whether the Petitioners have 
standing to contest the County's actions in approving a conditional rezone permitting the 
development of a nuclear power plant is not required to ignore the real and substantial haims that 
may result from that power plant and which the Court is required to determine do exist, simply 
because the Federal government has the ultimate say on safety issues. Said simply, there is no 
question but that the Petitioners are adversely affected by the approval of the conditional rezone 
which permits a nuclear power plant. Notwithstanding AEHI's protestations to the contrary, the 
Petitioners have standing to contest the County's land use decisions. 
6 Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission, 
461 U.S. 190, 103 S.Ct. 1713 (1983) and U.S. v. City o/New York, 463 F.Supp. 604 (SDNY 1978). 
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Conditional Rezone is 
Comprehensive Plan. 
Because it is Based Upon an 
The Petitioners have pointed out that under the holding in Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, 
Inc. v. City of Hailey, 133 Idaho 320, 986 P.2d 343 (1999) the County's conditional rezone of the 
subject property from Agricultural to Industrial was invalid because the County's 
Comprehensive Plan is invalid. The County's Comprehensive Plan is invalid because it does not 
include an analysis showing general plans for power plant sites, an element required to be 
included in every comprehensive plan by LC.§ 67-6508. This missing element from the 
County's Comprehensive Plan is clearly critical to the issue in this case since the very purpose 
for the conditional rezone granted by the County was to permit AEHI to construct a power plant. 
In response to this defect in the County's Comprehensive Plan, Respondents first argue 
that the Petitioners originally raised the issue of the invalidity of the County's Comprehensive 
Plan over two years ago during the County's hearings on AEHI's application to amend the 
County's Comprehensive Plan Map, an observation that is entirely correct. As pointed out in 
Petitioners' opening brief, Petitioners did, in fact, raise the issue of the invalidity of the County's 
Comprehensive Plan during the 2009-2010 public hearing process in which AEHI requested that 
the County's Comprehensive Plan Map be amended to reclassify the subject property from 
Agricultural to Industrial. In response to the Petitioners' warning, the County attempted to 
remedy the defect in its Comprehensive Plan by amending the text of the Plan to add language 
providing that energy producers who wish to locate energy production facilities in Payette 
County must apply to Payette County and each application will be considered on an ad hoc basis. 
R. p. 3883. 
Since there is no right to seek judicial review of an amendment to a county 
comprehensive plan (Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 181 P.3d 1238 
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(2008)), the issue was raised again by Petitioners during the public hearing process on AEHI's 
request for the conditional rezone which is the subject of this action.7 In that instance, the 
Petitioners advised the County that if approved, the conditional rezone would be invalid because, 
despite the County's 20 IO amendment to its Comprehensive Plan, the Comprehensive Plan was 
still invalid by reason of its continued failure to include an analysis showing general plans for 
power plant sites. R. p. 3674-3676. 
The fact that the Petitioners raised the issue with the County during the administrative 
process does not disqualify the Petitioners from raising the issue on appeal to this Court. Indeed, 
had the Petitioners failed to raise the issue before the County, Respondents would undoubtedly 
argue that the issue was waived and could not be raised in this action. The Petitioners diligence 
in warning the County of the defect in its Comprehensive Plan provides no basis to now excuse 
the County from performing its statutory duty. To the contrary, the County's continued refusal 
to perform that statutory duty in spite of the Petitioners repeated request that it do so, 
demonstrates and highlights the County's determination to approve AEHI's applications, no 
matter what the applicable law might otherwise require. 
Respondents next argue that the adoption of a comprehensive plan is a legislative act 
entitled to great deference. Respondents apparently hope that, by so labeling the County's 
action, the Court will not hold the County to the standard required by LC. § 67-6508. In support 
of that proposition, Respondents cite to Cooper v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada 
County, IOI Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980) and Gay v. County Commissioners of Bonneville 
County, 103 Idaho 626, 651 P.2d 560 (1982). Neither case, however, provides support for the 
7 The propriety of the County's amendment to its comprehensive plan is, however, the subject of a separate 
declaratory judgment action brought by some of the Petitioners, presently pending before this Court. 
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proposition that the Court should defer to a county's legislative action in adopting a 
comprehensive plan which fails to conform to the requirements of the applicable statute. 
Cooper was an appeal of the Board of Ada County Commissioners' denial of Cooper's 
and Edmunds' application for a rezone of certain prope1iy. The denial of the rezone was 
overturned due to the failure of the Board to afford Cooper and Edmunds the procedural due 
process to which they were entitled. Although the Court discussed the distinction between 
legislative actions, such as the adoption of comprehensive plans, which are subject to limited 
review by the courts, and quasi judicial actions, such as granting rezones, which are subject to 
greater review, nowhere in that case did the court suggest that counties are free to ignore the 
requirements of I.C. § 67-6508 in the adoption of their comprehensive plans. Similarly, Gay was 
an appeal of the action of the Bonneville County Commissioners permitting the construction of a 
fertilizer storage and blending facility in an agricultural zone. Relying on Cooper, the court 
concluded that approving a change of authorized land use is a quasi judicial action requiring the 
application of procedural due process protections and that the county had failed to provide such 
protections in granting that approval. Like the Cooper case, however, nowhere did the court 
suggest that counties are not required to conform to the requirements of LC. § 67-6508 in 
adopting their comprehensive plans. 
In any event, whatever deference the County may be entitled to in the adoption of its 
comprehensive plan does not extend to the County's failure to include in its plan a statutorily 
required element. The law in this state is clear: " ... a valid comprehensive plan must contain 
each of the components as specified in section 67-6508." Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, 133 
Idaho at 321. If it does not, the plan is invalid and any zoning ordinance adopted under it is 
invalid. Id. 
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Respondents next argue that since the County worked really hard, involved numerous 
people and incurred great expense in the adoption of its Comprehensive Plan in 2006, the County 
should be excused from failing to include in that Plan a required element Respondents provide 
no authority for such a proposition and Petitioners are aware of none. Notwithstanding the 
County's purported efforts, the adopted Comprehensive Plan is defective and fails to conform to 
the requirements of the statute. 
Next, Respondents argue that the County's Comprehensive Plan as originally written in 
2006 does, in fact, include an analysis showing general plans for power plant sites. In support, 
they point to language in the Comprehensive Plan which acknowledges that Idaho Power 
supplies electricity in Payette County and that electricity is generated by several hydroelectric 
facilities in the region (including a power plant not mentioned in the comprehensive plan), and 
ask the Court to conclude that such treatment of the topic is sufficient analysis of general plans 
for power plant sites. The comprehensive plan, they argue, is not a facility siting statute. 
The Petitioners have never called for the County to adopt a facility siting statute. The 
Petitioners do believe, however, that in order to comply with the applicable statute, some effort 
should be made to include provisions in the plan to guide the siting of power plants. The 
Petitioners do expect that the County should be required to fulfill its duty to "consider previous 
and existing conditions, trends, compatibility of land uses, desirable goals and objectives, or 
desirable future situations for each planning component" including "an analysis showing general 
plans for ... power plant sites ... ". LC. § 67-6508. The Petitioners also believe that compliance 
with the statute's requirement to generally plan for power plant sites is not achieved by providing 
in the County's comprehensive plan that applications for power plant sites be addressed on a 
case by case basis without any prior planning. In adopting that ad hoc approach to approving 
PETITIONERS' REPLY BRIEF, Page 14 
power plant sites, the County has, in fact, expressly refused to plan for such facilities in direct 
contravention of the requirements of this statute. There is simply no other reasonable way to 
describe the County's approach to the issue. As a result, under the holding of Sprenger, Grubb 
& Associates, the County's comprehensive plan is invalid and the conditional rezone of the 
subject property is likewise invalid. 
C. The Conditional Rezone Constitutes Spot Zoning. 
The Respondents' sole defense to Petitioner's spot zoning claims is that the rezone is not 
illegal spot zoning because it allegedly meets the type one spot zoning test. (Respondent's Brief 
at 19.) Respondents, completely ignoring the type two spot zoning test, argue that a court need 
not address type two spot zoning if a rezone meets the type one test. Their arguments, however, 
fail for t\vo reasons. First, the rezone is invalid under the type one test. Second, even if the 
rezone met the type one test, it does not meet the type two test, and contrary to their argument, a 
rezone can still be invalid as type two spot zoning even if it meets the type one test. 
Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that there are two forms of spot zoning, or 
ways in which a rezone is not in accord with the comprehensive plan. Evans v. Teton County, 
139 Idaho 71, 76, 73 P.3d 84, 89 (2003). As set forth in Petitioner's opening brief, according to 
Evans, type one spot zoning is a rezoning of property for a use prohibited by the original zoning 
classification. Id at 77, 73 P.3d 90. If the zone change is in accord with the comprehensive 
plan, it is not invalid as type one spot zoning. Id That said, it may still be prohibited as type 
two spot zoning if the zoning change "singles out a parcel of land for use inconsistent with the 
permitted use in the rest of the zoning district for the benefit of an individual property 
owner." Id 
Contrary to Respondents' erroneous assertion, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in 
Taylor v. Canyon County Ed of Comm 'rs, supra did not change this analysis; it did not make 
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"type two" spot zoning a nullity. In fact, the Taylor decision confirmed the analysis originally 
set forth in Evans. Id at 436-37, 210 P.3d at 544-45. The Taylor court, quoting the Evans 
decision, reaffirmed that there are two types of spot zoning and that "'the test for whether type 
one spot zoning is valid is whether the zone change is in accord with the comprehensive plan"' 
and that a zoning change may still be prohibited as type two spot zoning if the change "singles 
out a parcel of land for use inconsistent with the permitted use in the rest of the zoning district 
for the benefit of an individual property owner." Id. at 436,210 P.3d at 544 (quoting Evans, 139 
Idaho at 77, 73 P.3d at 90). 
In Taylor, contrary to Respondents' asse1iion, the Supreme Court did not hold that courts 
need not consider whether type two spot zoning occurred if the spot zone meets the type one spot 
zone test. Instead, the Supreme Court held that the only spot zoning at issue in the case was type 
one spot zoning and that the type one spot zoning that occurred was valid because it was in 
conformance with the comprehensive plan. Id. at 437, 210 P.3d at 545. Specifically the Court 
stated that "the Vicker's claim of spot zoning need not be addressed since the type one spot 
zoning that occurred in this case is valid." Id. The Court agreed with Canyon County that "only 
type one spot zoning occurred in [the] case." Id. at 436, 210 P.3d at 544. Thus, the Taylor 
decision is distinguishable on the facts because the Court in Taylor did not hold that type two 
spot zoning should not be considered if the spot zone meets the type one test, but instead found 
that the only possible type of spot zoning that occurred was type one spot zoning. Reading the 
Taylor decision otherwise would be contrary to the facts of the case. Furthermore, such a 
reading would make type two spot zoning a nullity because, under such a reading, if the zone 
meets the type one test it is valid and if does not meet the type one test, there is no need to 
determine the spot zone's validity under type two spot zoning because it is invalid under type 
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one. The Idaho Supreme Court, however, has not evinced any intention to make type two spot 
zoning a nullity. 
Rezone Fails as Illegal Type One Spot Zoning. 
Respondents argue that the rezone does not constitute spot zoning because it is in accord 
with the Payette County Comprehensive Plan. Their argument fails for several reasons. As 
described in Petitioners' opening brief and in Part II.B of this brief, the manner in which the 
Comprehensive Plan was amended to authorize the project in and of itself violates the spirit of 
the rules against spot zoning. Indeed, it could be said that the comprehensive plan was "spot" 
amended because it was amended at the request of AEHI specifically to allow for a rezone to 
take place for a use that was inconsistent with the permitted uses in the rest of the zoning district 
for the benefit of an individual property owner. 
Also as set forth in Petitioners' opening brief and in Part II.B of this brief, the manner in 
which the Comprehensive Plan was amended to allow for this inconsistent use was in 
contravention of the Local Land Use Planning Act. LC. § 67-6508. In fact, the invalid 
amendment to the Comprehensive Plan, in application, mandates that sites for power plants be 
"spot zoned." That amendment provides that "[ e ]nergy producers who wish to locate electric, 
gas or other energy production facilities in Payette County must apply to the Payette County 
Planning and Zoning Department and each application will be considered on an individual basis 
in accordance in accordance (sic) with the Local Land Use Planning Act (LC.§ 67-6500 et seq.), 
Payette County Code and this plan." R. p. 3883. Thus, under the improper amendment, there is 
no power plant provision that the rezone can be in accord with. Consequently, the rezone is 
invalid as type one spot zoning. The Respondents' interpretation that the amendment authorizes 
the rezone must be rejected because it conflicts with the plain language of the amendment and 
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because under such interpretation, the County would have free reign to engage in type one spot 
zoning for power plants because under the amendment, power plants can be located anywhere. 
There would be no zone that is off limits. Under such interpretation, all a power plant developer 
has to do is request a rezone and that rezone will conform to this improper amendment of the 
Comprehensive Plan. 
Moreover, it is clear that this amendment was requested by AEHI to specifically 
authorize its plan to engage in illegal spot zoning. Respondents, however, should not be 
permitted to circumvent the prohibitions on spot zoning, by amending the comprehensive plan to 
allow spot zoning to occur. Accordingly, the Court should find that the spot zoning performed 
pursuant to the invalid Comprehensive Plan is improper. 
2. The Rezone Fails as Illegal Type Two Spot Zoning. 
As set forth above, even if the spot zoning that occurred in this case meets the test for 
validity under type one spot zoning, it must still be scrutinized as to whether it constitutes illegal 
type two spot zoning. In that regard, the spot zoning that occurred in this case is quintessential 
type two spot zoning. There was no evidence presented that the surrounding area had changed 
from agricultural to heavy industrial. To the contrary, the Payette County Commission found 
that "the surrounding uses include agriculture, confined animal feeding operations, a county 
landfill and residential." R. p. 4156. In sum, the rezone impermissibly singled out a parcel of 
land in the midst of a wide swath of agricultural land and changed the classification from 
agricultural to "I-2 (Heavy Industrial)" solely for the economic benefit of the developer and 
owner. By so doing, the County permitted "a use of that parcel inconsistent with the use 
permitted in the rest of the district... merely for private gain." Dawson Ente1prises, Inc. v. Blaine 
County, 98 Idaho 506, 515, 567 P.2d 1257, 1266 (1977); see also Balser v. Kootenai County Bd. 
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of Com'rs, 110 Idaho 37, 714 P.2d 6 (1986) (landowner not entitled to change existing zone 
classification from agricultural to industrial where, among other things, the requested zone 
change was of an isolated parcel in the midst of other agricultural parcels). As such, the rezone 
is invalid as it is classic "type two" spot zoning. 
D. The Conditional Rezone Violates the Provisions of Payette County 
Code§ 8-10-9. 
Petitioners have pointed out that the conditional rezone approved by the Board violates 
Payette County Code § 8-10-9 in that the approved use for the rezoned property violates the 
prohibition against any use "in any manner creating dangerous, injurious, noxious or otherwise 
objectionable conditions which would adversely affect the surrounding areas or adjoining 
premises," specifically, the emission of "harmful radioactivity at any point." In support of their 
claim, the Petitioners point to the unrebutted testimony submitted by Dr. Arjun Makhijani 
demonstrating that the construction and operation of AEHI's proposed nuclear power plant will 
routinely and unavoidably emit harmful radioactivity which could adversely affect the 
surrounding areas or adjoining premises. 
Respondents counter by saying that Dr. Makhijani's testimony is not unrebutted and 
point to other evidence in the record they say contradicts his testimony. While the record does 
contain testimony from a few individuals generally testifying to the safety of nuclear power 
plants, and while the Nuclear Regulatory Commission publication mentioned on page 21 of their 
brief does address the routine emissions of tritium from nuclear power plants, none of the 
testimony, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission publication, directly rebuts 
Dr. Makhijani's testimony. In fact, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission publication actualiy 
supports Dr. Makhijani's testimony wherein it admits that nuclear power plants do routinely 
release tritiated water and that any exposure to tritium poses a health risk. Thus, violation of 
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Payette County Code§ 8-10-9, even taking the evidence proffered by AEHI into account, 1s 
certain to occur. 
Respondents nevertheless go on to argue that in any event, the Board was entitled to 
make its own factual findings based on the "conflicting testimony" and that this Court is bound 
to accept those findings unless clearly erroneous. The problem with that argument is that, as 
pointed out in Petitioner's opening brief, the Board made absolutely no findings with respect to 
Payette County Code§ 8-10-9. No mention is made of the evidence presented by either the 
Petitioners or AEHI on that point, no attempt was made to weigh the evidence and no analysis or 
mention is made of Payette County Code§ 8-10-9. The Board simply ignored both the evidence 
presented and the provisions of Payette County Code§ 8-10-9. Thus, there are no findings made 
by the Board to which this Court could defer even if the Court felt compelled to do so. 
A governing body is bound to follow the provisions of its ordinance. Noble v. Kootenai 
County, 148 Idaho 937, 231 P.3d 1034 (2010); Taylor v. Board of County Commissioners, 
124 Idaho 392, 860 P.2d 8 (Ct. App. 1993). The Board completely ignored the provisions of its 
ordinance requiring consideration of whether the conditional rezone would result in dangerous, 
injurious, noxious or otherwise objectionable conditions such as, but not limited to the emission 
of harmful radioactivity. And, the Board entirely failed to consider the unrebutted evidence of 
such dangerous and injurious conditions submitted by Petitioners which, coupled with the failure 
of the Board to apply this evidence to the requirements of the County's own ordinance, was 
arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of the Board's discretion. As pointed out in Petitioners' 
opening brief and below, a decision making body must articulate in writing the facts found, the 
conclusions reached, and the rationale underlying those findings and conclusions. Jasso v. 
Camas County, 151 Idaho 790, 264 P.3d 897 (2011). In this instance, the Board has not only 
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failed in its obligation to find facts, but also failed in its obligation to reach legal conclusions and 
explain the rationale underlying those factual findings and legal conclusions, leaving this Court 
to guess what the Board might have found and concluded. 
Similarly, the issue of federal preemption now raised by Respondents was unaddressed. 
Respondents argue that nuclear safety questions are preempted by federal law and that a decision 
to withhold a permit based on nuclear safety concerns would have been illegal. However, 
federal preemption was never raised before the Board, nor did the Board ever mention federal 
preemption as a basis for its decision. So far as the Petitioners have been able to determine, the 
record is silent on the topic. It is a well-established rule in Idaho that review on appeal is limited 
to those issues raised before the lower tribunal and that an appellate court will not decide issues 
raised for the first time on appeal. Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 
Idaho 121, 176 P.3d 126 (2002); Balser v. Kootenai County, 110 Idaho 37, 714 P.2d 6 (1986). 
Here, in their submittal to the Board (R. p. 3683-85) the Petitioners specifically argued for the 
application of Payette County Code § 8-10-9 to AEHI' s application for the conditional rezone. 
However, AEHI did not argue federal preemption as a reason for the County not to apply the 
provisions of that section. As a result, AEHI has waived the right to raise the issue now. 
Accordingly, the Board's decision approving the conditional rezone should be vacated for the 
reason that the approved use violates Payette County Code § 8-10-9. 
E. The 20 Year Development Agreement Exceeds the Statutory Authority of the 
County. 
Respondents argue that there is no statutory limit on the content of a development 
agreement. (Respondent's Brief at 23.) Their argument, however, has it backwards. Counties 
only have the ability to act as authorized by the Idaho legislature. I.C. § 31-60 I. Accordingly, 
development agreements are confined by the terms of the authorizing statute. In this instance, 
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the authorizing statute, LC. § 67-6511A, provides that a county may "require or pe1mit as a 
condition of rezoning that an owner or developer make a wTitten commitment concerning the use 
or development of the subject parcel." (Emphasis added.) The statute, however, does not 
authorize a county to make any commitments to the owner or developer other than to rezone the 
prope1iy. Nor does it authorize a county to freeze land use regulations and thereby bind future 
boards of commissioners. 
Respondents ignore the authorizing language of LC. § 67-651 lA and instead claim that 
the County is authorized by Payette County Code § 8-5-11 to make binding commitments in a 
development agreement. That ordinance, however, does not contain any language making such 
an authorization nor could it because an ordinance cannot authorize a County to act in excess of 
its legislative grant of authority. Johnson v. Blaine County, supra. In fact, Respondents have not 
cited to any authority empowering a County to make commitments to the owner or developer in 
a Development Agreement. 
Furthermore, Respondents do not dispute that the County cannot bind future boards of the 
Payette County Commission. Instead, they argue that the Development Agreement is nothing 
more than a recognition of the rezone. As set forth below, the Development Agreement, 
however, is much more than a recognition of the rezone. It contains numerous ultra vires 
commitments by the County concerning its land-use functions which extend beyond the term of 
the current board of commissioners. As such, the Development Agreement is illegal. See, Idaho 
Falls v. Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 97, 117 P.2d 461, 463-64 (1941); Inverness Mobile Home 
Community, Ltd v. Bedford Tp., 687 N.W.2d 869, 874 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). 
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Petitioners 
Agreement 
Not Mischaracterize Contents of the Development 
Contrary to Respondents' assertions, Petitioners have not mischaracterized the terms of 
the Development Agreement. The express language of that agreement makes clear that the 
agreement is ultra vires. Indeed, although the County may be authorized to enter into certain 
agreements, the legislature has not empowered the County to enter into a Development 
Agreement that exceeds the County's grant of authority contained in LC. § 67-651 lA. Allied 
Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County of Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405,413,258 P.3d 340,348 (2011). (Holding 
that county commissioners are not empowered "to perform acts ultra vires, or beyond the scope 
of their statutorily-authorized duties" and that "a board of county commissioners may not expand 
its statutory authority" by contract.) That, however, is exactly what the County did in this case. 
2. Examples of Illegal Terms in the Development Agreement 
Recital J requires the County to "continue to take steps necessary to rezone the 
Property." R. p. 4104. The plain language of this provision is that the County, due to the 
Development Agreement, is committed to rezone the property even if a rezone is improper. 
Such a commitment is beyond the County's statutory authority. Accordingly, if this Court were 
to remand this matter and ask the County to rescind the rezone, the County would be in breach of 
the Development Agreement. Such an outcome was not intended by the legislation authorizing 
development agreements, which specifically limits the commitments in such agreements to 
commitments by developers and owners. 
Section 2.1 binds the County to the rules and regulations in place on the date of the 
Development Agreement with respect to the "Project," including requiring that the County not 
change any of those rules or regulations without the consent of AEHI. (R. p. 4105.) Citing to the 
cases Chisholm v. Twin Falls County, 139 Idaho 131, 75 P.3d 185 (2003) and Payette River 
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Property Owners Ass'n v. Board of Com'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 976 P.2d 477 
(1999), Respondents assert that Section 2 does not improperly bind the County because AEHI's 
right would always be governed by the law in effect at the time of the application. These cases 
are readily distinguishable. 
In Chisholm, a neighboring land ovmer sought review of the issuance of a permit for a 
dairy. The neighbor argued that the County failed to comply with notice provisions required by 
a section of the Idaho Code that was enacted after the permit was approved. Noting that the 
"applicant's right are dete1mined by the ordinance in existence at the time of filing an application 
for the permit," the Court declined to apply the statute retroactively and instead examined 
whether the correct procedures had been undertaken under the statutes in operation at the time. 
Chisholm, 139 Idaho at 134-35; 75 P.3d at 188-89. Similarly, in Payette River Property Owners 
Ass'n v. Board of Com'rs of Valley County, supra, an organization filed an application for a 
conditional use permit in a flood zone. After the application was denied, the organization argued 
that a Land Use Ordinance, which was enacted after the application was filed but before the 
conditional use permit was decided, should have been the governing standard. On appeal, the 
Supreme Court disagreed. 
Both of these cases stand for the unremarkable position that the law and procedures 
concerning the granting or denying of a permit are governed by the law in effect at the time. 
However, this is not what the Development Agreement memorializes. The Development 
Agreement notes that the applicable rules governing the future development of the Property are 
those in force at the time of the application, unless mutually amended by amendment to the 
Agreement." R. p. 4105, Sections 2.l(a) and (b) (emphasis added). That is, in contravention of 
the law, the Development Agreement purports to limit the County's ability to adopt future land 
PETITIONERS' REPLY BRIEF, Page 24 
use ordinances and policies, safety codes, and rezoning which might otherwise apply to the 
future development of the Property and purports to give AEHI and the County the authority to 
decide the applicable law. This is not the mere memorialization of the principal that the law at 
the time of the application is the controlling law, but rather contains concessions that exceed the 
authority of LC. § 67-651 lA and Payette County Code § 8-5-11 and contains commitments by 
the County concerning the development of the parcel, not merely commitments by the developer. 
Under the law, AEHI is entitled to have its conditional rezone application determined under the 
County's ordinances as they existed on July 13, 2010, when AEHI submitted that application. 
AEHI is not entitled to have every future application it may be required to make for its nuclear 
power plant project determined under the County's ordinances in effect on July 13, 2010. 
Rather, under the law, any future applications AEHI is required to submit must be determined 
under the County's ordinances in effect when those applications are filed. The development 
agreement imperrnissibly attempts to modify that legal principle. If Section 2.1 is actually 
intended to simply state this legal principle, as AEHI and the County now maintain, it would not 
require seven paragraphs to do so. Clearly, the purpose of Section 2.1, in its entirety, is to 
handcuff future boards of county commissioners and prevent them from enacting any changes to 
the County's ordinances which might otherwise be applied to AEHI's power plant project 
except, for example, ones that do not change any rules applicable to AEHI's project or ones that 
AEHI agrees to. 
Section 2.l(b), contrary to Respondents' arguments, does in fact limit the County's 
freedom to act with respect to future "approval requests." (R. p. 4105.) It delineates the future 
actions that the County may take thereby excluding all others. Id. It then states that the County 
cannot enact future rules or regulations without first providing "AEHI with an opportunity to 
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suggest methods of enacting and implementing such provisions to the Property and Project." 
This commitment by the County is ultra vires because it is in excess of the County's authority 
with respect to Development Agreement and because it binds future Boards to provide AEHI 
with such opportunities. 
Section 2.3 is ultra vires because in that section the County commits to "cooperate in 
good faith to agree upon and use reasonable efforts to process amendments to this Agreement." 
R. p. 4107 This commitment is also ultra vires because it is binding on future boards for the 
duration of the Development Agreement. Furthermore, the section limits the County's future 
action in matters beyond the rezone. It provides: 
No moratorium, future ordinance, resolution or other land use rule or regulation 
imposing a limitation on the development or the rate, timing or sequencing of the 
development, of the Property or any portion thereof shall apply to or govern the 
development of the Property whether affecting land use permits, subdivisions 
plat(s), building permits, occupancy permits or other entitlements to use issued or 
granted by County, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement. 
Id Thus, the section is ultra vires because it contains commitments from the County limiting the 
County's right to act. 
Sections 2.5 and 2.6, which provide that while AEHI has a vested right to develop the 
property, it has no obligation to do so, are not analogous to a land-use approval. (R. p. 4107.) 
While it is true that a land-use approval does not require an owner to develop the at-issue 
property, here, unlike a mere land-use approval, the County is bound by several commitments in 
the Development Agreement while AEHI has no obligation to develop the property. These 
commitments are what make the Develpoment Agreement unlawful. 
Section 2.7 of the Deveiopment Agreement provides that the "County, as necessary to 
implement the installation of Public Infrastructure, shall cooperate reasonably with AEHI." (R. 
p. 4107.) Despite Respondents' protestations to the contrary, the plain language of this section 
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contains a commitment by the County to assist AEHI. Such a commitment, as set forth above, is 
beyond the statutory authority granted to the County with respect to development agreements. 
The commitment is also ultra vires because it extends beyond the cunent commission to future 
commissions for the duration of the Development Agreement. Id The fact that the Section also 
provides that "the level of cooperation that is reasonable under the circumstances" shall be 
determined "by the then-sitting Board" does not alleviate the problem; future Boards still have to 
reasonably cooperate. Future Boards do not have the discretion to decide not to cooperate. 
Ferguson v. City of Orofino, 131 Idaho 190, 953 P.2d 630 (Ct. App., 1998) (When one party to 
a contract retains power or sole discretion in an express contract, it must exercise that discretion 
in good faith.) Thus, the contract unlawfully restricts the ability of future boards to exercise their 
police powers. 
Section 3.2 is ultra vires because it requires the County to cooperate with AEHI in the 
defense of a lawsuit challenging the Agreement and provides that if separate counsel is retained 
for each party, costs "shall be shared equally by the parties." (R. 4108.) These are firm 
commitments by the County to AEHI in the Development Agreement. Frnihermore, these 
commitments are binding on future Boards. Consequently, this section is improper and it makes 
no difference that Respondents, in contravention of the Development Agreement, allegedly have 
not shared costs. 
Section 3.5 provides for costs and attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in the event of 
litigation over a default. (R. p. 4109.) The fact that this provision applies to both the County and 
AEHI does not change the fact that it is ultra vires in that it contains a commitment from the 
County to AEHI to pay AEHI' s attorneys' fees in the event AEHI successfully sues the County 
for a default-a commitment not authorized by LC.§ 67-651 lA. 
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Finally, AEHI and the County point to Section 6.14 of the Development Agreement 
(R. p. 4113) and argue that the severability provision contained therein resolves the problems 
with the illegality of the Development Agreement. (R. p. 4112.) AEHI and the County fail to 
mention Section 6.8 of the Development Agreement (R. p. 4113) which, while also containing a 
severability provision, goes on to require the County to renegotiate any such illegal provisions, 
which, like so many other provisions of the Development Agreement, impermissibly seeks to 
bind future boards. 
Therefore, because the agreement binds the County, and does so for 20 years or more, it 
is void as a matter of law. 
F. The 20 Year Development Agreement and Rezone were not Properly 
Adopted. 
Petitioners have also pointed out that the Development Agreement was not properly 
adopted by ordinance as required by LC.§ 67-651 IA, the first sentence of which clearly requires 
the approval of a development agreement by adoption of an ordinance: 
"Each governing board may, by ordinance adopted or amended in accordance 
with the notice and hearing provisions provided under section 67-6509, Idaho 
Code, require or permit as a condition of rezoning that an owner or developer 
make a written commitment concerning the use or development of the subject 
parcel." 
In addition to the statute, the Development Agreement itself provides that its term commences 
upon the adoption of the "Development Agreement Ordinance" which is defined as the "county 
ordinance that duly adopts this Agreement". R. p. 4101. And, although the rezone was 
conditioned on adoption of a development agreement, there is no evidence in the record that the 
Development Agreement was actually adopted by any official action of the Board. Respondents 
respond by pointing to the second sentence of LC.§ 67-6511A which authorizes governing 
boards to adopt ordinances providing for the creation, form, recording, modification, 
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enforcement and termination of development agreements and Payette County Code§ 8-5-11 
which provides that a development agreement shall take effect upon the adoption of the 
amendment to the zoning ordinance. 
The solution to this supposed dilemma is found in the application of a few general rules. 
The first, as set out in Ciszek v. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, supra, is that the 
Board, in approving a rezone, is obligated to comply with the provisions of the Local Land Use 
Planning Act and in this case, specifically, LC. § 67-651 IA. The second is that statutory 
construction begins with the literal language of the statute. Cowan v. Board of Commissioners of 
Fremont County, supra. And the third is that statutes are to be construed so that effect is given 
to all their provisions, and no part is to be rendered superfluous or insignificant. Friends of 
Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 197, 46 P.3d 9 (2002). 
Applying those general rules to the matter at hand requires that the Court first look to the 
language of LC.§ 67-651 lA, interpreted so as to give effect, in this instance, to both the first and 
second sentences, and then apply that interpretation to the County's adoption of the Development 
Agreement. The first sentence authorizes a governing board to approve a development 
agreement as a condition of a rezone and requires that a development agreement be adopted by 
ordinance. The second sentence authorizes a governing board to adopt ordinance provisions 
regarding certain details of development agreements such as the form and content. However, the 
second sentence does not subsume the first. Rather, the first sentence addresses a different 
topic-the manner in which development agreements must be adopted. The second sentence is 
similar to the provisions of LC. § 67-6512 (regarding conditional use permits), LC. § 67-6513 
(regarding subdivisions) and LC. § 67-6516 (regarding variances) which permit governing 
boards to adopt, as a part of their zoning ordinances, specific provisions for the processing of 
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applications for certain permits. In each instance, the legislature granted authority to the 
governing boards, within the boundaries set by the statute, to adopt their own provisions for 
issuing such permits. However, the governing boards must still act within the confines of those 
statutes regarding such matters as notice, hearings and other limitations imposed by the 
legislature. 
In this instance, giving effect to both the first and second sentences of the statute, the 
Board is authorized to adopt an ordinance detailing certain aspects of the content and handling of 
development agreements, yet the Board is required to adopt development agreements by 
ordinance. To the extent the County's ordinance contemplates adoption of a development 
agreement other than by ordinance, it conflicts with this statute and is void. In this case, the 
County failed to adopt the Development Agreement in the manner required by the applicable 
statute and therefore both the Development Agreement and the rezone on which it is based are 
void. 
G. Payette County's Hearing Notice and Hearing Proceedings Violated the 
Requirements of the Local Land Use Planning Act, Payette County's 
Ordinance and Principles of Procedural Due Process. 
Petitioners have argued that the administrative proceedings conducted by the County 
were fundamentally unfair to the Petitioners, were violative of the notice requirements of 
LC.§ 67-6509 and LC.§ 67-6511, were violative of Payette County's hearing procedures as 
codified at Payette County Code§ l-7-2A, and otherwise deprived the Petitioners of their due 
process rights. Among the defects in the proceedings conducted by the County, as detailed in the 
Petitioners' opening brief, are the failure of the County's published and mailed hearing notices to 
include a summary of AEHI's conditional rezone application (one that seeks approval for a 
nuclear power plant) and a description of the affected land sufficient for identification, the 
improper shortening of time for interested persons to submit ,vritten testimony and evidence in 
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opposition to AEHI' s conditional rezone application, withholding AEHI' s proposed development 
agreement from the public, preventing effective review and comment on it, until just prior to the 
public hearings, and favoring AEHI by permitting it essentially unlimited time to make oral 
presentations to the Board while imposing strict time limits on the public. 
Respondents argue that the Court should excuse these defects because the County 
otherwise satisfied the legal requirements to provide notice of AEHI' s conditional rezone 
application and that (i) AEHI's conditional rezone application had been filed with the County 
and was available to the public for several months before the hearings were held, (ii) the County 
posted AEHI' s application on its website, (iii) the public could purchase copies of AEHI' s 
application, (iv) the Petitioners could have participated in the technical review committee 
meetings held by the County, (v) AEHI spoke to a number of business and community 
organizations in the months leading up to the filing of its application, (vi) because some of the 
Petitioners were involved in prior proceedings on a different application (an amendment of the 
County's Comprehensive Plan), they should somehow have been aware of the filing, content and 
details of AEHI's conditional rezone application, and (vii) the County could "interpret" its 
ordinance requirements to not require a summary of AEHI's application when it failed to include 
one in its published notices. 
If any of what Respondents now rely upon to show that the public had notice of 
AEHI' s conditional rezone application actually met the requirements of the statute, they might 
have an argument. The fact, however, is that those activities do not meet the requirements of the 
statute and cannot be used as substitutes for statutory notices8• Instead, the statute requires that 
8 The activities Respondents seek to have substituted for the statutory notice are in any event poor substitutes: (i) 
the filing of an application with the County gives notice to nobody except the County, (ii) only AEHI and certain 
state and local agencies are invited to the technical review committee meetings, (iii) posting the application on the 
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notice, containing a summary of the proposal, be published in a local newspaper and mailed to 
property owners within 300 feet of the external boundaries of the land being considered. The 
notice published and mailed by the County did not contain such a summary. The list of AEHI's 
applications included in the notice are not sufficient. As our Supreme Court has stated, "It is a 
well settled principle that notice and hearing requirements in zoning enabling acts are conditions 
precedent to the proper exercise of the zoning authority." Citizens for Better Government v. 
Valley County, 95 Idaho 320,322,508 P.2d 550, 552 (1973). If a zoning action does not comply 
with the statutory notice requirements, it is invalid. "When the statute requires notice and 
hearing as to the possible effect of zoning law upon property rights ... the statutory notice and 
hearing then becomes necessary in order to satisfy the requirements of due process and may not 
be dispensed with." Jerome County v. Holloway, 118 Idaho 681,684, 799 P.2d 969, 972 (1990). 
By failing to provide the required notice, the County has deprived the Petitioners and others 
similarly situated of their due process rights to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard 
on AEHI' s request. 
Respondents also seek to avoid the statutory notice requirements by pointing to Evans v. 
Board of Commissioners of Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428, 50 P.3d 443 (2002) for the 
proposition that the public only need be given notice of the type of issues and evidence that are 
likely to arise at a hearing and the types of evidence they may wish to present to rebut an 
applicant's claims. Their reliance on Evans is misplaced. First, the court in Evans was not asked 
County's website only gives notice to those who might happen to look at the website and chance upon the 
application, (iv) the right to purchase a copy of AEHI's conditional rezone application really only helps those who 
happen to know that the application exists, (v) speaking to business and community organizations does not make for 
notice to the neighboring property owners, such as the Petitioners, (vi) Petitioners involvement in a different prior 
application does not provide notice about the filing, content and details of another later application, and (vii) the 
County never "interpreted" the notice requirements to provide something other than that which is required by 
statute, since the Board entirely ignored the Petitioners' arguments regarding defects in the County's hearing 
notices, making absolutely no mention of them in their written decision. R. p. 4137-4160. 
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to address the sufficiency of the notice required to be published and mailed to neighboring 
property owners by I.C. § 67-6509 and I.C. § 67-6511. Rather, the Court was asked to address 
the sufficiency of the application filed by the applicant in that case-an entirely different matter. 
Second, the materials objected to by the appellants in the Evans case at least advised the public 
that the applicant proposed a gravel pit on its property. Here, the notice published and mailed to 
the County entirely omitted the fact that AEHI proposed a nuclear power plant for the subject 
property, a fact that most anyone would consider important enough to merit mention. 
As for the conduct of its hearing, Respondents ask the Court to read into the hearing 
procedures established by the County's Code (Title 1, Chapter 7, Payette County Code) a right in 
favor of the County "to limit written testimony and control the manner in which such testimony 
may be submitted", where no such right actually exists. The County's rules of procedure are 
simple: A party may present oral testimony and submit exhibits. There is no time restriction on 
submission of exhibits and no provision permitting the County (or the hearing officer) to 
arbitrarily establish one. That the County departed from its established procedures is not 
contradicted. The effect of having done so was to illegally and unreasonably limit the 
participation of interested parties in general and the Petitioners in particular. 
To make matter worse for the Petitioners, the County withheld AEHI's proposed 
development agreement from the public until just a few days before the December 2, 2010, 
Planning and Zoning Commission hearing and then repeated the maneuver with the revised 
version of the development agreement, releasing it just a few days before the June 6, 2011, 
Board of County Commissioner's hearing. Again, Respondents ask the Court to excuse the 
County from the requirement announced in Johnson v. City of Homedale, 118 Idaho 285, 796 
P.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1990), that all materials required to be submitted with an application be made 
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available to the public in advance of its hearings, by pointing out that drafts of those documents 
were available to the public in advance of the hearings. As pointed out in Petitioners' opening 
brief, the development agreement is a critical element of AEHI' s application. The development 
agreement is intended to, among other matters, set forth the conditions upon which a rezone 
might be granted and the approved nuclear power plant developed. Once the prope1iy is rezoned 
and a development agreement adopted, AEHI, or anyone else who might acquire the subject 
Property, will claim to have the right to construct a nuclear power plant without further action, 
approval or control by the County, except to the extent that right is limited or conditioned by the 
development agreement. Thus, if the rezone is upheld, the development agreement becomes the 
single most important element of the County's decision. 
The "draft" development agreement which Respondents say the Petitioners could review 
was, at the request of the Planning and Zoning Commission, being reviewed and revised by the 
County and its attorneys between the date of the Planning and Zoning Commission 
recommendation of approval and the date of the Board's public hearing. R. p. 4029. There is no 
way for the public in general, or the Petitioners in particular, to know what changes were made 
( and what changes were not) until the final revised form of the development agreement was 
released for public review and comment. It could be that the development agreement remained 
largely unchanged or it could have been dramatically changed. It could have been made better 
from the Petitioners perspective or it could have been made worse. There was simply no way to 
know until the proposed development agreement was actually published. By the time it was 
published, the public in general and the Petitioners in particular were afforded little time to 
review, analyze and respond to the content of the development agreement. This is what 
Petitioners object to. As the court in Johnson v. City of Homedale, supra, pointed out, 
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petitioners were "left with a dearth of information on whether-and in what regard-to object to 
the proposal." 119 Idaho at 287. 
Finally, Respondents ask the Court to excuse the patently obvious favoritism accorded 
AEHI in making its oral presentation to the Board by arguing that the County's rules of 
procedure provide that the hearing officer may set a time limit on oral presentations. While the 
County's procedural rules do grant the hearing officer that power, neither the ordinance, nor any 
principles of law cited by Respondents, permit the hearing officer or the Board of County 
Commissioners to discriminate in the application of those time limits. While the public was 
limited to five minutes or oral testimony, AEHI was permitted 15 minutes at the December 2, 
2010, hearing (Tr. p. 7) then unlimited time at the December 9, 2010, hearing to rebut. Tr. p. 
263-324. Similarly, the public was limited to five minutes for oral testimony at the Board of 
County Commissioners June 6, 2011, hearing while AEHI was permitted essentially unlimited 
time to make its presentation, including the right to make a second presentation after public 
comment was closed. June 6, 2011, Tr. p. 111-131. Clearly AEHI received favored treatment-
and it showed in the County's decisions. 
All of the above described barriers to a meaningful opportunity for the Petitioners to 
participate in the P&Z Commission's December 2010 hearing and the Board's June 2011 
hearing, the defective notices, the limitation of ,vritten submittals, the uneven application of time 
limitations imposed on oral testimony, the special treatment afforded AEHI in making two 
presentations to the Board, and the missing and delayed development agreement all violated 
Petitioners' due process rights and warrant a reversal of the decision approving the rezone and 
development agreement. 
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Board's Written Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law are 
Petitioners have demonstrated in their opening brief that the Board's written Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law failed to satisfy the requirements of LC.§ 67-6535 and have 
thereby prejudiced Petitioners substantial right to due process. The Board's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Petitioners point out, consist of conclusory statements that are unsupported 
by any reasoned explanation of the grounds upon which they rely. The vast majority of the 
Board's Findings of Fact are nothing more than paraphrased summaries of the testimony given 
during the June 6, 2011, public hearing. There is no mention of the written evidence submitted 
by interested parties, including Petitioners. The Board makes no effort to state the relevant 
contested facts, resolve any disputed facts, or articulate the rationale for rejecting factual 
information presented by those opposing AEHI' s proposal. In short, the Board simply ignored 
the testimony and evidence submitted by anyone other than AEHI, failed to explicitly respond to 
the applicable factual and legal questions before it and failed to provide an explanation as to how 
the conditional rezone application complied with the requirements of the Payette County Code. 
AEHI and the County respond by saying the Board's findings satisfy the requirement of 
Idaho and that there is no specific algorithm for findings and conclusions. Petitioners 
acknowledge that no specific algorithm is required in the preparation of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. A governing board is, however, obligated to do more than paraphrase the 
testimony given at the public hearings and conclude that an applicant's proposal conforms to the 
requirements of its ordinance. The requirement for written findings and conclusions is not 
overly complex. A governing board is simply required to state the relevant contested facts, state 
how those contested facts were resolved, identify the evidence supporting the factual 
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determinations, and explain the basis for legal conclusions. LC. § 67-6535; Jasso v. Camas 
County, supra, at 794. 
In this case, the Board should, at a minimum, be required to actually address, rather than 
totally ignore or summarily dismiss, the evidence submitted by Petitioners regarding, for 
example, the compatibility of AEHI's proposal with surrounding uses, the actual, practical 
availability of utilities, including water, the opinions of suffounding landowners, and other 
factors relevant to the suitability of rezoning the property, all as required by Payette County 
Code § 8-11-7 A. The Board might also be required to actually do some fact finding rather than 
skipping that step and proceeding directly to conclusion making. If the 17 ½ pages of 
paraphrased testimony contained in the Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is 
eliminated, all that is left is the Board's conclusions. As a result of the approach taken by the 
Board, the Comi is left to guess what facts the Board may have found and how those facts 
support the Board's conclusions. The Board might also be expected to address the provisions of 
Payette County Code § 8-10-9 discussed above, a criteria entirely unaddressed by the Board. 
The Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law simply do not serve the important 
function of such documents, including the facilitation of judicial review. For those reasons, the 
Court should reject the Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as inadequate and 
overturn the Board's approval of the conditional rezone. 
I. Petitioners Substantial Rights Have Been Prejudiced. 
AEHI contends that the Petitioners have not demonstrated that their substantial rights 
have been prejudiced as a result of the County's approval of the conditional rezone, as required 
by LC.§ 67-6535(4). In support, AEHI cites to Krempasky v. Nez Perce County Planning and 
Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 245 P .3d 983 (2010), where the court held Krempasky' s conclusory 
allegations of harm insufficient. This case is not like Krempasky. Here, the Petitioners have 
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demonstrated that the approved power plant does, in fact, pose a risk of harm to the Petitioners 
and will, in fact, interfere with the use and enjoyment of their properties sufficient to meet the 
standard expressed by the Court in Hawkins v. Bonneville County, supra, where the court said 
"The petitioner opposing a permit must be in jeopardy of suffering substantial harm if the project 
goes forward, such as a reduction in the opponent's land value or interference with his or her use 
or ownership of the land." 151 Idaho at 233. 
In this case, the Petitioners have demonstrated the harm they will suffer as a result of the 
approved power plant. For example, WTitten testimony was submitted on behalf of the 
Petitioners H-Hook, LLC, John and Jo Ann Jeffries, Jeffrey and Deborah Weber, Joe and Betty 
Bercik, James Underwood, Neighbors for the Preservation of the Big and Little Willow Creek 
Community and People for Payette's Future, Inc. as to both the interference in the use and 
enjoyment of their properties near the proposed power plant site (and for the organizations, the 
properties of their members) and the diminution in value of those properties. R. p. 3660-3667. 
That evidence is summarized in Petitioners' opening brief at page 13 and Appendix A and in this 
reply brief in Section IL A., above. 
In addition, Mr. and Mrs. Weber separately submitted written testimony that they operate 
a dog training and boarding facility and business on their property, the income from which they 
rely for their livelihood. That livelihood would be directly affected by the development of a 
nuclear power plant on the subject prope1iy, the Webers have testified, since their customers 
would no longer consider their facility to be a desirable place to take and leave their animals. 
R. p. 3655-3656. 
Michael Humphreys, a managing member of H-Hook, LLC, which operates a cattle 
ranch and related fanning operation on property adjacent to the proposed power plant site, also 
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submitted separate written testimony in which he reiterated the effect the power plant would 
on his family's ranching operation and testified that the proposed power plant will place a 
cloud of uncertainty on the properties surrounding the power plant, which uncertainty has an 
economic cost. R. p. 3911-3912. 
Petitioners Bercik and Jeffries have also submitted additional written testimony 
demonstrating that because they live within a few miles of the approved power plant they would 
be adversely affected due to their vulnerability to damage and injury to their persons and 
properties as a result of a nuclear accident, including the potential need to evacuate their 
properties (R. p. 3604-3609; 3610), In fact, all of the individual Petitioners have shown that their 
properties are located within the ten mile Emergency Planning Zone of the approved power plant 
interfering with the use and enjoyment of their properties and putting them in jeopardy of 
substantial harm to their persons and properties, all of which is summarized in Petitioners' 
opening brief at pages 15-16 and in this reply brief above, in Section II. A. 
Petitioners have also submitted wTitten testimony about the routine emission of harmful 
radioactive water from the approved power plant, exposing them to radioactive materials which 
are recognized carcinogens, again interfering with the use and enjoyment of their properties. 
R. p. 3660-36667. This evidence, too, is summarized in Petitioner's opening brief at pages 14-15 
and in this reply brief in Section II. A., above. 
Moreover, the Petitioners have demonstrated that the County's defective notice, improper 
hearing procedure and failure to adopt a reasoned decision in accordance with requirements of 
LC. § 67-6535 have prejudiced their substantial rights. See, e.g., Jasso v. Carnas County, supra. 
None of this evidence is apparently sufficient to satisfy Respondents, both of whom 
seem to believe that some higher order of proof is required of these Petitioners than is generally 
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required in land use matters. Although zoning decisions need to be based on substantial 
evidence, I.C. § 67-5279, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized the relative informality of 
hearings on land use matters and has accepted the fact that it would not be feasible to require that 
evidence presented in such hearings strictly comply with the rules of evidence. See, Evans v. 
Board of Commissioners of Cassia County, supra, at 432. Substantial evidence is no more than 
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Wohrle v. 
Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 267, 274, 207 P.3d 998 (2009). The evidence presented by 
Petitioners to demonstrate prejudice to their substantial rights is most certainly the type of 
evidence commonly considered in local land use matters and is of a type that reasonable minds 
might accept to support that conclusion. 
Although the evidence summarized above provides a sufficient basis for the Court to find 
that substantial rights of the Petitioners have been prejudiced by the action of the County, in 
order to remove any doubt, Petitioners request that the Court take judicial notice, pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 201, of the affidavits of Petitioners John Burlile, H-Hook, LLC, Clifford 
Morgan, Thomas Pence, Torn Roland, James Underwood and Jeffrey Weber submitted in a 
related action pending before this Court, John W. Burlile, et al v. Alternate Energy Holdings, 
Inc., et al, Case No. CV- 2012-364. Those affidavits further describe the distinct harm and 
injuries that have already resulted and will result from the action of Payette County in approving 
the conditional rezone for AEHI, including the inability to continue long standing business and 
agricultural operations on their properties and plan for future operations and expansion of them, 
reduced demand for products produced on their properties, the practical inability to market and 
sell their properties due to the negative stigma of being near a nuclear power plant, and the 
resultant significant diminution in value of their properties. In addition, two expert witnesses 
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(Mark Richey and Pat Thacker) have also submitted Affidavits in that case describing and 
corroborating the negative impact that the conditional rezone has had on the value of Petitioners' 
properties. Copies of those affidavits are attached to this reply brief in Appendix A These 
affidavits clearly demonstrate that Petitioners' substantial rights have been prejudiced as a result 
of the County's actions. 
Knowing that the evidence is otherwise sufficient, Respondents continue to argue 
erroneously, as they did in their attack on Petitioners' standing, that Petitioners may not rely on 
the risk of injury to their persons and properties posed by its power plant to establish prejudice to 
their substantial rights, saying those matters are preempted by Federal law. AEHI again 
overstates the extent of Federal control. Although the Federal government controls the safety 
and radiological aspects of nuclear power plants, the states exercise their traditional authority 
over land use matters. Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. State Energy Resources 
Conservation and Development Commission, supra. Petitioners do not ask the Court to permit 
the County to enter the field of regulating power plant safety, rather, Petitioners point to the risk 
of harm to their persons and properties posed by a nuclear power plant to establish their right to 
contest the County's approval of a nuclear power plant under state and county land use laws, a 
power specifically reserved to the states. See, Northern California Assoc. to Preserve Bodega 
Head and Harbor, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission, 61 Cal.2d. 126, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432, 390 
P.2d 200, 204 (1964) (recognizing that states retain power to determine location of nuclear 
power plants under their land use laws); see also, Afarshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. 
App. 237, 237 N.W.2d. 266 (1975) and cases and authorities cited therein at 237 N.W.2d. 
276-277. 
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Respondents also continue to suggest that the Court should overlook the County's illegal 
action in approving the conditional rezone because "[t]his is not Petitioners' only chance to let 
decision makers know their concerns regarding nuclear power." Respondent's and Intervenors' 
Brief page 48. Respondents argue to the Court, as AEHI did to the County, that the County need 
not concern itself with the details of AEHI's proposal because, after all, AEHI will be subjected 
to a rigorous review process before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC"). Respondents 
fail to mention, however, that the NRC will not revisit the County's land use approvals. Unless 
contested now, the approvals become final. 
As AEHI consistently did during the public hearing process, Respondents attempt to 
paint the Petitioners as rabid antinuclear zealots who have res01ied to "hyperbole and fear 
mongering" in making their arguments to the County and this Court. Respondent and 
Intervenor's brief pages 42-43. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Respondents have, 
throughout the process, steadfastly confined their arguments to legitimate land use issues and 
addressed the harms they will suffer only in the context required to demonstrate standing and 
prejudice to their substantial rights. Petitioners should not be denigrated for making the 
arguments they are legally required to make, especially when Respondents demand they be made 
by attacking Petitioners standing to pursue their petition for judicial review. 
In sum, the Petitioners' substantial rights have been prejudiced as a result of the 
County's illegal approval of the conditional rezone requested by AEHI and have amply 
demonstrated that prejudice. AEHI's attempts to divest the Petitioners of their opp01iunity to 
contest the County's illegal actions are based on an overly narrow view of the nature of the 
injuries required to be shown and an overly broad view of the extent of Federal control over 
power plant siting, neither of which are supported by recognized authority. 
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CONCLUSION 
The County's decision to approve the conditional rezone requested by AEHI must be 
overturned and vacated in its entirety because the decision violates constitutional or statutory 
provisions, is in excess of the County's statutory authority, was made upon unlawful procedure, 
and is arbitrary and capricious. Specifically, the County's defective hearing notices, improper 
proceedings and the inadequacy of the Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, taken 
as a whole, violate both the requirements of the County's ordinances and the Local Land Use 
Planning Act as well as the Petitioners' due process rights, justifying the Court in vacating the 
Board's decision. The rezone, having been approved pursuant to an invalid comprehensive plan 
and resulting in illegal spot zoning, including type 2 spot zoning which cannot be cured, should 
be vacated for those reasons as well. The approval of the conditional rezone should also be 
vacated because the rezone was approved for a use which, by its very nature, will violate the 
explicit provisions of Payette County Code respecting hazardous and dangerous uses and 
because the Board arbitrarily failed to address that issue in its findings and conclusions. Finally, 
because the rezone was made pursuant to a development agreement which was not properly 
approved, authorized or adopted by the Board and which is beyond the statutory authority of the 
Board, the decision approving the conditional rezone and the development agreement must be 
vacated. A fair reading of the record leaves no doubt that AEHI and its proponents sold the 
project to the County with the tantalizing promise of creating thousands of jobs and an economic 
renaissance for the County. The County bought ,A .. EHI's sales pitch and, without any serious 
consideration for either the legal rights of neighboring property owners or the injuries that those 
property owners would bear, did whatever it took, legal or not, to approve the project. None of 
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the arguments made by Respondents can legitimize the County's flawed process and the 
resulting erroneous decision to approve AEHI' s power plant. 
DATED: This {pt}- day of December, 2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this i 'f'-/ day of December, 2012, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Anne Marie Kelso 
Payette County Prosecutor 
1115 1st Avenue North 





251 E. Front St., Ste. 200 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax: 208.388.1001 
E-mail: jbutler@spinkbutler.com 
Attorneys for Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc. 
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JOHN W. BURLILE 
BRIANE NELSON MITCHELL (ISB #2346) 
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MAUK & BURGOYNE 
515 South 6th Street 
Post Office Box 1743 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1743 
Telephone: (208) 345-2654 
Facsimile (208) 345-3319 
THOMAS A. BANDUCCI (ISB #2453) 
tbanducci@b1,vsla1;vgroup.com 
WADEL. WOODARD (ISB #6312) 
,v·woodard@b\.vslawurouo.com 
DARA PARK.ER (ISB #7177) 
doarker@bv1slawgrouo.com 
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN, PLLC 
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 342-4411 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DiSTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
JOHN W. BURLILE, an individual; H HOOK ) 
LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company; ) 
CLIFFORD D. MORGAN and MARY A. ) 
MORGAN, individually and as husband and 
wife; TOM PENCE, an individual; CYRIL W. 
ROLAND and IRENE J. ROLAND, 
individually and as husband and wife; 
THOMAS G. ROLAND and MARCIA R. 
ROLAND, individually and as husband and 
wife; JAMES S. UNDERWOOD, JR., an 
















ALTERNATE ENERGY HOLDINGS, INC., a ) 
Nevada Corporation; DONALD L. GILLISPIE, ) 
an individual; JENNIFER RANSOM, an ) 
individual; COUNTY OF PAYETTE~ a· - _-), _ 
politicctl s~h'divisiori of the State oflcfuh.o; and ··} · 
P9 :ES 1,..10, fictitiously named, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) ---------------~ 
Case No. CV-2012-364 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN W. BURLILE 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO 
COURT'S QUESTIONS REGARDING 
STANDING 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Payette ) 
Plaintiff Joh,_'1 W. Burlile, first being duly sworn, subscribes and states as follows: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and, if called as a witness, 
could and would competently testify thereto. 
2. I reside at 8105 Little Willow Road and I also own property in Payette County, 
located at 7100 Little Willow Road. I have lived in this area for more than 25 years. I live 
around 6 miles from the site where AEHI has been given permission by Payette County to build 
a nuclear power plant. 
3. I have knowledge of where the other Plaintiffs reside and have attached an 
accurate map of the area showing their approximate locations. 
4. I am the manager of the H Hook Ranch which is a working cattle ranch. The 
Ranch has approximately 15,000 acres and is located on both sides of Stone Quarry Road, and 
both sides of Little Willow Creek Road in the eastern part of Payette County. Most H Hook 
employees live on the Ranch with their families. 
5. The H Hook Ranch shares a common border with the JG Schwarz property where 
AEHI has received approval to build a nuclear power plant. The common border between H 
Hook and the JG Schwarz property is approximately three and three-quarter miles in length. 
6. H Hook has its weaner calf operation at the comer of Stone Quarry and Little 
Willow Roads. At any given time, we may have as many as 300 weaner calves at that comer. I 
believe that the increased traffic along Stone Quarry and Little Willow Roads for the thousands 
of construction workers will cause stress to our weaner calves and may force us to close and 
move the feedlot. 
7. We routinely use both Little Willow Creek and Stone Quarry Roads for our ranch 
operations. We use the roads for access, moving our cattle and farm equipment. These are rural 
roads which are used as much for farm and ranch operations as anything else. Little Willow is 
only twenty feet wide at places, while Stone Quarry is also only twenty feet wide at places. The 
thousands of construction workers who will be using these roads will disrupt and interfere with 
our ranch operations. 
8. On the H Hook Ranch we have seven wells that we use for obtaining water for 
our domestic use as well as for irrigation. I am concerned that we will not be able to use our 
wells in the future if AEHI proceeds with its nuclear plant. 
9. I believe that the value of my property and all the property near the proposed 
nuclear plant is worth less because of the County's actions in approving construction of the plant 
I also believe that the proposed nuclear power plant has and will interfere with the rural ranch 
lifestyle that I have enjoyed with my family and our neighbors in the Little Willow Creek/Stone 
Quarry area for the last 26-27 years. 
DATED This 41... day of November, 2012 
~W.Burlile 
SUBSCRJBED AND SWORN TO Before me, the undersigned Notary Public, this ~ 1 
day of November, 2012. 
DEBRA S BOWEN 
Notary Public 
State of Idaho 
No~ Public fo. daho • /A 
Residing at: ' ' - t'(._ 
Commission Expir : / O 12, ZtY S---
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802 W. Bannock St., Ste. 500 
Boise, ID 83702 
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Richard A. Roth 
The Roth Law Firm, PLLC 
295 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor 
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P.O. Box 2582 
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tbanducci@bws1awirroup.com 
WADEL. WOODARD (ISB #6312) 
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dparker@bwslawgroup.com 
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN, PLLC 
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500 
Boise, Idaho 83702 · 
Telephone: (208) 342-4411 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CLIFFORD D. MORGAN and MARY A. ) 
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wife; TOM PENCE, an individual; CYRIL W. 
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Defendants. ) ----------------· 
Case No. CV-2012-364 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY WEBER 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO 
COURT'S QUESTIONS REGARDING 
STANDING 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTYOFPAYETTE ) 
I, Jeffrey G. Weber, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 
1. That I am a Plaintiff in the above entitled matter and my address is 10465 Stone Quarry 
Road, Payette, Idaho. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and, if called as a 
witness, could and would testify competently thereto. 
2. That I have owned the home and lived at the above address for more than eight (8) years 
and have operated a dog training business and dog boarding business at the same location. 
3. That the land for miles around this site has al'?fays been planned and used for agriculture 
and is appropriate for the boarding and training of upland game and waterfowl hunting dogs. 
4. That I purchased the land and built the home, kennels, and other dog training facilities at 
this location because it was surrounded by agricultural land and had always been zoned 
agricultural. 
5. That I believed that I could operate my business here until it was time for me to retire and 
sell the home and dog training and boarding facilities to another trainer. 
6. That Payette County has now changed the Comprehensive Plan, rezoned a parcel within 
approximately three (3) miles of my home and business, and entered into a twenty (20) year 
Development Agreement with Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc. (AEID) to permit the company or 
its assignee, at any time during the term of the agreement, to construct a nuclear power plant · 
within three (3) miles ofmy home and business. 
7. That Payette County, by entering into the twenty (20) year Development Agreement with 
AEIIl, granting the rezone, granting the variance, and changing the county's Comprehensive 
Plan, has seriously harmed the marketability of my real property and my business and reduced 
the market value of my property. 
8. That a part of the harm to my business and property results from the County's decision, 
which may cause my property to be included in a "Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency 
Planning Zone'\ which will make many of the owners of dogs unwilling to leave their dogs with 
me for training or for boarding. 
9. That being placed in the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone could 
require that I have to evacuate and find a place to house and care for as many as thirty-five (35) 
to forty ( 40) dogs, an impossible task. 
2 
10. That the actions of AEffi and Payette County have made my property so undesirable as a 
dog boarding and training location that my property's value as a dog business facility bas been 
destroyed. 
11. That I would not buy a dog business in this or a similar location so near a proposed and 
approved nuclear power plant, and I am sure that no other trainer would want to buy it. 
12. That I have come to my conclusion regarding the reduced value of my property, based 
primarily upon my personal knowledge of the property and my knowledge of the dog training 
and boarding business. I have also discussed these matters with friends, real estate professionals, 
and other persons in the dog training and boarding business. 
13. That my discussions with other persons have confirmed that other trainers would not be 
willing to buy a property located near a proposed nuclear power plant. 
14. That these discussions have also confirmed that other persons would not want to purchase 
a home located within a few miles of an approved nuclear power plant and that the value of my 
residence is also harmed by the County's actions. 
15. That I have compiled and reviewed information regarding my investment in my home 
and in the dog training and boarding facilities in order to determine the amount of financial harm 
caused because of the reduced value ofmy home and business. 
16. That I have concluded, based on the above information and my review of the amount I 
have invested in my home and business, that my real estate, including both the home and the dog 
training and boarding business property, has been reduced in value in a sum in excess of eighty-
five thousand dollars ($85,000). 
17. That I have also been harmed by the County's action of August 29, 2011, in entering the 
20 year Development Agreement and granting the rezone, because I now cannot plan for the 
future operation and expansion of my business because as long as the County actions are in 
effect my business has little or no value. 
18. That because of the threat of possible construction of a nuclear power plant in such close 
proximity to my property, I am unable to plan for the future operation, improvement, or sale of 
my home and business. 
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CLIFFORD D. MORGAN and MARY A. ) 
MORGAN, individually and as husband and 
wife; TOM PENCE, an individual; CYRIL W. 
ROLAND and IRENE J. ROLAND, 
individually and as husband and wife; 
THOMAS G. ROLAND and MARCIA R. 
ROLAND, individually and as husband and 
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Case No. CV-2012-364 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS F. PENCE 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO 
COURT'S QUESTIONS REGARDING 
STANDING 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF PAYETTE ) 
I, THOMAS F. (TOM) PENCE, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 
1. That I am a Plaintiff in the above entitled matter and my home address is 5433 Big 
Willow Road, Payette, Idaho. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and, if called 
as a witness, could and would testify competently thereto. 
2. That Payette County has now taken several actions at the request of Alternate Energy 
Holdings, Inc. (AEHI), a Nevada corporation, which will permit AEHI to construct a nuclear 
power plant approximately one and one-half (1 ½) miles from my home and ranch. 
3. That Payette County has also agreed that AEHI can reconstruct Big Willow Road, which 
is now a partially paved, but mostly gravel, road used for ranch and limited recreational 
purposes, as a paved industrial highway to provide primary access to their nuclear power plant. 
4. That I have owned a home and ranch at the above stated address on Big Willow Road for 
many years, have resided on the ranch most of my life, and my family has owned this land for 
generations, my great grandfather having lived on and operated the ranch since 1867, before 
Idaho achieved statehood. 
5. That I manage the ranch land for livestock operations according to an intensive grazing 
plan, and I also raise grass hay for horses and provide custom grazing. 
6. That a part of the ranch is managed for wildlife habitat and hunting and is also operated 
as a shooting preserve, which includes hunting for upland game birds and waterfowl. 
7. That the wildlife management area also includes an extensive riparian zone which 
provides habitat for other species, including wild turkeys, deer, bear, and at times a cougar. 
8. That Big Willow Road, which is located in front of my house, is on my ranch property, as 
is the bridge over Big Willow Creek, and both the road and the bridge are, as acknowledged by 
Payette County in its Findings of Fact on a prescriptive easement. 
9. That at no time during the county application and approval process did anyone from 
Payette County ever contact me or discuss with me any changes in that part of Big Willow Road 
that passes through my lands, or the possible construction of a nuclear power plant only one and 
one-half (1 ½) miles from my home. 
10. Tnat Payette County and AEHI have now purportediy entered into a Deveiopment 
Agreement to make drastic changes in the use of the road, which changes will cause serious 
practical and economic harm to me and to my real property by making it very difficult, if not 
impossible, to operate the shooting preserve and to continue normal agricultural operations. 
11. That Payette County and AElll have agreed in their Development Agreement that Big 
Willow Road" ... shall be paved and improved to meet minimum geometric parameters of a 45 
mph roadway designed in accordance with MSHTO design standards and designed to meet HS-
20 load ratings." Development Agreement, Exhibit D-3, para. 13. 
12. That the Development Agreement continues and states: 
"The anticipated public primary access roadway, Big Willow Road, includes a bridge over Big 
Willow Creek, which bridge shall be evaluated for integrity and load bearing capacity in 
accordance with anticipated loads during construction of the Project. If the approaches to the 
bridge are not sufficient according MSHTO Load and Resistance Factor Design Specifications 
( current edition) to accommodate off-tracking of larger equipment, improvements to, or 
reconstruction of the bridge shall be completed prior to commencing Phase IV--Pre-Construction 
Grading." Development Agreement, Exhibit D-3, para. 14. 
13. That in addition to having lived and worked on the ranch for almost all of my life, I have 
also worked as an agricultural consultant and for a time sold real estate, specializing in recreation 
property. 
14. That I am acquainted with and have discussed the effect of the County's actions with 
others, including a real estate professional and an attorney, both of whom are familiar with my 
ranch property. 
15. That the rezoning of the proposed site for the construction of a nuclear power plant and 
the entering into the Development Agreement, which has a term of twenty (20) years with 
provision for extensions, together with the agreed-upon changes which are proposed to be made 
to the road and the bridge, have markedly decreased the value of my property. 
16. That I have concluded, after considering the above and discussing the matter with other 
knowledgeable persons, that the value of my property has been decreased in the amount of three 
hundred to four hundred thousand dollars ($300,000 to $400,000) by the actions of AElll and 
Payette County. 
~ 
DATED this _i__ day of November, 2012. 
C1l,nw:~ l (I~ 0 
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The Roth Law Firm, PLLC 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
JOHN W. BURLILE, an individual; H HOOK ) 
LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company; ) 
CLIFFORD D. MORGAN and MARY A. ) 
MORGAN, individually and as husband and 
wife; TOM PENCE, an individual; CYRIL W. 
ROLAND and IRENE J. ROLAND, 
individually and as husband and wife; 
THOMAS G. ROLAND and MARCIA R. 
ROLAND, individually and as husband and 
wife; JAMES S. UNDERWOOD, JR., an 
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Case No. CV-2012-364 
AFFIDAVIT OF CLIFFORD D. 
MORGAN IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 
RESPONSE TO COURT'S 
QUESTIONS REGARDING 
STANDING 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTYOFPAYETIE ) 
I, CLIFFORD D. MORGAN, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 
1. Tha~ together with my wife MARY A. MORGAN, I am a Plaintiff in the above entitled 
matter and my address is 7405 Little Willow Road, Payette, Idaho. I have personal knowledge of 
the facts stated herein and, if called as a witness, could and would testify competently thereto. 
2. That my wife Mary and I have owned our home and farm and have lived here, together 
with other family members, on these premises since 1993. 
3. That prior to coming to Idaho we had lived in several western states because of being 
transferred to new locations by my employer. 
4. That I had worked in the communications industry for thirty-two (32) years as an 
employee of AT&T. 
5. That after my retirement from AT&T I began another career, selling real estate. 
6. That while I was employed in the real estate industry I became familiar with appraisal 
techniques and the process of determining the market value of real property. 
7. That my wife and I purchased our present property, which consists of a home and other 
buildings, because we wanted to live in a clean, quiet, healthy, rural environment away from the 
noise, smell and intrusion of traffic. 
8. That my wife and I purchased our present property, which is seventy-two (72) acres of 
cropland and a riparian zone along Little Willow Creek, because we also wanted to pursue a self-
sufficient lifestyle. 
9. That my wife and I, along with other family members, have during these last nineteen 
(19) years grown, preserved, and prepared much of our food and have also raised some cattle and 
kept several draft horses on the property. We have also raised some alfalfa hay on the property. 
10. That I have also served for ten (10) years on the Board of Directors of the Little Willow 
Irrigation District. 
11. That I have during the time I have lived here, in part because of my tenure on the 
irrigation board, become familiar with the properties owned by my neighbors on Little Willow 
Road and Stone Quarry Road. 
12. That I am familiar with property values in this area and during the time I've lived here 
have observed and been aware of sale prices of various other properties in this area. 
13. That my home and farm. is located approximately four (4) miles from the Alternate 
Energy Holdings, Inc. (AEHI) site which has been approved by Payette County for the 
construction of a nuclear power plant. 
14. That my property includes a part of Stone Quarry Road and Little Willow Road and the 
bridge which is located near the comer of Little Willow Road and Stone Quarry Road. 
15. That Stone Quarry Road has been designated as a secondary emergency access road for 
AEHI' s proposed nuclear power plant. Development Agreement, Exhibit D-4, para. 16. 
16. That Payette County in its contract with AEHI has agreed that Stone Quarry Road 
" ... shall be paved and designed and improved to meet AASHTO design standards reasonably 
determined by County and AEHI' s traffic engineer ... ". Development Agreement, Exhibit D-4, 
para 16. 
17. That my property is not large enough to be operated as a commercial agricultural 
business. 
18. That the prospect of these changes agreed to by Payette County has a very negative effect 
on the qualities that have made my home such an attractive property, specifically the clean, quiet, 
natural surroundings, with very little traffic. 
19. That the approval and rezoning of the AEHI site by the County has made my property 
much less attractive as a home site and retirement farm. 
20. That I have concluded that the value of my property has been decreased by approximately 
one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) by the approval of the AEHI applications and the 
entering into the Development Agreement by Payette County. 
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JOHN W. BURLILE, an individual; H HOOK ) 
LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company; ) 
CLIFFORD D. MORGAN and MARY A. ) 
MORGAi'-J, individually and as husband and 
wife; TOM PENCE, an individual; CYRIL W. 
ROLAND and IRENE J. ROLAND, 
individually and as husband and wife; 
THOMAS G. ROLAND and MARCIA R. 
ROLAND, individually and as husband and 
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Case No. CV-2012-364 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES S. 
UNDERWOOD, JR. IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 
RESPONSE TO COURT'S 
QUESTIONS REGARDil"l"G 
STANDING 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF PA YEITE ) 
I, JAMES S. UNDERWOOD, JR., being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 
1. That I am a Plaintiff in the above entitled matter and my address is 8720 Little Willow 
Road, Payette, Idaho. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and, if called as a 
witness, could and would testify competently thereto. 
2. That I have owned a home and been domiciled at the above address for more than six (6) 
years and have owned, for more than thirty-five (3 5) years, another parcel of land, in the Little 
Willow Creek area, located approximately six (6) miles north ofmy home. 
3. That I have, for many years, had clients and friends who lived in or owned property in the 
Little Willow Creek area and am generally familiar with local land values. 
4. That I completed an elective course, in law school, that included as a major section the 
process of appraising real property and have, since that time, participated in continuing legal 
education courses and other industry and institution sponsored courses involving real estate 
acquisition, development, sales, and financing, including both private and public properties. 
5. That I have been and am an active member of the Idaho State Bar for more than forty 
(40) years and a substantial part ofmy practice has consisted ofrepresenting real property sellers 
and buyers, real estate developers, and public and private lenders in matters that required my 
participation in determining the fair market value of many properties. 
6. That for fifteen (15) years I was a shareholder in a closely held corporation that 
developed rural home sites, in a ranch area east of Boise, and I was directly involved in the sale 
of more than twenty (20) of the lots, from the pricing of the lot through the sales process, and I· 
met with and discussed the features and the pricing of the various lots with dozens of prospective 
buyers. 
7. That in this perio~ which concluded with the final transaction in 2008, I gained 
additional experience about the qualities and features the prospective buyers were seeking and 
about the process of determining the fair market value of the parcels. 
8. That based on my education and experience, and my personal knowledge of my home 
and property, I submit this testimony regarding the reduction in the value of my home and 
property, as a result of the actions of Payette Count-y and Alternate Energy Hoidings, Inc., 
(AEHI). 
2 
9. That I had, in 2011, in preparation for renewing the homeowners insurance policy on my 
house at 8720 Little Willow Road, completed a review of the files from the purchase of the 
house, five years earlier, including an appraisal, my valuation notes, and other documents, in 
order to determine the present value of the property prior to discussions with the agent regarding 
renewing the insurance policy. 
10. That Payette County, by entering into the twenty (20) year Development Agreement -with 
AEHI, granting the rezone, granting the variance, and changing the county's Comprehensive 
Plan, has detrimentally affected the marketability of my real property and reduced its market 
value, by taking action which can result in the building of a nuclear reactor seven (7) miles from 
my property, where dangerous radioactive material may be stored for an indefinite period, and in 
the placing of my property in a proposed nuclear power plant "Plume Exposure Pathway 
Emergency Planning Zone". 
11. That I have come to this conclusion, and my conclusion regarding the amount of the 
reduction in the estimated value of my property, based primarily upon my personal knowledge of 
my property and my experience in determining the value of other properties, but also after 
consulting with :friends and other contacts who have knowledge and experience in determining 
the value of rural residential real property. 
12. That those whom I have consulted, in my consideration of and computation of the 
reduced value ofmy property, have included, but are not limited to, a real estate broker, a 
registered surveyor, a title specialist for a title insurance company, and a real property acquisition 
specialist, each of whom has experience regarding real property values, development or sales in 
southwest Idaho. 
13. That I have also conducted a limited online search and review of publications regarding 
the reduction in the value of real property near nuclear power plants, which identified 
investigations that include findings that nuclear power plants have a net negative effect on 
property values. 
14. That I have, based on my general experience, my experience with prospective buyers 
who choose to live in a rural ranch environment, and my discussions with other knowledgeable 
persons, concluded that the county's action, on behalf of AEIIl, has resulted in a reduction in the 
value of my home and property. 
15. That I have also concluded, based on the above, that when the estimated value of my 
residential property, after the county's action on August 29, 2011, in entering the 20 year 
Development Agreement and granting the rezone, is subtracted from the estimated value of the 
property before the action, the estimated reduction in value of my property, as a result of the 
county's action, is the sum of seventy-four thousand dollars ($74,000). 
3 
DATED this 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this __ day of November, 2012. 
l 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: f DAtio 
My Commission Expires: ',, ·Z0\7 
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ALTERNATE ENERGY HOLDINGS> INC., a ) 
Nevada Corporation; DONALD L- GILLISPIE,, ) 
m1 indi-vidua¾; JENNIFER RANSOM, rui ) 
individual; COUNTY OF PA YEITE, a ) 
ixilitical subdivision of the Strle ofldruto; and ) 
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. . ) 
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Case No. CY-.2012-364 
AJ:F.ID.A VlT OF 
MICHAEL HUMPHRE'YSlN 
SUJ>PORT OF FLAfflTIFFS' 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO 
COURT'S QUESTIONS REGARDING 
STAN.DIN°G 
. . ' 
·· .. , ' •··.· .... ·. ·. · ..•... 
. . . 
STATEOFTEXA.S ) 
· .... ·. ): ss 
County of Be,;rar . ) 
Michad Huµwhreys, first being duly sworn., subscribes and states as follows: 
1. I make this affidavit upon my personal knowl~ie. 
2. . · I am, a managingllle!Ilber of H Hook LLC> tlle owner and ope:qrtor of H Hook 
. ' .. ·· ·, . . . . . . : .. . ·. : . . 
Ranch m Payette Collllty (tef~d to as 7'H Hook Ranch" or "H Hook") one of the Plaintiffs in 
the above entitled matter. H Hook Rane~ whose street address is 10495 Stone Quany Road, is a .. , .- .. ·. . . :_.. . . . · ..... : .. _. .. · . ·. . . . ·.: . •. . . . 
working cattle ranch of approximat¢ly 15,000 acres tha! is lo~ted along Little Willow Road and 
Stone Q1.1arry Road, . My :furnily has operat~ the ranch and conducted related farming 
operations on the property since 1987. H HookRanch has 20 :full time resideuts. 
· 3. H Hook shares a continuous boundary of approximately 3 ¾ miles with the . 
property where the purportednuclear power plant will befocated. 
. . . . 
· • · 4. Jfthe nudea:r power plant is constructe4 during the proposed fol.IT to :6.ve"'.year · 
construction period~ I understand tlmt the construction site may operate up to 24 houra ~ day . 
·. . ·, ·. ' . ' ·. . ..... ·. . .·. . . : .. 
generating noise, dust, and traffic with several thousand workers arriving and d~parting daily in 
addition to material deliveries. H Hook and its neighbors 1,1se Stone Quarry Ro.ad and Little 
wmow Road for moving cattle as well as farm equipment, and those activities would be 
negatively affected by the traffic. 
5. H Hook also operates a feedlot for weaner calves at the corner of Little Willow 
Road and Stone Quany road fur tb.ree months of the year. This feedlot is approximately 1/2 mile 
from the Northeast comer of the Schw-arz Property '\\1lere the purported nuclear power plant will 
be located. Continuous traffic and the associated dust and noise ftom the daily arrivals and 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL HUMPHREYS-2 
departuxesto.andfrolll.fil1.in4ustrial sitewoul(l h~ve ?~v~re.i~p~ct pri tiieJe~ot· s operatjon · . 
and could render it unll&'able.· .. · 
·. 6. Two of the H Hook, ranch ;hom,e~ are foqa{eii qn theunpaved Sto11e Quarry !load. 
Continuous traffic and the associated dust and.noise.fron1.facility consttuctioµ andoperation, 
includingarrivals and departures to and from the indt!$trial site, woul<i adversely affect the use 
and enjoyment of these properties • 
. 7. . . All of theH Hook ranch workers and their filmilies live in homes on Little 
Willow Road. :Most have worked for the H Hook ranch for over ten years. H Hook is deeply 
concerned about its ability to co~tim1e its ~bing o~erations ff it is unable to retain ciualified ·. 
farm and ranch workers because the Utt.le Willow Creek area will beGome uninhabitable or less 
desirable for residences due to the adverse effects flowing from the proposed power plant and . - . ' . . ' . ,. . . .... ·.. . . \ . . .... ·,. 
related activities. . 
· ·. 8. H Hook is concerned about the risk of vandalism and theft to our homes and 
ranch properti~, vehicles, and livestock from the tho~sands. of transient workers that would be 
passing through the previously remote Little Willow Creek Community~ 
9. B Hook ope:r;ates several ground water wells in Sections 21 and 22 on the 
northeast boundary of the Schwarz Property for crop irrigation, stock water and home drinking 
water. The impact on ground water and electrical service from the construction and. operation of 
this industrial site may adversely affect H Hook Ranch. 
10. At present the area around Stone Quarry Road and Little Willow Road is 
considered own range. Cattle have the right of way. AEHI and Payette County have not 
indicated how this conflict could be resolved with the proposed power plant 
AFFIDAVlT OF MICHAEL RUMP:IIREYS-3 
J 1. , DwiIIg the rune since. 1987 whet) my family firstpnrchased the init~ much. 
properey Iocat~ at Hl495 Stone Quaey Road, I have participatedin Or cfuffl1y neg-0ti~~the 
. . . ·. ·. · .. · ...... ·. . . ·... . ·.··. ' .. · . ·.. ·. 
• · pm:c~ and sale of oo~itional ranch properties jn th~ Little Willow Creek~$ we expanded . 
. ()Uf ranch. . 
·. . . · 12. . In ~ddition to nzy falnily,s ran<ili located ip. Payette c®µty, I own jointly ,vith my 
spouse t1thir ranch pr~ in Idaho \\lhlch I assembled by the direct nesotlatlon and purchase of.·. 
four contiguous raooh properties in the previous nineteen ye;ap;. hi the pro~s of th~ 
~~ovs, r~~y.metwith and discussed th~~· andtl1eprlcing of the purchasoo . 
propertie~ "''Ith bro~ and prQspectlve selle~. J have ~ advanced degree in l}usiness and have 
considert,3.bfo. prior expeci.enee in vruµiI.tg bush:tesses • 
13. • ·· The Payette Coµnty Olmmissioners' actions in entering into the 20~year . ·. 
DevefopmentAgreement~th AEHt granting the rezone. gralltingthe variance, and changing 
the County• s O>mprehensive Plml Ilave. ju my OJ)inion, detrimentally ~ted the marketability 
of my fanlily's H Hook ranch property and reduced its market value,: especially when o:ne 
considers :the _pro~ of my fumily"s property being i.ocfoded iuthe 10-:mile nucle&r r~ctor ,i 
Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone". 
14. My opinions regarding '!he restricted marketability and the amount of the 
re.duction in the estimated value of my :family's property, are based primarily upon my 
knowledge and experience, but also after consulting with knowledgeable associates with 
experience valuing recreation :ranch property in Idaho~ 
15. Those with whom I have consulted concerning the re-duced value of my property 
include, a :recreation much broker,.a ranch appraiser, a much in..<mrance broker and a:ranch 
·· ... 16. · .·. . ™seA~ti~~atiOJl$c~<l ~~ r ~\V.frQnimy ·9wn.f;petje11qe: tb.<tt(~e . · ' 
market val11es of ~~elll ~al .~o~es~ sigIJJilca11tlyreduced not.(}nlydllfingmid ~er·····.· 
construction of a~uJear povrei' plant, but also inmlediately upon the chan~e in loc~ zoning to 
permit constniction of a.nll~learpowerplailt. ·. 
·. ·17. . · .. Therefore,1Jased9iithe above, I believe that the effectofthe county's actions on 
my family's ~ch properly, aI1d other ~ai:by properties, has b~en to significantly reduce the. . 
, ' • • • < •• '· •• ••••••• • • ' • • • • • • • • •• • • • • •• •• • • •••• • 
interest of any recreatl<>Iiratlch bu,yer in purchasing that property. I belie;ea prospective . 
recreation buyer would only be wterested in considerwg a purchase of my family's ran9h · .. 
property if at the in~tial conract, a significant discount from fair market value ~ offered as .<ill .. 
inducement Obviously, aprospective;ecreation buyermightjustas e~ilyhaye rerointe~st 
. ·. . ;_ . .· .... · ·. . . '. . ·. : ·. . : ; . : · .... : ·.· ·. 
de$Pite the offered initial discoun; due to the 20 year un~eIU!iniy :resultiJJg froni the ;ldjacent . 
approved nuclear plant site. 
· ·•·• 1 &. • 1herefore3 based upon the researcll I have performe~ and ~Y lmowl:dge of the 
value qf H H{)ok Rauch and similar properties prior to the zoning approval and the Devefopment 
Agreeillent, it is ru,y opinion that the value of H Hook Ranch has been significantly reduced --: 
well in excess of $100,000- because potential buyers will not wanttQ ~uy a ranch next to 
property which has the necessary County a,pprovais for the construction of a nuclear power plant. 
19. The cloud of uncertainty that has been created by the actions of Payette County 
have also forced me to postpone, perhaps indefinitely, my family's plans to undertake capital 
improvements on our property. 
flJ ~:I! ~~A-' 
Michael Humphreys ' .,  
AFFIDA VlT OFl\fiCHAEL HUMPHREYS- 5 
':_·? 
. . so~A1a~vmo 
My Ccm~s!ori fxplres 
. · AUU~$t 12, ~16 
..... ~~ ...... ""9 ..... ..-1-
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL HUMPHREYS-6 
Notary Public for Texas 
Residing at 0JV1 ·f\11trrl\ o ft 
MycomnnssiQnexpires:Aujust l2i 20\tp . 
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AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS ROLAND 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO 
COURT'S QUESTIONS REGARDING 
STANDING 
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STATE OF ___ ) 
)ss. 
County of ___ _,) 
Plaintiff Thomas Roland, first being duly sworn, subscribes and states as follows: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and, if called as a witness, 
could and would testify competently thereto. 
2, I reside at 4331 Little Willow Road with my wife, Marcia. My mother, Irene, 
resides at 4001 Little Willow Road. My father Cyril, who was also a Plaintiff in this action, 
passed away last month. 
3, My family operates a famtlng operation along Little Willow Road on which we 
have a dairy operation and raise com, wheat, alfalfa and both dairy and beef cows, 
4. The plan to build a nuclear power plant approximately four miles from our farm, 
wJit.ch has be~gapproved by Payette County, and the Development Agreement, have had and 
will continue to have a negative impact on my family's fanning business, 
5. The negative stigma of the planned nuclear plant impacts our dairy operation 
because everything that a cow consumes ends up going into its milk. 
6. I. as an experienced dairy farm.er can, by the taste of the mi~ distinguish between 
the types of feed that a cow has been consuming. 
7. The milk industry is extremely sensitive to any matter that could possibly taint its 
product and I anticipate that we may have a reduced demand for my farm's milk because of our 
location within a few miles of the planned AEHI nuclear plant. 
8. We routinely use Little Willow Road to move our farm equipment and even if 
Little Willow Road is only used for secondary access to the proposed nuclear plant, it v.ill still 
have a negative impact on our farming operations. Little Willow Road is a nan-ow. less than 25 
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feet wide in places, winding farm road vvith no shoulders. no center line and many patches and 
repairs. 
9. A lot of the farm equipment that we move on the road is sixteen to eighteen feet 
wide) including the corrugator and com planter. The disc, shredder and grain drill are fourteen to 
sixteen feet wide. 
10. Given the number of construction workers and regular employees that will be 
driving on the access roads to the nuclear plant, I do not know how we vvill be able to use Little 
Willow Road, which has been a key part of my family's farming operation for more than fifty 
years. 
11. Ifwe wanted to sell our farm, the fact that it is near the Payette County.approved 
AEHI site would have a negative impact on the marketability and the price we might receive. As 
an experienced farmer, I would not be interested in acquiring a farm near a planned or existing 
nuclear plant. 
12. Even without an accident, the perception that a nuclear accident could happen 
nearby is enough for me and m.ost people that I know. It is the risk of an accident that would 
discourage me from thinking about acquiring a faun near where a nuclear plant was located, or 
might be located. 
13. The County-approved plan for AEHI to build a nuclear power plant near my 
family's farm has interfered 'With our use and enjoyment of the farm and our rural lifestyle. 
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.\ 
DATED Thlsll""day of November, 2012 
~~~ 
---1homas Roland 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO Before me, the undersigned Notary Public, this :rr~ 
day of November, 2012. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF PAT THACKER IN 
SUPPORT OF CIVIL LAWSUIT 
REQUESTING INJUNCTIVE 
RELIEF, DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT, AND OTHER 
EQUITABLE RELIEF 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Pat Thacker, first being duly sworn, subscribes and states as follows: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and, if called as a witness, 
could and would competently testify thereto. 
2. I have extensive experience in the purchase and sale of ranch and farm prope11ies 
in Southwestern Idaho. I am a real estate broker licensed by the State ofidaho. 
3. I have been asked for my opinion about the impact that the proposed nuclear 
power plant, as reflected in the AEHI/Payette County Development Agreement, the Rezone, and 
the Variance, will have on the properties owned by the Plaintiffs that are all located within ten 
miles of the proposed plant. 
4. I have personal knowledge of the Little Willow, Stone Quarry and Big Willow 
area. I am also familiar with the properties owned by Plaintiff Tom Pence (5433 Big Willow 
Road), the H Hook Ranch (10495 Stone Quarry Road), Jeffrey Weber (10465 Stone Quarry 
Road), Clifford and Mary Morgan (7405 Little Willow Road), the Ro lands ( 4001 and 4331 Little 
Willow Road), and Jim Underwood (8720 Little Willow Road). 
5. It is my opinion that Payette County's approval and accommodation of the AEHI 
plan to build a nuclear power plant has and will continue to reduce the value of properties that 
are located adjacent or nearby to the proposed site of the plant. I also believe that any effort to 
sell or market properties adjacent or near to the proposed plant will be hampered by the 20-year 
Development Agreement as well as the rezoning and variance. I have reached these conclusions 
after consideration of many different factors, including the following: 
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a. The Payette County 20-year Development Agreement, the Rezone 
from agriculture to industrial, and the height variance are Adverse Material Facts 
that would need to be disclosed to any potential purchaser of property adjacent or 
near to the proposed nuclear plant. This is a requirement in Idaho and it would 
apply to any property owner within the IO-mile Emergency Planning Zone. 
Nuclear facilities have a negative stigma and this stigma is even stronger after the 
Fukashima disaster. 
b. I have talked with some of the most active purchasers of ranch and 
farm land in Southwest Idaho. Without exception, I have been told by these 
individuals that they would not be interested in acquiring land near the proposed 
nuclear plant. In fact, several of these individuals indicated that they would not 
be interested even if a substantial discount was provided to the price of the 
property. 
c. I have reviewed literature relating to the impact that nuclear power 
plants have on the value of surrounding prope1iies. One of the things that I 
noticed was that agricultural land is more negatively impacted than residential 
properties because agricultural land does not receive any of the so-called benefits 
that may come from a nuclear plant (i.e., better paying jobs and potentially 
increased tax base). 
d. The value of the cattle and crops raised from the ranches and fanns 
near the nuclear power plant will be negatively impacted. Regardless of whether 
there is any type of accident, the fact that cattie and crops are associated with the 
nuclear power plant will adversely affect the market. For example, · at the 
Winnemucca cattle auctions, there win certainly be a negative impact when cattle 
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are described as having been raised near the Payette nuclear power plant versus 
cattle raised practically anywhere else. Similarly, people who currently purchase 
hay or milk from the Little Willow farms will be less likely to make those smne 
purchases if the hay or milk is associated with the Payette nuclear plant. 
e. In my experience, there is oftentimes a premium attached to ranch 
and farm properties in Idaho, particularly by out-of-state buyers, who are looking 
for rural property with recreational attributes, particularly for hunting. The 
proposed plant and all of the traffic that it would bring to the Big Willow, Stone 
Quarry, Little Willow area would undoubtedly discourage that type of out-of-state 
purchaser. 
' , .. ;-/.., 
DATED This J.i.. day of November, 2012 
10J 
I k:l!J! / 
/Pay'fhi~~ 
/ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO Before me, the undersigned Notary Public, this (l!)~ 
day of November, 2012. 
SALLY ANDERSON 
Notary Public 
State of klaho 
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COUNTY OF PAYETTE, a political subdivision of ) 




STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
I, Mark W. Richey, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 
1. I am a State Certified Appraiser in Idaho and Oregon, a designated member of the 
Appraisal Institute, and a Professional Member of the American Society of Farm Managers and 
Rural Appraisers. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and, if called as a witness, 
could and would testify competently thereto. 
2. I have conducted an investigation regarding the effects on neighboring real 
property of Payette County's recent land-use decisions authorizing the development of a nuclear 
power plant in the Little Willow Creek neighborhood in Payette County. My opinions are 
effective as of November 15, 2012. 
3. The definitions I relied on for this project are as follows: 
Market Value 
The most probable price which a property should bring in a competitive and open market 
under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller each acting prudently and 
knowledgeably, and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus. Implicit in this 
definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specified date and the passing of title 
from seller to buyer under conditions whereby: 
1. Buyer and seller are typically motivated; both parties are well informed or 
well advised, and acting in what they consider their best interests; 
2. A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market; 
3. Payment is made in terms of cash in U.S. dollars or in terms of financial 
arrangements comparable thereto; and 
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4. The price represents the normal consideration for the property sold 
unaffected by special or creative financing or sales concessions granted by anyone 
associated with the sale. 1 
External Obsolescence 
An element of depreciation; a diminution in value caused by negative externalities and 
generally incurable on the part of the owner, landlord, or tenant.2 
Environmental Stigma 
An adverse effect on property value produced by the market's perception of increased 
environmental risk due to contarnination.3 
Exposure Time 
1. The time a property remains on the market. 
2. The estimated length of time the property interest being appraised would 
have been offered on the market prior to hypothetical consummation of a sale at 
market value on the effective date of the appraisal; a retrospective estimated based 
on an analysis of past events assuming a competitive and open market. 4 
4. The scope of my assignment and the extent of this investigation included the 
following: 
1. researched locations of existing commercial nuclear generating facilities in 
the West; 
2. obtained basic familiarity with nuclear power generating facilities 
oversight and regulatory guidelines impacting surrounding areas; 
3. reviewed articles pertaining to real property in proximity of nuclear 
generating facilities; 
4. interviewed Institutional investors; 
5. interviewed lenders; 
6. interviewed real estate brokers; 
1 The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal, Fifth Edition, 2010, pp. 122-123. 
2 The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal, Fifth Edition, 2010, p. 73. 
3 Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, 2012-2013 Edition, p. A-18. 
4 The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal, Fifth Edition, 2010, p. 73. 
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7. toured the neighborhood, including a "drive-by" of the site proposed for 
the nuclear generating facility; and 
8. determined the effects to real estate in the Little Willow Creek 
neighborhood due to proximity of a nuclear power generating facility. 
5. A copy of my professional qualifications has been attached to this Affidavit as 
Exhibit A. I am familiar with this neighborhood because I have made appraisals on various 
properties in the area during my career. Some ofmy clients include John Stringer, OX Ranch, 
Fred Humphreys, H-Hook Ranch, Harry Bettis, Darrel Barker, and Ralph Crawford. Each of 
these appraisal assignments were of ranch properties. Agriculture, both farming and ranching, is 
the primary economic practice of most of the property owners within this neighborhood and is 
considered a conforming use. There have been a few acreage-type homes constructed within this 
neighborhood over the past twenty years. Other than these few homes, I have not observed any 
significant transition or change in use in this neighborhood. 
6. Throughout my career, I have appraised real estate that is subject to eminent 
domain actions where a change or stigma occurs that was caused by various projects. For these 
reasons, I understand the process and investigation required to appraise property that has 
experienced external obsolescence, environmental stigma, project blight, or a combination of 
these physical or legal conditions. This report describes the steps I took in obtaining the 
competency required by USP AP to provide professional assistance in this assignment and afford 
a credible opinion(s). 
7. General information regarding costs, benefits, problems, and basic regulations 
were reviewed. What I considered important for this initial investigation are the emergency 
planning zones. li Ph.1...1ne Exposure Pathway Zone extends out from a facility \\<ith a 10-mile 
radius. This zone is concerned with exposure to, and inhalation of, airborne radioactive 
contamination. The second is an Ingestion Pathway Zone that reaches out over an area within a 
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50-mile radius of the plant. This zone is concerned with the ingestion of food and liquids that 
may become contaminated by radioactivity. Regardless of the zone, these types of designations / 
map overlays could create a preconceived negative stigma, which affects real estate at least 
during the initial announcement and planning process. 
8. I reviewed professional literature regarding real estate values in proximity to 
nuclear power generating facilities. The most current book that discusses issues pertinent to this 
type of project was written by Robert A. Simons, When Bad Things Happen to Good Property. 
He discusses the effects external conditions have on real property and includes a formula to 
calculate the "after" values. Additional articles include: 
Externalities of Nuclear Power Plants: Further Evidence, Sherman Folland and 
Robbin Hough. This is a good article that relates environmental stigma to farms. 
The authors conclude that a value decline of 10 percent can occur out 60 miles 
from a facility. They also relate the risk to the farms in proximity to a nuclear 
power facility having more risk and less profit as well as uncertainties due to 
health consequences of the commodities produced. One additional comment in 
this article is that they expect reduction in land rent for a farm with proximity to 
one of these facilities in comparison to a farm with no proximity characteristics. 
Standard on the Valuation of Properties Affected by Environmental 
Contamination, International Association of Assessing Officers. They conclude 
that proximity to a nuclear power plant is likely to produce a negative value 
effect. 
The Impacts of nuclear facilities on property values and other factors in the 
surrounding communities, Roger H. Bezdek and Robert M Wendling. They 
conclude that long-term impact may be nil. However they go on, "but this does 
not necessarily remove the issue from the agenda of public concern, and that the 
short-run adjustment costs borne by some located near nuclear power sites may be 
substantial." This conclusion relates to the subject neighborhood because the 
approval was recent, and the uncertainty with potential affects is likely at its peak. 
The Effect of Power Plants on Local Housing Values and Rents, Lucas W. Davis. 
This author concludes residential neighborhoods within two miles of nuclear 
power generating plants experience 3 to 7 percent value/rent reductions, and goes 
on to say that there are larger value decreases within one mile of a facility. This 
aspect is of concern in the subject neighborhood because there are residential 
building improvements. 
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summary, the weight of the research indicates a material reduction in market value which 
begins with the approval of the local zoning decision. 
10. An important concern regarding liquidity is the ability of an owner to refinance a 
property in this type of neighborhood or a buyer to obtain financing. I interviewed a few of the 
primary agricultural lenders to learn if there are any lending guidelines that would adversely 
affect the ability to finance. If there is no financing, a seller would need to find a cash buyer, and 
this would limit the pool of potential buyers to a point that could cause a major hardship on an 
owner. 
11. Robb Steinke of Rabobank America indicated they would consider a loan on an 
agricultural property in this neighborhood as long as the market value reflected the external 
condition and perceived market risk. Mr. Steinke said they had made loans for properties 
adjacent to the INEL facility in Eastern Idaho, but qualified that statement with the fact this 
neighborhood has a track record, and it is an experimental/developmental facility rather than an 
active generating facility. Regardless, Mr. Steinke stated that a loan-to-value ratio less than the 
current 65/35 for good credit customers or 55/45 for normal customers would not apply. A 
40/60 loan-to-value ratio would be likely. 
12. Erin Plumb with AXA-Equitable AgriFinance stated he was not familiar with any 
"like" scenario within their institution. He thought financing under the scenario of an 
open-ended 20-year development agreement for a nuclear power plant would likely cause his 
institution not to lend on that type of property. 
13. Jack McCall of Clear Creek Land & Mortgage stated he was involved in 
financing a large fa1-rn in the Magic Valley 20+ years ago that was adjacent to a former landfili. 
At that time he said, "It took a very expensive environmental impact study prior to getting the 
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loan approved." Mr. McCall did not think it would be possible under the current regulatory 
overview to get a loan approved under the scenario I described with his institutional investor, 
MetLife Agricultural Investments. He commented that the potential for the construction of a 
nuclear power plant would be an adverse condition and a "prison would be a better neighbor." 
Mr. McCall thought that once the facility was constructed it would be difficult for the operators 
in the neighborhood to market and or sell their potatoes or cattle. 
14. I interviewed three real estate brokers regarding the marketability of a property 
within a neighborhood targeted for the construction of a nuclear power generating facility. 
Brokers have good insight to the whims of market participants, and if they perceive difficulty in 
marketing, several conditions occur. Some of these would be the loss of enjoyment, stigma, and 
liquidity. Trent Jones of Hall and Hall in Ketchum, indicated that none of his buyers would be 
interested in a property within a neighborhood impacted by a potential nuclear power generating 
facility. He would not be interested in listing a property in this neighborhood because his buyers 
would not consider even looking due to the externality and perceived risk. 
15. Henri Lemoyne of Lemoyne Realty and Appraisal in Twin Falls, markets and 
sells agricultural real estate throughout southern Idaho. Mr. LeMoyne stated that if they were 
priced right, recognizing the external condition, he would market properties in this 
neighborhood. He qualified his comments that the price( s) would need to be less than competing 
areas unaffected by the uncertainty caused by the potential for the construction of a nuclear 
power generating facility. He stated, "[a]II environmentally sensitive purchasers would be 
eliminated from the pool of potential buyers," under the scenario I discussed. 
16. Kim Brnce, Silverhawk Realty in Frn.itland has a 445-acre property for saie on 
Little Willow Creek. It was listed in March of2012 for $350,000 and reduced in September of 
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2012 to $319,500. I asked her ifthere had been market interest, and she said there has been by 
local purchasers. Ms. Bruce indicated that while non-local purchasers may be affected by the 
potential of a nuclear power plant, local purchasers are not as affected because, according to Ms. 
Bruce, the typical response from a local purchaser when told about the nuclear power plant is 
that if there is a problem plant it will not make any difference if you are within one mile or ten 
miles away from the plant. That said, the property has not sold, and the external 
location/neighborhood characteristics are built into the asking price. Given the current strong 
market for agricultural real estate, it is unusual that this property has been on the market as long 
as it has, which tends to demonstrate that there are concerns regarding external obsolescence. 
17. I have re-inspected the neighborhood as part of this assignment. No significant 
changes have occurred over the past twenty years regarding highest and best use. Agriculture 
remains the predominant land use and is considered a conforming use. 
18. Based on my investigation, I have concluded there have been adverse effects on 
real property within the Little Willow Creek neighborhood created by the granting of the 
Development Agreement to AEHI by Payette County and the associated zoning changes, etc. 
Those adverse effects are: 
1. Stigma - perceived or actual, 
2. Loss of enjoyment, 
3. Extended exposure time, 
4. Limited demand pool, 
5. Financing- difficult and lower loan to value ratios, 
6. Liquidity has been affected 
7. Increased capitalization/discount rates. 
Each of these elements individually or combined have an adverse effect on the real property in 
the subject neighborhood. It is difficult to measure the extent of the stigma or loss of value 
without conducting a complete valuation and carrying this analysis forward to an appraisal of 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK W. RICHEY IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO 
COURT'S QUESTIONS REGARDING STANDING - 8 
each property owned by your clients. Nevertheless, based on my investigation to date, it is my 
opinion that the value of the Plaintiffs' Petitioners' properties have been decreased due to the 
Development Agreement and accompanying zoning changes which authorize the development of 
a nuclear power plant in close proximity to the Plaintiffs' properties. This decrease in value 
occurred immediately upon the public announcement 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this __ day of November 2012. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
My Commission expires: i I - 7 - ;;2 0 I 3 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR LEA VE TO FILE BRIEF IN EXCESS OF 
50 PAGES, Page 1 
This memorandum is submitted in support of Petitioners' Motion for Leave to File Brief 
in Excess of 50 Pages. Respondent, Payette County, and Intervenor, Alternate Energy Holdings, 
Inc. (herein "Respondents") have objected, in their Reply Brief, to the filing of an over length 
brief by Petitioners. Respondent and Intervenor's Brief, page 12, footnote 3. Petitioners submit 
that there is good cause for the filing of a brief in this matter in excess of 50 pages. 
First, it should be noted that the Respondents' specific objection to Petitioners' brief is to 
the attachment of Appendices A and B to the brief. Appendix A is a list of the names and 
addresses of each of the Petitioners, indicating the distance of each Petitioner's property from the 
power plant approved by the County. Appendix A was included in anticipation that Respondents 
would object to Petitioners' standing to pursue their Petition for Judicial Review. Appendix B is 
a summary of some of the evidence contained in the record which supports the standing of the 
Petitioners to pursue their Petition for Judicial Review. It was also included in anticipation of 
the Respondents' attack on Petitioners' standing. 
Second, those appendices do not count towards the 50 page limit set forth in I.A.R. 34(b ). 
Indeed, that rule expressly provides that "[n]o brief in excess of 50 pages, including covers and 
anything contained between them excluding addendums or exhibits, shall be filed without the 
consent of the [court]." (Emphasis added) Therefore, Respondent's objection that the brief is 
over-length on account of Appendix A and Appendix B is without merit. 
That said, Petitioners recognize that even taking the appendices out of the equation, the 
brief is still slightly over-length. There is good reason for this. The Court will no doubt recall 
that there are presently pending before the Court two Petitions for Judicial Review filed by 
Petitioners, one seeking review of Payette County's approval of a variance (Case 
No. CV-2011-335) and this one, seeking review of Payette County's approval of a related 
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conditional rezone. After briefing was completed in the variance appeal, Intervenor, Alternate 
Energy Holdings, Inc. ("AEHI"), filed a motion seeking to have certain Petitioners dismissed 
from the action on the grounds they lack standing to pursue their appeal. That motion was 
briefed and argued before this Court and is pending a decision. 
In an effort to avoid a similar attack on Petitioners' standing in this appeal, Petitioners 
elected to more fully address AEHI's standing arguments in their opening brief. To do so, 
Petitioners devoted approximately ten pages of briefing to the standing issue and the related issue 
of prejudice to Petitioners' substantial rights in their opening brief. Petitioners also attached 
Appendix A in order to provide the Court information about the locations of Petitioners' 
properties in relation to the approved power plant, information which AEHI argued was missing 
from the briefing in the variance appeal. In addition Petitioners attached, as Appendix B, a 2 ½ 
page summary of some of the evidence in the record supporting the Petitioners' standing. 
Contrary to Respondents' accusation, that Appendix was not included in an attempt to avoid an 
over length brief, but in an attempt to improve the readability of the Petitioners' brief by not 
including in the text of the brief itself, detailed information taken from the record, yet making 
that information convenient for the Court to review. 
If not for the need to address the issue of Petitioners' standing, Petitioners' brief could 
have met the 50 page limit demanded by Respondents. Fully addressing the standing issue was, 
of course, critical since, as Respondents have pointed out, the determination of that issue is a 
prerequisite to determination of the substantive appeal issues raised by Petitioners. The Court's 
decision on that issue will determine whether the Petitioners will have their day in Court. 
In addition to the foregoing, the Petitioners have identified seven separate substantive 
issues for determination by the Court in this appeal including whether the conditional rezone is 
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invalid because it is based upon an invalid comprehensive plan, whether the conditional rezone 
constitutes illegal spot zoning, whether the conditional rezone violates the provisions of the 
Payette County Code, whether the Development Agreement exceeds the statutory authority of 
the County, whether the Development Agreement is void for not having been properly adopted, 
whether Payette County's hearing notice and hearing proceedings violated the requirements of 
the Local Land Use Planning Act, Payette County's ordinances and principals of procedural due 
process and whether the Board's written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
inadequate. Examination of those issues requires detailed analysis of both factual matters and 
legal issues. In an attempt to keep the length of the brief manageable, however, Petitioners 
devoted only about 30 total pages to discussion of those issues, an average of just over four 
pages each (with a high of about 7 pages and a low of about 2 pages), resulting in a reiatively 
concise treatment of each issue. In other words, the substantive portions of the Petitioners' brief 
were not, in Petitioners' view, overwritten. There was simply a relatively long list of issues to 
address, requiring a brief somewhat longer than permitted by right under the rules. 
Finally, in making their objection to Petitioners' brief, the Respondents do not claim they 
are prejudiced by the length of Petitioners' brief. Respondents do not argue that Petitioners have 
been unfairly advantaged by the length of their brief, nor that Respondents have been unfairly 
disadvantaged. Respondents do not claim that Petitioners are unduly benefited as a result of the 
over length brief nor that they are unduly detrimented. Respondents simply object to the 
technical violation which this Court is free to excuse in the exercise of its discretion. 
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For the above reasons, Petitioners respectfully request that the Court authorize the filing 
of the Petitioners' October 18, 2012, brief in the above captioned matter. 
DATED: This {p t1--day of December, 2012. 
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1115 1st A venue North 
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Case No. CV 2011-959 
(Consolidated with CV 2011-335) 
OBJECTION TO 
PETITIONERS' REPLY BRIEF 
AND 
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR LEAVE 
TO FILE BRIEF IN EXCESS OF SO 
PAGES 
Appiicantiimervcnor Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. (''AEHI"), by and through its 
coum::el of record, objects to the additional affidavits attached to Petilioners' Reply Brief. AEHI 
also opposes Petitioners' aftcr-the~foct motion to allow an over-length brief, as set forth below: 
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OBJECTION 
hereby objects to the attempt to incorporate additional affidavits and testimony 
filed in Case No. CV-2012-364 in Petitioners· Reply Brief. Petitioners claim that this Court 
should take judicial notice of these affidavits: however, this matter is not a "civil action" (see, 
e.g .. Krempast.y v. Nez Perce County Planning and Zoning, 150 Idaho 231,239,245 P.3d 983. 
991 (2010)), but is, instead, a petition for judicial review driven by the separate rules, standards, 
and procedures contained in I.R.C.P. 84 and the Administrutivc Procedure Act (Title 67, Chapter 
52, Idaho Code). Those procedures require that the record before the Court be based solclv on 
the evidence presented before the agency below. See I.C. § 67-5277. Additional items may be 
included in the record only through the augmentation procedure identified in Ruic 84(1). 
The record is subject to review and settlement through a process identified in Rule 84(j). 
Thar process was drawn out to incredible lengths in this case: however, Petitioners, Respondent, 
and AEHI each agreed that the record was complete and settled upon filing of the Notice of 
Transmitting of Electronic Record of Consolidated Agency Record by the Respondent on 
October 4, 2012. The timeframe in which to supplement the record ran-at the latest1-from 
that time. Petitioners made no such motion. And an attempt to do so under these circumstances 
would be futile as the affidavits unmistakably fail to qualify under Rule 84(1), which requires that 
the "additional materials" be documents previously '"presented to the agency." 
AEHI respectfully requests that the additional affidavits be stricken from the record in 
this case. AEHI further requests that the affidavits also be stricken as their attachment to the 
Petitioners· Reply Brief renders the same well in excess of the limitations identified in Idaho 
Appellate Rule 34(b), which limits briefing to no more than fifty pages-cover to cover. 
1 Respondent previously filed a Norice of Tran.,·miuing of Agt:ncy Record on August 2, 2012. Thnt filing should be 
considered to haw triggered the timeframe in which to supplement; however, for purposes of argument. we assume 
that the timeframe for wpplementation began with the later filing on October 4. 20 I 2. 
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OPPOSITION MOTION TO FILE BRIEF EXCESS OF 
AEHI also opposes Petitioners' Motion for Leave to File Brief in Excess of 50 Pages. 
Contrary to Petitioners' assertion, there is no good cause for filing such an overlength brief. 
First, Petitioners claim AEHI forced them to file an ovcrlcngth brief by previously raising 
the issue of standing, stating, "If not for the need to address the issue of Petitioners' standing, 
Petitioners' brief could have met the 50 page limit demanded by Respondent::;," Petitioners· 
Memo in Support, at 3. In the saine breath, however, Petitioners reeogni%e that the issue is 
prerequisite to Petitioners' claims. Indeed, it is Petitioners' burden to allege standing to support 
their participation in this petition for judicial review. and the fifty pages allowed by rule is more 
than sufficient space in which to make the specific altegations required by Idaho case law. If 
Petitioners anticipated the argument and legitimately believed addressing standing would push 
them over the 50-page limit, then they should have asked for permission rather than forgiveness. 
Second, Rule 34(b) limits briefs to fifty pages, which includes "covers and anything 
contained between them excluding addendums or exhibits, ... " It should be noted, first, 
Petitioners have not labeled the additional pages as addenda or exhibits, but instead referred to 
them as appendices. In addition, while Petitioners' Brief is numbered up to page 52, Petitioners· 
Brief actually contains 58 pages from caption to certificate of delivery. From there, Petitioners 
add four additional pages labeled as appendices-again, not addenda or exhibits. Those 
additional pages contain allegations and argument that very easily could have been included 
within Petitioners' Brief: There is nothing in Rule 34(b) that allows Petitioners not to count the 
first six pages of their brief, and nothing in Rule 34(b) that permits Petitioners to skirt the 50-
page limit by placing additional allegation and argument in "appendices," Petitioners argument 
amounts to nothing more than an endaround of the appellate rules, and would have this Court 
adopt an interpretation that would render Rule 34(b) meaningless. 
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DA TED this 13th day of December 2012. 
SPINK BUTLER, LLP 
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Attorneys for Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. 
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( 
Petitioners submit this Memorandum response Alternate Energy 
Holdings) 's (AEHI) objection to Petitioners' Reply Brief. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
AEHI objects to Petitioners' request that this Court take judicial notice of several 
affidavits tiled by certain Petitioners and other witnesses1 in a related case pending before this 
Court, John W. Burlile> et al v. Alternate Energy Holdings Inc., et al, Case No. CV2012-364. 
For the Court's convenience, copies of those affidavits were attached to Petitioners• Reply Brief 
in this matter as Appendix A. Those affidavits were submitted in Case No. CV2012-364 in 
response to questions regarding the Plaintiffs' standing to pursue the claims made therein. Since 
similar questions regarding Petitioners' standing were raised in this case, Petitioners submitted 
the affidavits here to provide further evidence that Petitioners have standing to pursue this 
appeal. AEHI objects to the Court considering the affidavits on the ground that the Court's 
review of the action of the Payette County Board of County Commissioners (the "Boardn) in in 
this case must be based solely on the record of the administrative proceedings. As shown below, 
AEHI's objections to the affidavits are without merit. For purposes of establishing standing to 
contest the action of the Board~ the Court is not confined to the record made before the Boal'd, 
and may consider the affidavits of Petitioners and other witnesses. 
II. ARGUMENT 
This action was initiated as a petition for judicial review of the action of the Board in 
approving a conditional rezone for ce~in property in Payette County, the approval of which 
permitted AEHI to develop a nuclear power plant thereon. Petitioners are property owners and 
1 The affidavits in question were made by Plaintiffs John W. Burlile, Jeffrey G. Weber, Thomas F. Pence, 
Clifford D. Morgan, fames S. Underwood, Michaol Humphreys, as Managing Member of B-Hook LLC, and 
Thomas Roland; Pat Thacker, a licensed real estate broker; and Mark Richey, a real estt1.te appraiser. 
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residents rezoned property. Petition Judicial Review, the 
Petitioners alleged that they are '"affected persons having an interest real property which. may 
be adversely affected by the Board of County Commissioners• approval of the [conditional 
rezone] within the provisions of I.C. § 67-6521, whose substantial rights have been prejudiced 
within the meaning of I.C. § 67~5279(4)." In thefr opening brief, Petitioners further addressed 
the issue of standing by pointing out that all individual Petitioners reside on or own property 
adjacent to or within a few miles of the approved power plant and all within the ten~mile radius 
Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone of the approved power plant> where they 
are especially vulnerable to injury and haim in the event of an accident at the plant, that the 
nuclear plant, if constructed, would expose the Petitioners to injury and hann from the routine 
emission of radioactive water into the environment, that their use and enjoyment of their 
properties would be adversely impacted by the construction and operation of the power plant and 
that the values of their properties were diminished as a result of the approval of the conditional 
rezone. AEHI and Payette County (together the HRespondents,,) responded by arguing that the 
Petitione1s1 allegations were "insufficient to establish standing." Respondent and Intervenor's 
Brief, page 12. Petitioners' allegations, they say, are ill defined and lacking in detail. Id at 
page 13. 
In view of Respondents continued attacks on Petitioners' standing, Petitioners, in their 
Reply Brief, further described the basis for their standing and requested the Court take judicial 
notice of the above-described affidavits in which the factual basis for standing was described in 
greater detail. 2 
2 The informadon contained in the subject affidavits is not new or different from that which Petitioners have 
previously argued and relied upon. Rather, those affidavits simply provide greater detail in support of allegations 
previously made, 
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AEHI cites to no case law holding that a district court, considering an attack on a 
petitioner's standing to ,..,""'"""' judicial review of a zoning decision, is confined to the record 
made before the zoning body, and Petitioners are aware of none. Indeed, such a requirement 
would make little sense, since standing is a matter for detennination by the Court, not th.e Board 
of County Commissioners. Standing ls a preliminary question the Court resolves before reaching 
the merits of the case. Hawkins v. Bonneville County Board of Commissioners, 151 Idaho 228, 
231, 254 P .3d 1224, 1227 (2011 ). It is a jurisdictional issue and as such is a question of law for 
determination by the Court. Christian v. Mason, 148 Idaho 149, 151, 219 P.3d 473 (2009). 
Standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have 
adjudicated. Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371; 375, 913 P.2d 1141, 
1145 (1996). As has been previously pointed out, to have standing in a land use case the 
Petitioners need to allege, not prove, only that the development could potentially harm his 
or her real estate interest. Hawkins, supra. i at 231. Said simply, a determination of standing to 
pursue judicial review is a legal question for determination by the court1 not by the agency whose 
action is the subject of review. 
The Local Land Use Planning Act does not require that a person interested in an 
application being considered by a planning and zoning commission or a governing board first 
establish standing in order to participate in a hearing on that application. In fact, the Local Land 
Use Planning Act does not even require that an "affected person" eligible to seek judicial review, 
as defined in I.C. § 67-6521, participate in the hearings before the decision making body. The 
need to consider a party•s standing to pursue a petition for judicial review a.rises only after a 
petition for judicial review has been filed, an event which takes place after the zoning body has 
held its hearings and made its decision. Zoning boards do not make factual findings or reach 
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legal conclusions about standing and certainly the Board made no such factual findings nor 
._,a,du1.,u any such legal conclusions this case. Accordingly, there is simply no reason for the 
issue to be addressed during administrative proceedings and no reason for the Court to be 
confined to consideration of the administrative record in making its determination of a 
petitioner's standing. Instead. where the is.sue of standing is raised, as here, after the 
administrative proceedings have been completed, the Court is free to consider additional 
evidence in support of a party's standing to pursue judicial review. 
A recent Idaho Supreme Court decision that addressed standing in a land use case relied 
upon affidavits that had been presented to the court considering the petition for judicial review. 
In In the Matter of the Jerome County Board of Commissioners, 153 Idaho 298, 281 P.3d 1076 
(2012) the court was asked to determine the standing of the various petitioners contesting Jerome 
County's approval of a permit for a livestock confinement operation (an "LCO'l As is common 
in such cases3, in addressfog the standing issue, the court briefly described the facts and 
circumstances bearing on the standing of the various petitioners saying: 
"Next, we find that the record contains sufficient allegations that the LCO 
could potentially harm the individual property owners' real estate and health 
interests. Evidence was presented to the board regarding probable compromised 
resale value of existing homes in the area, odors, and possible health concerns. 
These could each be categodzed as threatened hann.u [internal citations omitted] 
281 P.3d at 1087. 
The court went on to point out, however, that "[t)he record on appeal includes an 
affidavit from the Idaho Rural Council, Inc. stating that 'several [members] own and farm real 
3 In most such land use cases where the issue of standing has been raised, the court briefly discusses the fa.ctual basis 
for a. dete1minatfon of standing, but does not state the source of those facts~whether they are contained entirety in 
the administrative record or alleged in the petition for judicial review, or addressed in the petitioners' briefing. 
Petitioners have found no Idaho case, however, where the court h11s stated that it must confine itself to the 
administrative record in determining the issue of standing. 
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property adjacent to the proposed Big Sky LCO ... several who live on such prope1iy.' 
... An affidavit from ICARE names three members whose primary residences are within one 
mile of the proposed LCO ... " 281 P.3d at 1087Hl088. Based on those affidavits, the court 
found that those organizations had standing to appeal the board's decision. By relying on those 
affidavits to support allegations of standing to pursue the petition for judicial review, it is 
apparent the Supreme Court did not believe it was confined to the administrative record. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that the administrative record in an 
appeal brought by a petition for judicial review may be supplemented with affidavits submitted 
for purposes of establishing standing. In Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Bonneville 
Power Administration, 117 F .3d 1520 (9th Cir. 1997), the petitioners submitted affidavits to the 
court to establish standing. The administrative agency (Bonneville Power Administration) 
moved the court to strike the affidavits (as AEHI has done here). The Court denied the motion 
and agreed to consider the affidavits saying: 
"Because Article Ill's standing requirement does not apply to agency 
proceedings, petitioners had no reason to include facts sufficient to establish 
standing as a part of the administrative record. We therefore consider the 
affidavits not in order to supplement the administrative record on the merits. but 
rather to determine whether petitioners can satisfy a prerequisite to this court's 
jurisdiction .... Because standing was not at issue in earlier proceedings, we hold 
that petitioners in this case were entitled to establish stariding anytime durin1ithe 
briefing phase. We consider the affidavits solely to determine whether petitioners 
have standing to bring this action." 
117 F.3d at 1527-1528. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has also recently applied the rule. In U.S. 
Magnesium, LLC v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 690 F.3d 1157 (10th Cir. 
2012), the petitioners sought judicial review of an action of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA). The EPA argued that the petitioner lacked standing to pursue the appeal. In an 
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to establish its standing, the petitioner attached an affidavit to its :reply brief, In agreeing 
consider affidavit for the purpose of determining whether the petitioner had standing to 
challenge the EPA~ s action, the court said: 
"Before addressing whether U.S. Magnesium has standing, we must first 
determine whether we can consider the declaration of Bryce Bird, Director of 
UDAQ (Bird Declaration), which U.S. Magnesium attached to its reply brief. 
Generally, parties petitioning for review of agency decisions may only reply on 
evidence in the administrative record, but> as we have recognized, 1 [b ]ecause 
Article Ill's standing requirement does not apply to agency proceedings, [US 
Magnesium) had no reason to include facts sufficient to establish standing as a 
part of the administrative record.' Qwest Commc 'ns Int'! v. FCC, 240 F.3d 8861 
892 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Nw. Envtl. Def Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 117 
F.3d 1520, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1997)." 
690 F.3d at 1164. The court went on agree with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Northwest 
Environmental Defense Center that the petitioners were entitled to establish standing anytime 
during the briefing phase and relied on the affidavit attached to the petitioner's reply brief in its 
consideration of the issue. 
This Court should likewise consider the affidavits submitted by the Petitioners in this 
case. The situation regarding standing here is similar to the situations in Northwest 
Environmental Defense Center and US. Magnesium. H~re the statutory requirements for 
standing do not apply to the County's proceedings. The issue of standing arises only once a 
petition for judicial review has been :filed. Because standing was not an issue in those earlier 
proceedings, Petitioners should be permitted to establish standing now, by affidavit submitted 
during briefing. Moreover; because it is the Court, not the agency which makes the 
determination on standing, the Court is permitted to consider additional evidence in order to aid 
the Court, s determination of the issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Petitioners request the Court overrule AEHI' s 
Objection to Petitioners' Reply Brief and take judicial notice of the above described affidavits. 
DATED this 21st day of December 2012, 
Wade L. Woodard 
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I hereby certify that on this 21st day of December 2012> a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Anne Marie Kelso 
Payette County Prosecutor 
1115 1st Avenue North 
Payette1 ID 83661 
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CASE NO. CV 2011-959 
CV2011-335 
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF 
On December 6, 2012, Petitioners filed a Motion by Petitioners for Leave to File 
Brief in Excess of 50 Pages. The motion was brought pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(p) and 
I.AR. 34(b). Petitioners assert that the additional length was necessary to address 
standing issues that were raised in a related appeal currently before this Court. Next, 
Petitioners assert that there are seven substantive issues, not including standing, to be 
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considered by the Court. Additionally, Petitioners assert that under the Rule(s). 
appendices are not included in the total page count. Finally, Petitioners state that 
Respondents are not prejudiced by the length of the brief. 
The Intervenor filed an Objection to Petitioners' Reply Brief and Response to 
Motion for Leave to File Brief in Excess of 50 pages on the grounds that the additional 
affidavits were not before the Board, and therefore cannot be considered by this Court 
on review. Further, the briefing is required to be no more than fifty pages, cover to 
cover. Finally, if more than fifty pages was needed to address the issues in this matter, 
the Petitioners should have requested permission prior to filing the brief, rather than 
asking for forgiveness after the fact. Intervenor requests that the affidavits be stricken. 
Idaho Ru!e of Civil Procedure Rule 84(p) provides as follows: 
Briefs and memoranda shall be in the form and arrangement and filed and 
served within the time provided by rules for appeals to the Supreme Court 
unless otherwise ordered by the district court; provided that such briefs 
may be typewritten and copies may be carbon copies or photo copies. 
Only one {1) original signed brief need be filed with the court and copies 
shall be served on all parties. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 34(b} then provides, "No brief in excess of 50 pages, 
including covers and anything contained between them excluding addendums or 
exhibits, shall be filed wfthout consent of the Supreme Court." The Petitioners' brief, 
which is in excess of the fifty page limit even without any of the attached documents, 
was filed prior to obtaining permission for the overlength filing. The Intervenor objects to 
the excessive length of the brief on the grounds that there is no good cause to support 
the length. Although the Court wourd prefer that a motion to file a brief in excess of fifty 
pages be made prior to the actual filing of the overlength brief1 in this case the number 
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of issues in this appeal and the complexity thereof do warrant the additional briefing 
provided. Therefore, the Petitioners' Motion will be granted with respect to the brief only. 
With respect to the attached appendices, the Court's review is necessarily limited 
to the factual record that was before the county. LC.§ 67-5277; St. Luke's Magic Valley 
Reg'! Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. of County Com'rs of Gooding County, 150 Idaho 484, 486, 
248 P.3d 735, 737 (2011). Because those affidavits, and the infonnation contained 
therein, were not before the Board in this matter, they cannot be considered during this 
Court's review of the Board's decision. The affidavits contained within Appendix A and B 
will therefore be stricken. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion by Petitioners for Leave to File Brief in 
Excess of 50 Pages is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 
DATED: \_\(1'.fc..\A. 7-Cj t 20\~ 
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Stephen A. Bradbury 
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1015 W Hays St 
Boise, ID 83702 
Thomas A. Banducci 
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN, PLLC 
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Boise, ID 83702 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
NEIGHORS FOR THE PRESERVATION 
OF THE BIG AND LITTLE CREEK 
COMMUNITY, an unincorporated 
associations, et al .,, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF PAYETTE COUNTY, 
Respondents, 
and 
ALTERNATE ENERGY HOLDINGS INC., 
a Nevada corporation, 
Applicant/Intervenor. 
I. 
CASE NO. CV11-959 
CV11-335 
ORDER ON APPEAL AND ORDER OF 
REMAND IN CV11-959 
Course of Proceedings 
Petitioners appeal the Payette County Board of County Commissioners' 
(hereinafter, Board) decision to rezone property designated for agricultural use to heavy 
industrial use to allow the Intervenor to build and operate a nuclear power plant and to 
approve a Development Agreement and concept plan for the project. 
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Intervenor wishes to purchase property to build a nuclear power plant in Payette 
County. The land he wishes to purchase is zoned for agricultural purposes so 
Intervenor sought an amendment to the Payette County Comprehensive Plan, filed an 
application to rezone the land on which property is located from agricultural use to 
heavy industrial use, and a variance from the 125 feet height restriction for buildings in 
the Heavy Industrial zone. 
The applications for the zone change, the approval of a development agreement 
and conceptual plan, and a variance were filed on June 22, 2010. (R., pp. 166-175.) 
The Board designated a Technical Review Committee that held public meetings to 
address the above applications. Following the recommendation of that committee, 
Payette County Planning and Zoning Commission (hereinafter, Commission), posted 
notice and held public meetings on December 2 and 9, 2010. In advance of the 
hearings, hundreds of pages of documents were submitted and 47 people, both in favor 
of and opposed to the rezone, made statements 1 at the hearings on December 2, 2010 
and December 9, 2010. The Commission approved the variance and recommended 
the Board approve the rezone and Development Agreement. Various parties appealed 
the decision of the Commission to approve the variance. 
The Board held a public hearing on the rezone and the Development Agreement 
on June 6, 2011 and at that hearing, took statements2 from interested parties. (R., pp. 
3996-4021, Tr. 6/6/11, generally.) The Board deliberated on June 20, 2011, ultimately 
1 No orai testimony was given at the hearings on December 2 or December 9, 2010, as 
no person was placed under oath prior to making statements. (See infra.) Therefore, the 
court will treat the oral information given at the hearings as statements rather than 
testimony. 
2 For the reasons stated in footnote 1, and as discussed infra, there was no oral 
testimony, only statements. 
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granted the application and rezoned the land from agricultural use to heavy industrial 
use, and entered into a Development Agreement with Intervenor. The Board issued its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on August 29, 2011 (R., pp.4137-
4160,) and thereafter, adopted Ordinance 2011-03 to effectuate the rezone. (R., 
pp.4161.) Petitioners appeal the Board's decision to rezone the property and enter the 
Development Agreement. This matter was consolidated with Payette County Case CV-
2012-335 for purposes of Argument and Opinion because of the length of the record 
and the relationship between the issues. The Record, therefore, includes the materials 
and transcripts from the hearings in both cases. 
11. 
Issues on Appeal 
1. Whether the decision to approve the rezone is invalid for the reason that it was 
not based on a valid Comprehensive Plan as required by I.C. § 67-6511. 
2. Whether the decision to grant the rezone constitutes illegal spot zoning. 
3. Whether the decision to grant the rezone and Development Agreement was 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion because the use approved violates 
Payette County Code § 8-10-9, which prohibits any land or building in any zone 
to be used or occupied in any manner creating dangerous, injurious, noxious, or 
otherwise objectionable conditions, including the emission of harmful 
radioactivity, which could adversely affect the surrounding areas or adjoining 
premises. 
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4. Whether the County acted outside its statutory grant of authority in approving the 
Development Agreement, rendering the Development Agreement illegal and 
unenforceable. 
5. Whether the Board failed to properly adopt the Development Agreement. 
6. Whether the decision to approve the rezone and Development agreement 
violated the notice and hearing requirements of the Payette County Code, the 
Local Land Use Planning Act, and Petitioners' due process rights. 
7. Whether the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by the Board of 
County Commissioners were inadequate under the Local Land Use Planning Act 
and thereby violated Petitioners' due process rights. 
111. 
Standard of Review 
Preliminarily, this Court finds that the statements made at the December 2, 2010, 
and June 6, 2011 hearings were not testimony, as no individual oath or affirmation was 
given to any of the speakers. "The basic purpose behind an oath is to affirm the import 
and necessity of telling the truth." State v. Nunez, 138 Idaho 636, 641, 67 P.3d 831, 836 
{2003). Idaho Rule of Evidence 603 requires that before testifying, every witness must 
declare "by oath or affirmation" that he will tell the truth. State v. Hardman, 120 Idaho 
667, 670, 818 P.2d 782, 785 {Ct. App. 1991). The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act 
requires that, "all testimony presented at hearings will be given under oath or 
affirmation." IDAPA 58.01 .23.558. 
At the December 2, 2010 hearing, Mr. Osborn stated, "No one is going to be 
given an individual oath this evening, but everyone is going to be testifying under a 
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penalty of perjury." (Tr. 12/2/10, p.7, Ls. 7-9.) This statement is insufficient to transform 
statements into testimony for several reasons. First, a charge of perjury requires 
that an individual "having taken an oath" makes a false statement. IC. §18-5401 3• Mr. 
Osborn's statement that individuals would be subject to a penalty of perjury without 
having taken any oath is incorrect. Secondly, IDAPA requires that all testimony given at 
hearings be given under oath or affirmation. Thus, because there was no oath, there is 
no oral testimony, only statements by interested parties. 
Similarly, at the June 6, 2011 hearing, although the Board stated individuals 
would be sworn in before speaking (6/6/11 Tr., p.1, L.8,) it does not appear anyone was 
given an oath before making a statement and as such, there is no sworn testimony of 
any of the Petitioners in this hearing. (See, 6/6/11 Transcript, generally, and Record, 
pp.3993-4021.) 
The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) allows an affected person to seek 
judicial review of an approval or denial of a land use application, as provided for in the 
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA). Idaho Code § 67-6521(1 )(d) (2002); 
Evans v. Bd. Of Comm'rs of Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428, 430, 50 P.3d 443, 445 
(2002). The district court conducts judicial review of the actions of local government 
agencies. I.R.C.P. 84(a)(1) (2002). For purposes of judicial review of LLUPA decisions, 
a local agency making a land use decision, such as the Board of Commissioners, is 
treated as a government agency under IDAPA. Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 
3 I.C. 18-5401 provides" "Every person who, having taken an oath that he will testify, 
declare, depose, or certify truly, before any competent tribunal, legislative committee, 
officer, or person in any of the cases in which such an oath may by law be administered, 
wilfully and contrary to such oath, states as true any material matter which he knows to 
be false, is guilty of perjury." 
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357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000). The district court bases its judicial review on the record 
created before the local government agency. LR.C.P. 84(e)(1)." Evans v. Teton County, 
139 Idaho 71, 74, 73 P.3d 84, 87 (2003). Review on appeal is limited to those issues 
raised before the administrative tribunal. Balser v. Kootenai County Bd. of Comm'rs, 
110 Idaho 37, 40, 714 P.2d 6, 9 (1986). "[A]n appellate court will not decide issues 
presented for the first time on appeal." Id. "The court will not substitute its judgment for 
that of the [Board] on questions of fact." Id.; I.C. § 67-5279(1 ). Taylor v. Canyon County 
Bd. of Com'rs, 147 Idaho 424,431,210 P.3d 532, 539 (2009). 
The court must affirm the decision of the administrative tribunal unless the 
administrative tribunal erred and such error prejudiced the substantial rights of the 
appellant. I.C. § 67-5279(4)." Johnson v. Blaine County, 146 Idaho 916, 920, 204 P.3d 
1127, 1131 (2009). An administrative tribunal errs when its findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decision are: (a) in violation of the constitution or a statute; (b) in excess 
of its statutory authority; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3). 
In its Reply Brief, Petitioner asks the Court to take judicial notice of affidavits filed 
in Burlile, et.al. v. Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc. et.al., Canyon County Case CV-2012-
364. These affidavits are not present in the Record on Appeal and there is no indication 
that the affidavits were submitted to the Commission or the Board for their 
consideration. Therefore, because the affidavits were not presented to either the 
Commission or the Board, the Court declines to take judicial notice of the affidavits, as 
this Court sits in an appellate capacity and is therefore limited to reviewing the facts as 
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established by the agency from which the appeal is taken. Crown Point Development, 
Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 76, 156 P.3d 573, 577 (2007); l.C. § 67-5276. 
111. 
Certain Petitioners Have Not Established They Have A Bona Fide Interest In 
Real Property For Purposes Of Establishing Standing 
Standing is a preliminary question the Court must resolve before reaching the 
merits of the case. Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd. of Com'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 231, 
254 P .3d 1224, 1227 (2011 ), citing Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 143 
Idaho 704, 707, 152 P.3d 575, 578 (2007). LLUPA allows a person having a bona fide 
interest in real property who is adversely affected by a final decision granting approval 
for a rezone and an amendment to a comprehensive plan to petition for judicial review 
pursuant to IDAPA after exhausting all available remedies. I.C. §§ 67-652(i), 67-6516; 
Rollins v. Blaine Cnty., 147 Idaho 729, 731-32, 215 P.3d 449, 451-52 (2009); Evans v. 
Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 75, 73 P.3d 84, 88 (2003). Additionally, the "petitioner 
needs to allege, not prove, only that the development could potentially harm his or her 
real estate interests." Id. at 76, 73 P.3d at 89 (2003), see also, Hawkins v. Bonneville 
County Bd. of Com'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 231, 254 P.3d 1224, 1227 {2011 ). Thus, for 
standing, Petitioners must only allege, rather than "show'' prejudice to a substantial 
right: 
The language in LC. § 67-6535(c) instructing courts that "[o]nly those 
whose challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or violation of 
fundamental rights, not the mere possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a 
remedy or reversal of a decision" cannot be construed as a standing 
requirement. The existence of real or potential harm is sufficient to 
challenge a land use decision. 
ORDER ON APEAL AND ORDER OF REMAND IN PAGE-7 
Evans, 139 Idaho at 76, 73 P.3d at 89; Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 231, 254 P.3d at 1229. 
However, the record must contain evidence of both a property interest and the adverse 
effect on that property to establish standing. 
Petitioners allege that they have standing because: 
1. All of the individual petitioners reside or own property adjacent to, or within 
a few miles of, the proposed nuclear power plant (Petitioner's Brief, p.13); 
2. The organizational petitioners have standing to pursue the petition in their 
own right and on behalf of their individual members (Petitioner's Brief, 
pp.13-14); 
3. Individual Petitioners will be forced to live with the inherent risks of 
cataclysmic harm and diminution in the value of their properties resulting 
from the proximity of the power plant (Petitioner's Brief, p.14); 
4. The value of their property is immediately negatively affected by the mere 
possibility that a nuclear power plant may be built in the community 
(Petitioner's Brief, p.14 ); 
5. That there will be routine emissions of radioactive materials which will 
expose Petitioners to radiation or radioactive materials (Petitioner's Brief, 
pp.14-15); 
6. All petitioners reside or own property in the "Plume Exposure Pathway 
Emergency Planning Zone," as defined by the United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, exposing them to a greater risk of harm in the 
event of an accident (Petitioner's Brief, p.15); 
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7. There will be noise, dust and traffic related to the construction and 
operation of the power plant, thereby interfering with Petitioner's quiet 
enjoyment of their property (Petitioner's Brief, p.16); 
8. There will be a loss of business and commercial operations on the 
properties. (Petitioner's brief, p.16.) 
Respondent and Intervenor argue that Petitioners may not allege any adverse 
effects based on health or safety issues associated with radiological concerns or threats 
of harm caused by a nuclear accident, as health and safety issues related to 
radiological concerns are pre-empted by the federal government. In this, they are 
correct. 
The adverse effect relied upon by the Petitioners cannot be based upon safety or 
health concerns arising from radiological incidents of a nuclear power plant, as that area 
of law is are pre-empted by federal law and therefore, this Court has no subject matter 
jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims on those grounds. Moreover, because subject 
matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, Idaho State Insurance Fund By and 
Through Forney v. Turner, 130 Idaho 190, 191, 938 P.2d 1228, 1229 (1997), the Court 
must address this claim as raised by the Respondent and Intervenor, even where it was 
not previously raised. 
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as well as subsequent amendments, regulates 
nuclear reactors from the stand point of radiological health and safety concerns and 
those concerns are in the exclusive regulatory jurisdiction of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (hereinafter, "NRC"). 
Congress, in passing the 1954 [Atomic Energy] Act and in subsequently 
amending it, intended that the [t]ederal [g]overnment should regulate the 
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radiological safety aspects involved in the construction and operation of a 
nuclear plant, but that the [s]tates retain their traditional responsibility in 
the field of regulating electrical utilities for determining questions of need, 
reliability, cost, and other related state concerns. 
Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 300 Conn. 542, 552, 23 A.3d 1176, 1184 
(2011) citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation & 
Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190, 205, 103 S.Ct. 1713 (1983). 
In United States v. City of New York, 463 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), 
Columbia University received permission from the Atomic Energy Commission to build a 
nuclear reactor at the University for research purposes. Id. at 605. After completing the 
necessary licensing inspections and reviews, the NRC issued an operating license 
finding that the reactor could be "operated consonant with the public health and safety." 
Id. At the time, the City of New York did not require NRC licensees to obtain city 
certificates, permits or licenses prior to operation. Id. at 606. However, after Columbia 
received its federal operating license, the City, through its Board of Health, amended 
the Health Code which required NRC licensees, in addition to obtaining federal 
approval, to obtain additional certificates through the city. Id. The reason for the change 
was to address the City's obligation to provide emergency services based on any 
radiation releases or other nuclear incidents. Id. at 607. The City Commissioner denied 
Columbia's request for a certificate pursuant to the newly-enacted ordinance based 
"upon the possibility of injury to the health and safety of the public resulting from an 
accidental release of radiation." Id. 
The Court determined that because the City's decision "was based entirely upon 
the alleged possibility of injury resulting from an accidental release of radiation," an area 
in which the federal government had exclusive control, the City could not exercise any 
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control over the licensing and regulation of the reactor and therefore, the ordinance was 
invalid. Id. 
In Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d 266 
(1975), the Michigan Court of Appeals held that state courts were preempted from 
considering plaintiff's allegations concerning the workability of the nuclear power plant's 
emergency core cooling system and the possibility of nuclear accident. In that case, 
Marshall sought a declaratory judgment on the grounds that, among other things, a 
nuclear accident "would impair the marketability of his property, and result in a 
depreciation of the value thereof, and in a diminution in the rental value thereof ... " Id. at 
243, 237 N.W.2d at 273. He further claimed that the "results of a possible nuclear 
accident [would be] so catastrophic that the siting and location of the said plant is a 
private and/or public nuisance." Id. at 243, 237 N.W.2d at 273. 
After determining that the Atomic Energy Act granted exclusive jurisdiction over 
the area of radiological concerns to the federal courts, the Court held, 
We find that this state is preempted from regulating, and this Court from 
adjudicating, those matters which deal with dangerous radioactive 
hazards. Specifically, we hold that we are barred from considering 
plaintiff's allegations concerning the workability of the emergency core 
cooling system of defendant's plant and the possibility of nuclear accident. 
Id., at 247, 237 N.W.2d at 274. As such, the court could not consider or adjudicate any 
of Marshall's concerns regarding radiological hazards from the plant, although it could 
consider other, nonradiological hazards, such as steam, fog, and ice creating hazardous 
driving conditions. Id. at 247, 237 N.W.2d at 275. In support of its conclusion, the Court 
cited to 42 U.S.C. s 2021(k), which read as follows: 'Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for 
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purposes other than protection against radiation hazards." Id. at 249-50, 237 N.W.2d at 
(1975). 
Other courts have taken similar positions. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. 
Pollution Control Bd., 5 III.App.3d 800, 284 N.E.2d 342 (Ill.App.Ct. 1972) (state statute 
regulating level of radioactive discharge is preempted); New Jersey Dep't of Envir. 
Protection v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 69 N.J. 102,351 A.2d 337 (1976) (state 
regulation of spent nuclear material conflicting with AEC regulation of same is 
preempted); Pac. Legal Found. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 
659 F.2d 903, 921 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Congress's intent to assert exclusive federal control 
over the radiation hazards associated with nuclear materials is clear.") aff'd sub nom. 
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 
205,103 S. Ct. 1713, 1723, 75 L. Ed. 2d 752 ( 1983) ("the federal government should 
regulate the radiological safety aspects involved in the construction and operation of a 
nuclear plant, but the States retain their traditional responsibility in the field of regulating 
electrical utilities for determining questions of need, reliability, cost and other related 
state concerns.") 
All of Petitioners' claims about residing in the "Plume Exposure Pathway 
Emergency Planning Zone," exposure to "cataclysmic risk" or "radiation," and the 
adverse effects to their property are premised upon radiological concerns, which is an 
area of law preempted by federal law and therefore, this Court cannot adjudicate those 
claims. Petitioners must allege adverse effects other than the concerns about radiation 
emissions or other types of radiological accidents for the court to determine standing, 
therefore, the Court will not consider standing based on allegations 1, 3,4,5, and 6; 
ORDER ON APEAL AND ORDER OF REMAND IN CV11-959 PAGE-12 
rather it will consider only those adverse effects which are unrelated to claims of 
radiation or possible nuclear accident as establishing standing for purpose of this 
review. 
Respondent and Intervenor further argue that of the remaining allegations, the 
Petitioners have failed to identify specific adverse effects for each individual petitioner. 
A. Petitioner Neighbors for the Preservation of the Big and Little Willow Creek 
Community 
The Petitioner, Neighbors for the Preservation of the Big and Little Willow Creek 
Community, may have standing in its own right or solely as the representative of its 
members if it cannot establish injury to itself. Glengary-Gamlin Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. 
Bird, 106 Idaho 84, 675 P.2d 344 (Ct. App. 1983). "[T]o justify any relief the association 
must show that it has suffered harm, or that one or more of its members are injured." Id. 
at 515, 95 S.Ct. at 2213. Id. at 87,675 P.2d at 347, citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 
515, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2213 (1975). However, in order to establish standing the 
Organization must establish all three of the following elements: "(a) its members would 
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are 
germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted, nor the relief 
requested, requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Id. at 88, 675 
P.2d at 348 ( emphasis added). 
Petitioner asserts standing on two grounds: first, that standing is premised upon 
the "organization's [sic] members have standing to pursue the petition in their own right" 
and second, "the interests which they seek to protect in these proceedings are germane 
to each organization's purpose." (Petitioner's Brief, p.14.) 
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Although Petitioner cites to pages 3247-3261, and 3660-3667 of the Record as 
the location of the factual support to establish standing, the only mention of Neighbors 
for the Preservation of the Big and Little Willow Creek Community is on page 3248 of 
the Record, and the information, in its entirety, is as follows: 
The Neighbors for the Preservation of the Big and Little Willow Creek 
Community is an unincorporated association of potentially affected 
landholders, residents, and others with interests in the Big and Little 
Willow Creek Community who would be adversely affected by the 
approval of the Applications and resulting activities, including the same 
and similar adverse effects as described below for H Hook and others. 
(R., p.3248.) This summary indicates that the Petitioner organization is 
comprised of three different categories of people: potentially affected landholders, 
residents and others with interest. If standing is premised on the ability of the individual 
members to seek redress, that would require the individual members to have a bona 
fide real property interest that is adversely affected. This would exclude "residents and 
others with interests" absent some indication in the record that the residents and 
interested others were also landholders - an unlikely proposition given that landholders 
comprise a separate category. Residents and others with interest, without alleging that 
they are real property owners whose property will be adversely affected, are not those 
who could maintain the cause of action on their own, and therefore, do not confer 
standing on Petitioner organization. See, In re Jerome County Bd. of Com'rs, 153 Idaho 
298,281 P.3d 1076, 1088 (2012). 
Of the remaining members of the Organization who are landholders, there are no 
specifically identifiable members of the Organization that have a bona fide real property 
interest. Unlike the organizations in In re Jerome County Bd. of Com'rs, supra, in this 
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case, there is nothing in the Record that lists or otherwise indicates the membership of 
the Petitioner organization, whether those members hold property, and if so, where that 
property is located. Failing to specifically allege that an identified member of the 
organization has property that would be adversely affected deprives the Petitioner 
organization of standing on this basis. "As the record does not include any indication 
that Friends of Minidoka had a member who was an affected party suffering potential 
harm to real estate in the area surrounding the proposed LCO site, Friends of Minidoka 
cannot meet the first requirement for associational standing-no member has standing to 
sue in their own right." Id., at 410,281 P.3d at 1088. 
Even if the Petitioner Organization can point to an identifiable member, it has 
failed to allege any facts or claims related to the second and third elements of the 
standard. As to the second prong of the standard, "the interests which they seek to 
protect in these proceedings are germane to each organization's purpose," nothing in 
the Record supports this claim. Unlike the organizations in Glengarry-Gam/in, or In re 
Jerome County Bd. of Com'rs, the Record in this case does not contain any information 
about the constituents of the organization, why, how or when the organization was 
created, the goals or missions of the Organization or any other information that would 
indicate the Organization's purpose. Cf., Glengary-Gamlin Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. Bird, 
106 Idaho 84 (Ct. App. 1983). Finally, the Petitioner Organization has provided no 
claim or alleged any facts that neither the claim asserted, nor the relief requested, 
requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit and therefore, have not 
established the third prong of the test to acquire standing. 
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Because Petitioners have not alleged, provided factual support for, or argued the 
second and third bases for asserting standing, it has failed to meet its burden to 
establish it has standing to go forward, as issues not supported by argument or 
authority will not be reviewed. Cowan v. Bd. of Com'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 
501, 508, 148 P.3d 1247, 1254 (2006) ("[W]e will not address those issues because this 
Court does not consider issues not supported by argument or authority.") 
Even assuming it could establish a property interest, Petitioner Organization fails 
to sufficiently allege adverse effects as the only adverse effects alleged by the 
landholders are '"similar' effects described for H Hook and others." However, Petitioner 
H Hook's claims that it will be adversely impacted are based on particular factual 
representations - its proximity to the proposed development and the nature of its 
business as a cattle operation. There is no factual information in the Record about the 
proximity of the property interest of the Petitioner's landholders, what that property 
interest is or how that interest would be adversely affected by the Board's decision such 
that this Court can assess whether the owners have sufficiently alleged an adverse 
interest to their property. Therefore, the Petitioner Organization has failed to establish 
they have organizational standing to challenge the Board's decision and therefore, their 
appeal is dismissed. 
B. People for Payette's Future, Inc. 
As described in the Record, Petitioner is: 
An organization of over 90 members created to provide economic and 
other information and analysis, and to seek information, on land use, 
development, growth, and other issues affecting the future of Payette 
County. PFPF, acting for and on behalf of its 90-plus members, joins 
these comments and objections as to all procedural issues raised herein, 
including without limitation the County's failure to provide adequate notice 
of these Applications and an adequate opportunity to review and comment 
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on the application materials, all as required by Idaho law and the Local 
Land Use Planning Act, among other authorities. 
(R., p.3248.) The only identified individual members of the Petitioner Organization in 
the Record are Michael Humphreys, on behalf of, and whose family owns and operates. 
H Hook, LLC., (R., pp.111-112, 124; 3853-3854,) James Underwood (R., pp.124; 3854,) 
and Joe Bercik (R., p.3565.) To the extent any of those individuals can maintain a cause 
of action, then the Petitioner Organization has met the first prong of the test. 
The Petitioner has, however, failed to establish the second and third prongs of 
the test. As to the second element, the interest the Organization sees to protect is not 
germane to the organization's purpose as the Petitioner's mission or goal is to "provide 
economic or other information or to seek information" regarding various topics. These 
proceedings have no impact on the Petitioner's ability to gather, analyze or disseminate 
information and therefore, Petitioner has failed to establish this element. Notably, 
Petitioners make no argument in this regard. Similarly, the third element has not been 
alleged, supported or argued; therefore, Petitioner People for Payette's Future, Inc. has 
failed to sustain its burden establishing it has standing and the Court declines to further 
review the issue as issues not supported by argument or authority will not be reviewed. 
Cowan v. Bd. of Com'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 508, 148 P.3d 1247, 1254 
(2006) ("[W]e will not address those issues because this Court does not consider issues 
not supported by argument or authority.") Therefore, as to Petitioner People for 
Payette's Future, their appeal is dismissed. 
C. Petitioners Cody Burlile and Chris Burlile, De Burlile and Lori Pratt, John (Jack) 
Burlile and Linda Burlile, Jordan Cary and Harmony Cary, Susan Dahnke, Dale 
Dellinger and Jean Dellinger, Ray Denig and Jackie Denig, Richard Evey and 
Susan Evey, Lane Huddleston and Joyce Huddleston, Luke Huddleston, Jerry 
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Korn and Leon Korn, Cameron Mahler and Cindy Mahler. Cliff Morgan4 and Mary 
Morgan. Thomas Pence and Kimberly Christensen, Cyril Roland and Irene 
Roland, Tom Roland and Marcia Roland. Greg Semon and Terry Semon, Roger 
Smith and Mary Vivian Smith, Elizabeth Stephens, Dick Towner and Sue 
Towner. John Walgenback and Denise Morgan. Enrique Ybarra, Jr. 
The above-listed Petitioners assert standing on the basis of: 
1. All of the individual petitioners reside or own property adjacent to, or 
within a few miles of, the proposed nuclear power plant, (Petitioner's 
Brief, p.13); 
2. There will be noise, dust and traffic related to the construction and 
operation of the power plant, thereby interfering with Petitioner's quiet 
enjoyment of their property, (Petitioner's Brief, p.16); 
3. There will be a loss of business and commercial operations on the 
properties. (Petitioner's brief, p.16.) 
None of the above petitioners testified, either orally or in writing, about what 
property interest they have and what the adverse effect to their individual property 
would be. There is nothing in the record except general, unsworn statements that the 
"construction and eventual operation of the site could adversely affect marketability and 
value" (emphasis added) (R., p.3664,) or that there will be "noise, dust and traffic 
related to the operation of the power plant." None of these petitioners are listed as 
having property within 300 feet of the property boundaries (R., pp.184-186.) None of the 
petitioners provided oral testimony, written testimony or any written submissions as to 
4 Cliff Morgan appears in the complaint as an individual. He provided comments both 
as an individual (Tr., p.12/2/10, p.137, L.4-p.138, L.12) and as the President of Little 
Willow Irrigation District. (Tr., p.420, L. 21 - p.422, L.23; R., p.848). Because Little 
Willow Irrigation District is not listed as a Petitioner, Cliff Morgan is treated as an 
individual, rather than as the President of the Irrigation District, for the purposes of this 
Decision. 
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how the noise, dust or traffic would specifically impact them, or what business and 
commercial ventures would be lost as a result of the Board's decisions. 
In Ciszek v. Kootenai County Bd. of Com'rs, 151 Idaho 123,129,254 P.3d 24, 30 
(2011 ), Ciszek provided an affidavit alleging that the rezone will result in a decrease of 
her property's value, expose her to health risks and interfere with the use and 
enjoyment of her property. Here, nothing in the Record indicates or alleges specifically, 
what property interest these Petitioners have or how that property interest may be 
adversely affected. "It is the responsibility of the appellant to provide a sufficient record 
to substantiate his or her claims on appeal. In the absence of an adequate record on 
appeal to support the appellant's claims, we will not presume error." Belk v. Martin, 136 
Idaho 652, 660, 39 P.3d 592, 600 (2001 ). Because the Record does not provide any 
information regarding any bona fide property interest or any specific adverse effect, 
these Petitioners have not established they have standing to pursue this case and 
therefore, their appeals are dismissed. 
D. Petitioner Larry Dahnke 
Petitioner Dahnke5 appears on a list of names of Property Owners within 300 feet 
of the prospective property boundaries. (R., p.184.) Proximity to a proposed project, in 
and of itself, is insufficient to confer standing; the party must demonstrate both property 
ownership and that the property interest will be adversely affected. ("The appellants 
5 Susan Dahnke's name does not appear on the list of those homeowners in the 
Emergency Planning Zone. Nothing in the Record establishes that she has a property 
interest in Larry Dahnke's property, therefore the Court will not presume that she does, 
particularly where other entries on the list do indicate more than one name as property 
owners of a particular address. For example, then entry immediately above Dahnke, 
Larry, indicates that Horst, Daryl and Carol, reside at 5606 Little Willow Rd. (emphasis 
added). 
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standing status depends on whether they own property that may be adversely affected 
by the PUD's construction, not because they can claim they own property within a 
specified distance.") Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 75, 73 P.3d 84, 88 {2003). 
Nothing in the Record indicates Petitioner Dahnke is asserting his property 
interest will be adversely affected, except, perhaps reading the documents in the 
broadest sense, that it is the mere proximity that will adversely affect his property. The 
Court will not speculate as to what, if any, adverse impacts Petitioner Dahnke believes 
he will suffer, but in the absence of evidence in the Record to support his assertion of 
adverse effects, Petitioner Dahnke has failed to sustain his burden of proof to establish 
his standing to pursue the case and therefore, his appeal is dismissed. 
E. Petitioner Jeffrey and Deborah Weber 
Petitioners Weber allege that: 
Jeffrey and Debbie Weber have an interest in real property located at 
10465 Stone Quarry Rd., Payette, ID 83661, and would be adversely 
affected by the approval of the Applications and resulting industrial 
development activities. Among other activities, the Webers operate a 
hunting dog training business on their property, which business 
operations will be directly harmed and adversely affected by the 
proposed construction and operation of the industrial facilities proposed 
to be facilitated by the rezone and development Applications before the 
Commission. 
(R., p. 3248.) In another written submission, Petitioner Weber stated, 
Building a nuclear plant within 3 miles from our business would have a 
direct reflection on the desirability to bring dogs to our kennel for training 
and boarding. Building this plant within 3 miles of our business also puts 
us in a very dangerous position as responsible professionals. If AEHI 
were to have any type of nuclear accident. ... " 
(R., p. 3655.) 
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Deborah Weber also submitted written opposition to the rezone wherein she exp I ains 
that a prior development group held preliminary discussions about siting a nuclear 
power plant in Payette County. (R., p.3246.) During those discussions, there were 
concerns about the impact to the land, air, water and the protection of the community, 
as well as the time it takes for emergency vehicles to reach Little Willow Road and 
Stone Quarry Road; Petitioner Weber was impressed with the way those 
representatives handled the concerns and questions that existed at that time. (R., 
p.3246.) She does not allege, however, that the same concerns that existed in 2007 
also exist with the current proposal. 
Although Petitioners Weber have established their bona fide property interest, 
(R., p.184, 3655-3656; Tr. 12/2/10, p.138, L.24-p. 139, L.4; Tr., 6/6/11, p.96, L.16-p.98, 
L.15,) Petitioners have not established through written or oral testimony what the non-
radiological adverse effects will be on that property, as there is no sworn oral or written 
testimony or any other written submission that articulates a specific harm. Cf, Ciszek v. 
Kootenai County Bd. ofCom'rs, 151 Idaho 123,129,254 P.3d 24, 30 (2011)("Ciszek's 
affidavit alleges that the rezone will result in a decrease of her property's value, expose 
her to health risks and interfere with the use and enjoyment of her property.") 
In Davisco Foods Int'/, Inc. v. Gooding County, 141 Idaho 784, 787, 118 P.3d 
116, 119 (2005), the property owners challenged the special use permit of the Jerome 
Cheese factory to build a "reclaimed water project," arguing that, "the odor from this 
sewage empoundment can cause irreparable economic damage to residential values. 
Beautiful properties can suddenly be unsellable just with a change in the wind direction." 
Id. The property owner also presented testimony at the hearing that his property could 
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devalued by a change in the wind direction. Id. The Court found that was sufficient 
to establish an adverse effect. 
In Cowan v. Board of Com'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 
(2006), the Court held that because the property owner had "demonstrated his land will 
be adversely affected and presented evidence that the proposed development would 
adversely impact his property rights and diminish his property value," Cowan 
established standing to challenge the Board's decision. Cowan v. Bd. of Com'rs of 
Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 509, 148 P.3d 1247, 1255 (2006). What is not clear 
from the decision, however, is what evidence Cowan produced in order to sufficiently 
demonstrate the adverse effects on his property. 
Regardless, while it appears from these cases that the allegation requirement is 
relatively minimal and that an individual can establish an adverse effect for purposes of 
standing by simply articulating a specific adverse effect, there still must be facts alleged 
to establish the adverse effect. Simply using the words "adverse effect" without 
providing testimony or articulating what the specific adverse effects are, is insufficient to 
establish standing. Petitioners have not alleged what the non-radiological adverse 
effects will be on that property because all of their claims relate to the radiological 
impact, and/or fear of a radiological impact on their property. (See Record, p. 3655 
("Building this plant within 3 miles of our business also puts us in a very dangerous 
position as responsible professionals. If AEHI were to have any type of nuclear 
accident. ... ")) 
The most specific allegation of harm is that the Webers "operate a hunting dog 
training business on their property, which business operations will be directly harmed 
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and adversely affected by the proposed 
facilities proposed ... " (R., p.3248.) (emphasis added). Petitioners have not articulated 
how the construction and operation would affect their property given that Petitioners 
Weber live approximately 2.75 miles from the proposed site. (R., p.3655.) There is no 
evidence in the Record to establish how, over a distance of 2. 75 miles, the Petitioners 
Weber will experience an adverse effect to their property associated with the 
construction or operation of the proposed plant. Cf., Ciskek, 151 Idaho 123, 254 P.3d 24 
(2011 ). (Ciszek's affidavit alleged sufficient particularized harm to meet the standing 
requirements of a declaratory judgment action.") Because Petitioners do not allege how 
the proposed construction and operation would affect their property interest, Petitioners 
Weber have not met the statutory requirement to establish standing and their appeal is 
dismissed. 
F. Petitioners Jo Ann and John Jefferies 
Petitioner John Jefferies alleges that because there are "two gas wells ... within 5 
miles of the proposed location," AEHI should be required to maintain Big Willow Road 
and address safety concerns regarding the transportation of radioactive materials. (R., 
p.3241 ). Petition Jo Ann Jeffries alleges, generally, that there will be insufficient water 
to run a nuclear power plant, the cooling ponds seem too small and too shallow, and 
has concerns about the plan for transporting nuclear waste in Payette County and the 
potential for tax increases for all county taxpayers. (R., pp.3242; 3610.) 
None of the allegations establish that Petitioners Jeffries have a real property 
interest or that the adverse effects are specific to Petitioner's real property. At best, 
they allege only generalized harm, which is insufficient to establish standing. For the 
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reasons articulated in in this and previous sections, Petitioners Jeffries have failed to 
establish standing and therefore, their appeal is dismissed. 
G. Petitioners Joe and Betty Bercik 
Petitioners Betty and Joe Bercik live at 6550 Little Willow Road in Payette. (R., 
pp.3274; 3604-3609.) Petitioner Bercik was concerned that additional information was 
necessary before a rezone and variance could be granted. (R., pp.3274; 3604-3609). 
Specifically, Petitioner Betty Bercik was concerned about how much water the plant 
would use, what entities would have priority water rights, whether the site was 
seismically safe, how power would be transported, whether AEHI would be required to 
improve various roads to accommodate "5000 vehicles per day," and whether the 
construction of a concrete plant would be necessary. (R., p.3274.) Her oral statements 
mirrored her written submission. (Tr. 12/2/10, p. 107, s. 1-p.110, L.25.) She also 
submitted a letter in opposition to the rezone (R., p.3604,) outlining her concerns about 
safety if an earthquake were to hit. (R., p.3605.) Her oral statement mirrored that 
written submission. (Tr., 6/6/11, p.57, L.20 p.60, L.15.) She makes no representations 
about her business or livelihood being impacted or references to noise, dust or traffic 
issues in either her written or oral statements. 
Petitioner Joe Bercik's concerns were whether there was sufficient water for the 
project, whether the site was seismically safe, how the power would be transported, 
whether Intervenor would be required to maintain the roads such that the additional 
traffic could be accommodated, and how the project could be feasible. (R., p.3273.) He 
was also concerned about the impact on the infrastructure of Payette County, schools, 
housing and traffic will all be affected," (R., p. 3273.) His oral testimony mirrored his 
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written submission. (Tr., 12/2/10, p. 111, L.4 - p.114, L. 7.) Petitioner Joe Bercik also 
jointly submitted the letter regarding earthquake concerns (R., p. 3605,) and in an oral 
statement, reiterated the concerns about an earthquake, the lack of water, where waste 
would be stored, and the general opposition to the plant. (Tr., 6/6/11, p.63, L.16 - p. 66, 
L.16.) He makes no representations about his business or livelihood being impacted or 
references noise, dust or traffic issues in either his written or oral statements. 
While Petitioners Bercik have established they are property owners, they have 
not alleged any specific adverse effect on their real property. Instead, they both posed 
questions about aspects of the project, but those questions are generalized concerns 
about the project and cannot fairly be categorized as allegations of specific adverse 
effects on their real property. Without a specific allegation of an adverse effect, 
Petitioners Bercik have not established standing and their appeal is dismissed. 
H. H Hook, LLC 
Petitioner H Hook, LLC, has established both that it is a real property owner (R., pp. 
184-187; 3247,) as well as the adverse effects to its property interest. (R., pp. 3248-
3250.) Petitioner H Hook specifically alleges that during the construction, the 
construction "may operate up to 24 hours a day, generating noise, dust and traffic ... ," 
that the continuous traffic and associated dust and noise could render its feedlot for 
weaner calves unusable ... ," (R., pp. 3249; 3663,) that its ranch homes on Stone Quarry 
Road would be adversely affected by the "continuous traffic, and associated dust and 
noise from the construction," and that if Petitioner cannot provide for the employees who 
live in the ranch houses, the ranch business would be adversely affected. (R., pp. 
3249; 3663-3664.) 
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While some of Petitioner H Hook's allegations do not establish an adverse impact, 
for example, the fear that there may be depredation to crops from a future "significant 
elk herd," and the concern about the lack of open range, Petitioner H Hook has 
sufficiently alleged both that it owns real property and that the property may suffer 
potential adverse effects by the proposed use of the property and therefore, has 
established standing to challenge the Board's decision. 
IV. 
Certain Petitioners Have Failed To Establish Substantial Harm Pursuant to Idaho Code 
§67-5279(4) 
"I.C. § 67-6535(3) requires a demonstration of actual harm or violation of a 
fundamental right in order to be entitled to a remedy in cases disputing a LLUPA 
decision." Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 76, 73 P.3d 84, 89 (2003). Thus, the 
party appealing the Board of Commissioners' decision must show the Board of 
Commissioners erred in a manner specified under I.C. § 67-5279(3), and that a 
substantial right has been prejudiced. I.C. § 67-5279(4); Price v. Payette County Bd. Of 
Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998). Evans v. Teton County, 139 
Idaho 71, 74-75, 73 P.3d 84, 87-88 (2003) 
While the petitioner must show both an error under § 67-5279(3) and prejudice 
under § 67-5279(4), nothing in IDAPA requires the courts to address these two 
requirements in any particular order. Appellate courts, including the district court sitting 
in an appellate capacity, "may therefore affirm a governing board's decision solely on 
the grounds that the petitioner has not shown prejudice to a substantial right." See 
Krempasky v. Nez Perce Cnty. Planning & Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 235-36, 245 P.3d 
983, 987-88 (2010) (upholding a conditional-use permit because the petitioner failed to 
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challenge the district court's adverse ruling regarding substantial rights); Kirk-Hughes 
Dev. LLC v. Kootenai County Bd. of County Com'rs, 149 Idaho 555, 557, 237 P.3d 652, 
655. In other words, the Court may forego analyzing whether the governing board erred 
in a manner specified by LC. § 67-5279(3) if the petitioner cannot show that his or her 
substantial rights were violated." Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd. of Com'rs, 151 
Idaho 228, 232, 254 P.3d 1224, 1228 (2011 ). 
Even if all Petitioners established standing, most of them fail to assert any harm 
for which the Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate their claims. Petitioners allege two 
general categories of harm to assert there is prejudice to their substantial rights. The 
first category relates to the nature and proximity of the power plant to their property and 
the second category generally includes procedural challenges to the process by which 
the Commission recommended and the Board approved the application for rezone, the 
Development Agreement and the amendment to the Comprehensive Plan. 
In the first category, the Petitioners have five different claims: First, Petitioners 
argue that if Intervenor is permitted to build a nuclear power plant near or adjacent to 
Petitioners' property, "the community in which the Petitioners reside will be forever 
changed and each of the Petitioners will be forced to live with the inherent risks of 
cataclysmic harm and the resulting diminution in the value of their properties." 
(Petitioner's Brief, p.14.) Petitioners second allegation is even if the power plant is not 
built, they suffer "immediate economic harm due to the diminution on the value of their 
property caused by the mere possibility that a nuclear power plant may be built in their 
community." (Petitioner's Brief, p.14.) Third, Petitioners allege they will "suffer injury 
and harm" from the "unavoidable radioactive emissions and discharges" from the plant 
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the form of exposure to radioactive materials. (Petitioner's Brief, p.15.) Fourth, 
Petitioners allege that their property lies within the ten mile "Plume Exposure Pathway 
Emergency Planning Zone," which subjects them to greater health and safety concerns 
following some kind of nuclear accident or incident. Finally, Petitioners allege that the 
nuclear power plant will affect business, commercial, or agricultural operations and use 
of their property. (Petitioner's Brief, p.16.) 
In the second category, Petitioner's claim the County's defective notice, improper 
hearing procedure, and failure to adopt a reasoned decision in accordance with 
statutory requirements violated their due process right, thereby prejudicing a substantial 
right. (Petitioners' Brief, p.19.) 
Just as the Court could not adjudicate whether radiological concerns constitute an 
adverse effect on real property for purposes of standing, neither can the court determine 
that prejudice to a substantial right exists where the prejudice is premised on 
radiological concerns. To the extent the claims of economic harm are based on the 
safety and health concerns of a nuclear accident, the Court does not have subject 
matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim on that ground. 
Thus, as to claims in the first category, the only basis on which the court could find 
prejudice to a substantial right would be that the construction and operation of the 
nuclear plant will affect "business, commercial or agricultural operations" or "interfere 
with the use and enjoyment of their property." (Petitioner's Brief, p.16.) Of the 
Petitioners, only Jeffrey and Deborah Weber and H Hook, LLC., have alleged any 
general business, commercial or agricultural impacts on their real property and 
therefore, the decision of the Board is affirmed on this ground as to all Petitioners and 
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their appeal is dismissed, except as to Jeffrey and Deborah Weber and H Hook, 
who will be discussed separately. 
A. Petitioners Jeffrey and Deborah Weber 
Although this Court finds these Petitioners have not established standing, even if they 
had, they have not demonstrated prejudice to a substantial right as they have not 
sufficiently alleged non-radiological grounds showing how the plant will affect their 
business or commercial operations or how the use and enjoyment of their property will 
be affected. Petitioners Weber allege that: 
Jeffrey and Debbie Weber have an interest in real property located at 
10465 Stone Quarry Rd., Payette, ID 83661, and would be adversely 
affected by the approval of the Applications and resulting industrial 
development activities. Among other activities, the Webers operate a 
hunting dog training business on their property, which business 
operations will be directly harmed and adversely affected by the 
proposed construction and operation of the industrial facilities proposed 
to be facilitated by the rezone and development Applications before the 
Commission. 
(R., p. 3248.) Deborah Weber also submitted written opposition to the rezone wherein 
she explains that a prior group held preliminary discussions about siting a nuclear 
power plant in Payette County in 2007 and that there were concerns at that time. (R., 
p.3246.) She does not allege, however, that the same concerns that existed in 2007 
also exist with the current proposal. Regarding Intervenor's proposal, Petitioner Weber 
explains the failings of Intervenor but does not assert what the substantial prejudice to 
her business, agricultural or economic interests are other than the proximity of the 
proposed plant and health and safety concerns. 
The most specific allegation of harm is that the Webers "operate a hunting dog 
training business on their property, which business operations will be directly harmed 
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and adversely affected by the proposed construction and of industrial 
facilities proposed ... " (R., p.3248,) (emphasis added). In another written submission, 
Petitioner Weber stated, 
Building a nuclear plant within 3 miles from our business would have a 
direct reflection on the desirability to bring dogs to our kennel for training 
and boarding. Building this plant within 3 miles of our business also puts 
us in a very dangerous position as responsible professionals. If AEHI 
were to have any type of nuclear accident. ... " 
(R., p. 3655.) 
In Krempasky v. Nez Perce County Planning & Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 234, 245 
P.3d 983, 986 (2010), ten residents, including Krempasky, testified regarding their 
opposition to conditional use permit allowing construction of a wedding event center. 
The residents all testified regarding their shared concerns of noise and traffic. Id. The 
residents provided no actual evidence to support these fears or concerns. Id. The Idaho 
Supreme Court held: 
Krempasky only briefly addresses any prejudice to a substantial right, by 
alleging in a conclusory manner that her property rights have been 
prejudiced by the grant of the permit because of "noise, commercial traffic 
and a disproportionately large building in the residential area." However, 
she does not provide any applicable authority to support the allegation that 
these complaints constitute prejudice to a substantial right. 
Id. at 235, 245 P.3d at 987 (2010). Like Krempasky, Petitioners Weber only 
generally conclude they will be adversely affected by the proposed construction and 
operation of the industrial facilities but have not articulated how, specifically, the 
construction and operation would prejudice a substantial right in their property that is 
approximately 2.75 miles away from the proposed construction site. Additionally, in 
Krempasky, the residents testified. Here, the Webers made oral statements and 
presented written statements. The Record does not reflect that Petitioners Weber 
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provided any other evidence except for the general comments in their written 
statements that there would be an increase in noise, dust or traffic or that would affect 
their property given that they lived 2.75 miles away. Even if there were additional noise, 
traffic and dust how it would affect their ability to engage in their dog training business. 
Petitioners Weber have also failed to provide any evidence that fewer people would 
avail themselves of the Petitioner's dog training services or what, if any, impact they 
would suffer, apart from the health and safety concerns. It appears that it is the nature 
of the proposed facility as a nuclear plant that generates this concern. To the extent the 
concern is premised upon the safety of the plant, the Court cannot adjudicate the claim 
on that basis. Alternatively, the Court finds Petitioners Weber have not sufficiently 
articulated injury to a substantial right. 
Without any factual support or allegations of specific harm, the Petitioners Weber 
simply state in a conclusory fashion, that the rezone will have an adverse effect. 
Petitioners have the obligation of doing more than asserting a conclusion. Therefore, 
because Petitioners Jeffrey and Deborah Weber have failed to articulate prejudice to a 
substantial right, the decision of the Board to grant the application for a rezone is 
affirmed as to them. 
B. H Hook. LLC 
Petitioner H Hook raises several allegations about the substantial prejudice to its 
ranching operations. Petitioner alleges as follows: 1) the construction will generate 
"noise, dust and traffic" and affect the traffic on the road it uses to move cattle as well as 
farm equipment (R., pp.3249; 3663); 2) Petitioner's feedlot is "approximately ½ mile 
from the Northeast corner of the Schwartz property" at the corner of Little Willow Creek 
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and Stone Quarry Road and the "continuous traffic and dust" from the site "would have 
severe impact on the feedlot's operation and render it unusable" (R., pp.3249; 3663 ); 3) 
H Hook provides homes for its ranch hands and two of the ranch homes are located on 
the unpaved Stone Quarry Road. The continuous traffic, dust and noise during 
construction and operation would adversely affect the families who live there, thereby 
reducing the ability of H Hook to house and retain qualified ranch hands, which would 
affect its ability to operate the ranch (R., pp.3249; 3663); 4) there is an increased risk of 
vandalism and theft (R., pp.3249; 3664); 5} there are ground water wells and the impact 
on the ground water from construction and operation is unknown and should be 
addressed (R., pp.3249; 3664); 6) the industrial site could decrease value and 
marketability of the homes (R., pp.3249; 3664); 7) there is a possibility of a large group 
of elk congregating on protected ground, resulting in significant depredation of crops 
and grazing lands (R., pp.3249; 3664-3665); 8) there may be reduction in the ability of 
the owners to use H Hook property for upland bird and big game hunting because of 
potential weapon restrictions in an area surrounding a nuclear plant (R., pp.3250; 3665); 
and, 9) the proposed development did not address the open range issue. (R., pp.3250; 
3665.) 
Of these claims, the Court finds that claims 4, 7, and 8 are too speculative to 
provide a basis to show actual, substantial prejudice to an existing right. Allegation 5 is 
not a claim that is unique to Petitioner, claim 6 is based on radiological concerns and 
therefore, cannot be adjudicated by the court and allegation 9 involves property that 
does not belong to H Hook and is also speculative, as there has been no claim that the 
property would not continue to be open range. 
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Claims 1, 2, and 3, however, provide specific, factual, allegations that support 
Petitioner H Hook's claim that it will suffer actual harm pursuant to IC§ 67-6535(3) and 
therefore, have met their burden for purposes of establishing harm. 
Thus, only Petitioner H Hook has established both standing and substantial prejudice 
such that the merits of the case will be analyzed. 
V. 
The Comprehensive Plan Is Not Invalid Following the Amendment 
Petitioners allege that the Comprehensive Plan, both before and after the 
amendment, is invalid because it does not have any general provisions for power plant 
siting and utility transmission corridors and therefore, any rezone based on the 
Comprehensive Plan is also invalid.6 lntervenors argue that there is a general plan -
that applications will be considered on an individual basis - and that the provision for 
transmission lines are currently contained in the comprehensive plan. 
A valid comprehensive plan is a precondition to the validity of zoning ordinances. 
Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc. v. City of Hailey, 133 Idaho 320, 322, 986 P.2d 343, 
345 (1999). The inclusion of the components is mandatory. Idaho Code§ 67-6508. 
Black's Law Dictionary, defines "general" as: 
Pertaining to, or designating, the genus or class, as distinguished from 
that which characterizes the species or individual. Universal, not 
particularized; as opposed to special. Principal or central; as opposed to 
local. Open or available to all, as opposed to select. Obtaining commonly, 
or recognized universally; as opposed to particular. Universal or 
unbounded; as opposed to limited. Comprehending the whole, or directed 
to the whole; as distinguished from anything applying to or designed for a 
portion only. 
6 The Amendment to the Comprehensive Plan was approved by the Board June 21, 
2010. 
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Thus, Payette County, in its Comprehensive Plan, was required to address how it 
would deal with power plant siting as a whole. It needed a "universal" plan on power 
plant siting. The Comprehensive Plan, before the amendment, spends two paragraphs 
identifying what power is available to county residents, but does not discuss where in 
the County, if at all, those power plants are located. As such, before the amendment, 
the Plan has no provision for power plant siting, presumably because the power needs 
were being sufficiently met by plants located outside the county and therefore, there 
was no need to have power plant siting within the county. 
However, once there was a request to locate a power plant within the County, the 
Comprehensive Plan was statutorily required to have a provision addressing power 
plant siting. To achieve that, the Board amended section 9.2. 7.1 of the Comprehensive 
Plan to include the following: 
Energy producers who wish to locate electric, gas, or other energy 
production facilities in Payette County must apply to the Payette County 
Planning and Zoning Department and each application will be considered 
on an individual basis in accordance with the Local Land Use Planning 
Act, Payette County Code and this plan. 
(R., p.3883.) Payette County, in adopting the amendment, has complied with 
Idaho Code § 67-6508. Where a particular power plant would be specifically 
sited would depend on the type and size of the power plant, the need for power 
transmission and other factors. For example, a wind turbine would have different 
siting needs that an electrical transmission station. Unless and until the Board 
had information about the type of power plant to be sited in Payette County, the 
Board would be ill-equipped to try to anticipate the size, type, and other relevant 
factors to designate where, in Payette County, such a plant could be sited. 
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Conversely, upon application by an entity, the Board would then have the 
information it needed to determine, in conformity with federal, state and local law, 
where, if anywhere, the plant should be sited. Intending to address the requests 
as the requests are made, is a "general" plan, and as such, the Amendment to 
the Comprehensive Plan brings the plan into statutory compliance. Therefore, 
because this Court finds the Comprehensive Plan is valid. The decision of the 
Board is affirmed on this issue. 
VI. 
The Board's Approval of the Rezone Did Not Constitute Type I Spot Zoning 
Petitioners argue that the Board's approval of the rezone violated both 
Type I and Type II spot zoning. The Respondent and Intervenor argue that there 
was no spot zoning at all. 
"A claim of 'spot zoning' is essentially an argument the change in zoning is 
not in accord with the comprehensive plan." Evans v. Teton County, 139 
Idaho 71, 76, 73 P.3d 84, 89 (2003). In Evans, this Court clarified that 
there are two types of spot zoning. The first type, referred to as type one 
spot zoning, "may simply refer to a rezoning of property for a use 
prohibited by the original zoning classification." Id. 'The test for whether 
[type one spot zoning] is valid is whether the zone change is in accord 
with the comprehensive plan." Id. at 77, 73 P.3d at 90. "[T]he question of 
whether a zoning ordinance is 'in accordance with' the comprehensive 
plan is a factual question which can be overturned only where the factual 
findings are clearly erroneous." Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley 
County, 137 Idaho 192, 200, 46 P.3d 9, 17 (2002). The second type, 
referred to as type two spot zoning, "refers to a zone change that singles 
out a parcel of land for use inconsistent with the permitted use in the rest 
of the zoning district for the benefit of an individual property owner." Id. 
Taylorv. Canyon CountyBd. ofCom'rs, 147 Idaho 424,436,210 P.3d 532,544 (2009). 
As discussed above, the Comprehensive Plan was amended to permit 
applications for power plant facilities to be reviewed on an individual basis. Because 
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the Court has found the amendment rendered the Comprehensive Plan valid, and 
because this application for a rezone was granted consistently and in accord with the 
comprehensive plan, the Board did not engage in Type I spot zoning. Like the Taylor 
case, supra, the Board's finding that the rezone is in accordance with the Amended 
Comprehensive Plan is supported by substantial, competent, although conflicting, 
evidence in the record and therefore, must be affirmed. Consequently, because the 
type one spot zoning was valid, there is no need to address the claim of type two spot 
zoning and the decision of the Board is affirmed on this ground. 
VII. 
The Board Did Not Address Whether The Rezone Violates Payette County Code 
8-10-97 And The Court Declines To Address This Issue 
Petitioner contends that the rezone violates Payette County Code section 8-10-7 
which prohibits any activity that emits harmful radiation.8 At oral argument, Petitioner 
concedes that Payette County Code section 8-10-9 is likely invalid, as it is preempted 
by the Atomic Energy Act. The Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws or local 
ordinances that '"interfere with, or are contrary to,' federal law." Boundary Backpackers 
v. Boundary Cnty., 128 Idaho 371,376,913 P.2d 1141, 1146 (1996) citing Hillsborough 
County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Labs. Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 
7 Payette County Code Section 8-10-9 is a synopsis of official height and area 
regulations and the Petitioners have provided no briefing on this section. From the 
Brief, it appears Petitioners are referencing 8-10-7, which is the ordinance analyzed by 
the Court. 
8 Utilizing the Court's logic in Ada County v. 2007 Legacy 2013, Opinion No. 33 (March 
26, 2013), it appears that the ordinance prohibits the emission of harmful radiation at 
any point other than the source of such disturbance, thereby allowing harmful radiation 
at the point of the disturbance. Notwithstanding that, analysis, the Court declines to 
address this issue as discussed above. 
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2374-75, 85 Ed.2d 714 (1985) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 
6 L.Ed. 23 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.)). 
(9Wheat.} 1,211, 
If that section of the Payette County Code is invalid, the Board did not err in 
failing to reference or discuss the code section. However, the issue of whether that 
section of the Code is valid is not properly before this Court on appeal. Because 
Petitioner's concession at oral argument would result in a denial of this claim and 
because the validity of Payette County Ordinance§ 8-10-7 is not at issue in this appeal, 
the Court declines to address this issue. 
VIII. 
Some Parts Of The Development Agreement Are An Improper Delegation Of The 
Board's Exercise Of Its Police Power And Therefore, Are Invalid 
The Petitioners argue that the Development Agreement exceeds the statutory 
authority granted the Board because the Development Agreement makes commitments 
from the Board to the Intervenor and because the Agreement allegedly binds 
subsequent Boards; the Respondent and Intervenor disagree. 
A The Board Does Not Exceed Its Statutory Authority By Making Commitments 
Pursuant To I.C. § 67-6511A 
County commissioners must act as a board and have only such power as is 
expressly or impliedly conferred on them by statute. Shillingford v. Benewah County, 48 
Idaho 447, 282 P. 864, 866 (1929). Local Boards have the statutory authority to enter 
into Development Agreements and contracts, which can include both Development 
Agreements and long-term leases. Idaho Code §§ 67-6511A, 31-604(3) and 31-836, 
respectively; Wylie v. State, Idaho Transp. Bd., 151 Idaho 26, 32, 253 P.3d 700, 706 
(2011) (analyzing a Development Agreement as a contract to determine whether the 
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right of access to property had been contracted away as a term of the Development 
Agreement); Krasse/t v. Koester, 99 Idaho 124, 578 P.2d 240 (1978). 
Thus, Boards can, in some instances, enter into long-term contracts and bind 
subsequent Boards to the term of the contracts. Because local Boards have the ability 
to enter contracts, and a Development Agreement is akin to a contract, the Board has 
the statutory right to contract, including making commitments in a Development 
Agreement without exceeding the authority of I.C. §§ 67-6511A and 31-605(3). 
Additionally, although I.C. § 67-6511A allows Boards to permit or require an 
owner or developer to make commitments, it does not preclude a Board from also doing 
so. 
So long as the actions of local governing boards are not unreasonable, i.e. 
arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory, and bear 'a substantial relationship 
to the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare,' local governing 
boards act within their constitutional authority. 
Ciszek v. Kootenai County Bd. ofCom'rs, 151 Idaho 123,132,254 P.3d 24, 33 (2011). 
While a local governing body must comply with the procedural and 
substantive provisions of LLUPA, its authority in the land use arena is not 
derived solely from LLUPA. Rather, the cities and counties of this State 
have traditionally exercised their constitutional police powers to provide for 
planning and zoning activities in their jurisdictions and, therefore, their 
ability to act is not confined to only those actions specifically mentioned in 
LLUPA. 
Id. at 131, 254 P.3d at 32. Because LLUPA was intended to grant broad powers to 
local Boards in planning decisions, and because the constitutional grant of authority to 
exercise general police powers has been recognized as a broader grant of authority 
than those powers specifically articulated in statute, the Board has not exceeded its 
authority pursuant to I.C. § 67-6511A simply by making commitments to the Intervenor 
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in this case. It is not the fact of making a commitment that may render the Development 
Agreement invalid, but rather, the nature of the commitment made. 
B. A Board Acts Ultra Vires When It Unlawfully Restricts The Exercise Of Its 
Police Power By Present Or Future Boards 
Notwithstanding its ability to enter contracts and make commitments, if a Board 
acts ultra vires, a Development Agreement could be void. An improper commitment is 
one that would improperly limit, partially or wholly, a Board's ability to exercise its police 
power. Adopting zoning ordinances is the exercise of police power of the local 
government and that power cannot be "bartered away even by express contract since it 
immediately concerns the safety of persons and property." City of Idaho Falls v. 
Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 117 P.2d 461, 463-64 (1941 ). For example, an illegal 
concession of police power would occur when 
a zoning authority binds itself to enact a zoning amendment and agrees 
not to alter the zoning change for a specified period of time. When a 
zoning authority takes such a step and curtails its independent legislative 
power, it has acted ultra vires and the rezoning is therefore a nullity. 
Shelby D. Green, Development Agreements: Bargained-for Zoning That Is Neither 
Illegal Contract Nor Conditional Zoning, 33 Cap. U. L. Rev. 383, 411 (2004). 
On the other hand, 
By bargaining away the police powers, the courts cannot mean that the 
current legislature must refrain from entering into binding contracts or 
other obligations whose terms extend beyond the terms of the current 
body. Such an interpretation would almost nullify the municipality's power 
to contract and its power to be sued if every time, when things looked 
different, it could claim that the act was outside its power. 
Id. at 407-08. The question, then, is whether the Board improperly contracted away its 
police powers in certain provisions of the Development Agreement and if so, whether 
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the ultra vires commitments render just that portion of the Agreement void or whether 
entire Agreement is void. 
Even if the Board's acted ultra vires as to some of the provisions, that does not 
necessarily mean the entire agreement is void. For example, in Inverness Mobile Home 
Community, Ltd. V. Bedford Tp., 263 Mich.App. 241, 250, 687 N.W.2d 869, 875 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2004), despite finding that some of the paragraphs of the consent judgment 
were ultra vi res, the remedy was to declare those paragraphs void and strike them from 
the agreement, rather than declare the entire agreement void. Similarly, in Black v. 
Young, 122 Idaho 302, 834 P.2d 304 (1992), the Idaho Supreme Court remanded the 
issue of whether an ordinance which contained a severability clause, and parts of which 
were ultra vires acts by the Board, could be maintained by other factors to support the 
ordinance. Id. at 311, 834 P.2d at 309. 
The Petitioner alleges that the Development Agreement unlawfully binds future 
Boards because: 
1. Recital J requires the County to take the steps necessary to rezone the 
property (Petitioner's Brief, p.33); 
2. It limits the County's ability to exercise its police powers to adopt future land 
use rules, regulations, resolutions and ordinances that might be made 
applicable to the property (Petitioner's Brief, p.37); 
3. Requires the County to rezone other land in furtherance of Intervenor's 
development plans (Petitioner's Brief, p.37); 
4. Requires the County to adopt amendments to the development agreement in 
furtherance of Intervenor's development plans (Petitioner's Brief, p.37); 
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5. Restricts the County from initiating any changes to the Development 
Agreement unless consented to by Intervenor (Petitioner's Brief, p.37); 
6. Restricts the County's power to adopt moratoriums or other regulations on the 
manner or timing of the development of the project (Petitioner's Brief, p.37); 
7. Grants rights and privileges to Intervenor to demand that the County do and 
perform certain acts such as the acquisition of road right-of-way, installation 
of public infrastructure and expenditure of County resources in support of 
Intervenor's development plans (Petitioner's Brief, p.38); and, 
8. Requires the County to defend Intervenor in legal actions that may be brought 
challenging the validity of any County action related to AEHl's application. 
(Petitioner's Brief, p.38.)9 
1. Recital J To The Development Agreement Requires The Board To Take The 
Steps Necessary To Rezone The Property. 
Recital J of the Development Agreement reads as follows: 
AEHI desires that the Property be zoned 1-2 in accordance with the 
Payette County Comprehensive Plan. After hearings and 
recommendations by the P&Z Commission and hearings by the Board, 
County has determined that it is in the best interest of County to rezone 
the Property 1-2. AEHI has submitted to County a duly executed 
application requesting an amendment to County's Zoning Ordinance 
and zoning map in connection with the Property and the Project. 
County shall continue to take steps necessary to rezone the Property 
subject to the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement, including 
publication of the Rezoning Ordinance and the Development Agreement 
Ordinance. 
(R., p.4104.} Petitioners take issue with the last sentence of the recital. The Court finds 
this recital to be unclear. What is clear is that the rezone is subject to the terms and 
9 The Petitioners generally alleges claims that the Development Agreement unlawfully 
binds the Board on pages 33-34 of the Petitioner's Brief. These general allegations are 
encompassed in the above claims and will not be addressed separately. 
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conditions set forth in the Agreement. Because this Court finds several provisions of 
the Development Agreement to be an illegal restraint on the ability of future Boards to 
exercise its police power, Respondent and/or Intervenor may not wish the property 
rezoned in light of the provisions that have been struck from the Development 
Agreement. The Court remands this portion of the Development Agreement for 
clarification by the parties whether they wish the rezone to go forward in light of the 
changes the Court has made to the Development Agreement, as discussed infra. 
2. Some Portions Of The Development Agreement Limit The Board's Ability To 
Exercise Its Police Powers To Adopt Future Land Use Rules, Regulations, 
Resolutions And Ordinances That Might Be Made Applicable To The Property 
Specifically, Petitioners claim that section 2.1 (b) of the Development Agreement 
is an unlawful restraint on the Counties exercise of its police powers. Section 2.1 (b) 
provides: 
(b) Permissible Additions to the Applicable Rules. All future approval 
requests shall be evaluated consistent with the terms and intent 
expressed in this Agreement, as may be modified. Except as 
otherwise provided in this Agreement, County may enact the following 
provisions, and take the following actions, which shall be applicable to 
and binding on the development of the Property; provided, however, 
County shall provide AEHI with an opportunity to suggest methods of 
enacting and implementing such provisions to the Property and the 
Project: 
(i) future land use ordinances, rules, regulations, permit 
requirements, other requirements and official policies of 
County that are consistent with the express provisions of this 
Agreement, and not contrary to the existing land use 
regulations applicable to and governing the development of 
the Property, provided that such land use ordinances, rules, 
regulations, permit requirements, other requirements, and 
official policies shall, to the extent applicable, not involve the 
modification of any factual determinations of County 
memorialized in this Agreement and shall not materially 
impair AEHl's ability to develop the Property in the manner 
provided in this Agreement. In the event of conflict between 
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this Agreement and such future land use ordinances, rules, 
regulations, permit requirements, other requirements and 
policies of County, this Agreement shall control; 
(ii) other future land use ordinances, rules, regulations, permit 
requirements, development fees, other requirements, and/or 
official policies that AEHI may agree, in writing apply to the 
development of the Property; 
(iii) future land use ordinances, rules, regulations, permit 
requirements, other requirements and official policies of 
County enacted as necessary to comply with this Agreement 
or mandatory requirements imposed on County by state or 
federal laws and regulations, court decisions, and other 
similar superior external authorities beyond the control of 
County; provided, however, that in the event any such 
mandatory requirement prevents or precludes compliance 
with this Agreement, such affected provisions of this 
Agreement shall be modified as may be necessary to achieve 
the minimum permissible variance from the terms of this 
Agreement in order to achieve compliance with such 
mandatory requirement. To the extent such compliance 
requires any discretionary factual determination by County, 
such determinations shall be consistent with County's findings 
in connection with the rezone of the Property and as 
memorialized in this Agreement; 
(iv) future land use and other ordinances, rules, regulations, 
permit requirements, other requirements and official policies 
of County of uniform application throughout County and 
reasonably necessary to alleviate legitimate threats to public 
health and safety, provided that such land use ordinances, 
rules, regulations, permit requirements, other requirements 
and official policies shall, to the extent applicable, not involve 
the modification of any material factual determinations of 
County in connection with the rezone of the Property and as 
memorialized in this Agreement; and 
(v) future updates of, and amendments to, existing building, fire, 
plumbing, mechanical, electrical, dangerous buildings, 
drainage, and similar construction and safety related codes, 
such as the International Building Code, which updates and 
amendments are generated by a nationally recognized 
construction/safety organization, such as the International 
Conference of Building Officials, or by the state or federal 
governments. 
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(R., pp. 4106-4107.) Subsection 2(b), as an introductory paragraph, does not limit 
future Boards from taking action, it simply provides an opportunity for Intervenor to 
suggest ways of enacting provisions or actions that have already been determined 
by the Board. While the Development Agreement allows Intervenor to make 
suggestions, nothing in this portion of the Development Agreement requires future 
Boards to implement those suggestions and therefore, doesn't restrain or limit any 
future acts of a Board. 
Section 2(b )(i) allows future Boards to enact future land use actions only to 
the extent those future land use ordinances are not contrary to the land use 
regulations in effect at the time the Development Agreement is enacted. This is an 
improper curtailment of the Board's police power and as such, is an invalid term of 
the Development Agreement. See City of Idaho Falls v. Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 117 
P .2d 461 (1941 ). Section 2(b )((i) also unlawfully restricts future Boards because 
pursuant to the Development Agreement, future ordinances may not modify any of 
the factual determinations made by the County or materially impair Intervenor's 
ability to develop the Property in the manner provided in the Development 
Agreement. 
For example, the Board found that the Project will result in significant 
economic benefits to the County and the rezone is in the best interest of the 
County. (R., pp.4103; 4104). That fact is premised, in part, upon testimony by 
Intervenor that the power plant will be locally owned and operated, thus retaining 
profits and tax revenue within the State. (Tr., 12/2/10, p.20, Ls. 19-24; p.70, Ls. 21-
24; p.74, Ls. 22-24.) However, the fact of local ownership may change, if, for 
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example, Intervenor sold the project after obtaining all approvals but before building 
plant, to a foreign corporation. There then would be a change in one of the 
factual premises of the Development Agreement but future Boards would not be 
able to amend, alter, or adjust the Development Agreement in light of that new 
factual circumstance pursuant to Section 2(b)(i). 
The Board has an obligation to act for the good and general welfare of its 
citizenry and in so doing, a need might arise in which the factual premises 
underlying the Development Agreement are no longer accurate. To prohibit the 
Board from considering new factual scenarios that alter the factual premises 
existing at the time of the Development Agreement is an illegal restriction on the 
exercise of this and future Board's exercise of its police power and therefore, 
cannot stand. 
For the same reasons, the court finds the "shall not materially impair" clause 
to be a similar restriction and that clause also cannot stand. Finally, while the Court 
recognizes that the sections 6.8 and 6.14 are two separate severability clauses (R., 
pp. 4112, 4112,) it finds that the illegal portions of section 2(b)(i) cannot be severed 
from the remaining portion of the subsection as the Agreement clearly intended the 
provisions and the subsection be read as a whole, thus, the Court will strike section 
2(b)(i) in its entirety. 
The Court finds that section 2(b )(ii) is not an illegal restraint on the police 
power of future Boards because this provision simply allows Intervenor to agree that 
future ordinances may apply to the Project. This provision does not prohibit future 
Boards from acting, even if Intervenor disagrees with whether future ordinances 
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apply to the Project. It is the Court, not the parties, that ultimately determines 
whether ordinances apply and therefore, Intervenor's agreement as to the 
applicability is irrelevant to any legal determination and therefore, cannot bind future 
Boards. 
Neither does section 2(b )(iii) unlawfully restrict a future Board. This section 
simply requires the parties to draft a provision that both comports with the legal 
requirements and, as closely as possible, effectuate the intent of the agreement. 
There is nothing in this that restricts future Boards, particularly in light of section 
6.14, which allows a Party to terminate the Agreement if a Court has struck a 
portion of the agreement. 
While section 2(b )(iv) is an explicit acknowledgement of the Board's ability to 
exercise its police powers, this section limits future Boards' exercise of police power 
because if an ordinance regarding threats to public health and safety apply to the 
Development Agreement, future Boards may not modify any of the material fact 
determinations that were part of the determination to allow the rezone. This directly 
limits the Boards ability to determine, for example, that the rezone is "in the best 
interest of the County to rezone the Property to 1-2." (R., p. 4104, Recital J.) If 
some factual scenario develops such that there is a legitimate threat to public health 
and safety, it may no longer be in the best interest of the County to allow this 
property to remain zoned 1-2 and as a proper exercise of Board authority, future 
Board's may need to determine, in light of the facts that exist at the time, what is in 
the best interest of the County. Attempting to prohibit the Board from doing so, 
especially in the context of legitimate threats to public health and safety, is an illegal 
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restriction of the Board's authority and as such, is illegal 
will be struck. 
thus, section 2(b )(iv) 
Petitioners do not challenge Section 2(b )(v) and therefore, it will not be 
analyzed. 
3. The Development Agreement Does Not Require The Board To Rezone Other 
Land In Furtherance Of Intervenor's Development Plans 
Petitioners argue that section 2.2 of the Development Agreement requires future 
Boards to rezone property at Intervenor's request. Petitioners misread section 2.2, 
which provides: 
2.2 Additional Property. In the event AEHI owns or acquires 
Additional Property which is not subject to this Agreement, including, 
without limitation, Additional Property that will serve to meet 
requirements of local, state and/or federal governmental agencies in 
connection with development of the Project, and desires to subject 
such Additional Property to the benefits and obligations of this 
Agreement, AEHI may request that County rezone the Additional 
Property to 1-2. Upon such request, the Parties will commence rezone 
proceedings, including any necessary proceedings to amend this 
Agreement, for such Additional Property which will subject such 
Additional Property to this Agreement. The presently sitting Board may 
not predetermine the outcome of any future application for a rezone of 
any Additional Property. 
(R., pp.4106-4107.) Section 2.2 by its plain language does not restrict future Board 
action. This section treats Intervenor like any other citizen and allows Intervenor to 
request that certain property be rezoned. The future Board is only required to do 
that which it is required to do by law - to have a process in place by which 
applications for rezones are considered. "Commencing rezone proceedings" is 
nothing more than the Board must do in all circumstances - begin the proceedings 
to determine whether a rezone of the property would be warranted. 
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To the extent Petitioners argue that "commencing rezone proceedings" is an 
affirmative action by the Board to allow the rezone, the second part of this section 
makes it clear that any future rezone is left to the decision of the future Board and 
therefore, by the explicit language of section 2.2 there is no unlawful requirement of 
the future Board to do anything. 
4. The Development Agreement Requires The County To Adopt Amendments 
To The Development Agreement In Furtherance Of Intervenor's Development 
Plans 
Section 2.3 of the Development Agreement provides: 
2.3 Amendment. County and AEHI acknowledge that 
amendments to this agreement may be necessary or appropriate from 
time to time. When the parties agree that an amendment is necessary 
or appropriate, the parties shall, unless otherwise required by 
applicable law as established in this agreement or by state or federal 
statutes, regulations, rules and/or policies effectuate minor 
amendments administratively approved by the zoning administrator. 
The approval of such minor amendments shall not necessitate formal 
amendment of this agreement, but shall be retained in county's official 
file for the property. All amendments to this agreement shall be 
reviewed and approved by the board in accord with the notice and 
public hearing procedures of Payette County Code. The parties shall 
cooperate in good faith to agree upon and use reasonable efforts to 
process any amendments to this agreement. 
No moratorium, future ordinance, resolution or other land use rule 
or regulation imposing a limitation on the development or the rate, 
timing or sequencing of the development, of the property or any portion 
thereof shall apply to or govern the development of the property 
whether affecting land use permits, subdivision plat(s), building permits, 
occupancy permits or other entitlements to use issued or granted by 
county, except as otherwise provided in this agreement. Nothing in 
this section shall prohibit county from withholding the issuance of 
certificates of occupancy for a structure to be occupied if the 
improvements set forth in this agreement required to serve the 
applicable portion of the property on which a structure to be occupied 
is to be located are not in place prior to occupation of such structure. 
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Nothing in the first paragraph of section 2.3 can reasonably be read to require an 
unlawful delegation of the Board's police power. However, the second paragraph clearly 
limits the ability of future Boards to lawfully exercise its police power, despite the 
inclusion of the phrase "except as otherwise provided in this Agreement." First, no other 
section of the Development Agreement addresses the "rate, timing or sequencing" of 
the project. (See, R., pp. 4098-4136.) Additionally, there is no other portion of the 
Development Agreement that allows for "moratoriums, future ordinances, resolutions or 
other land use rules or regulations" that limit the development, timing or sequencing of 
the Project. 
There is no mechanism by which the current Board can prohibit future Boards, in 
every circumstance, from passing land use regulations regarding this Project and 
therefore, the first sentence of the second paragraph of section 2.3 will be struck. 
5. Section 2.4 of the Development Agreement Restricts The County From 
Initiating Any Changes To The Development Agreement Unless Consented 
To By Intervenor 
Section 2.4 provides as follows: 
2.4 Changes to Zoning and Development Program. Any requests 
for changes or modifications to this Agreement or the zoning 
designation applicable to the Property shall be processed in the manner 
then set forth by County Code and/or this Agreement and/or other 
applicable law. Any such requests that are initiated by County shall 
become effective only upon AEHl's written consent. 
The portion of Section 2.4 that prohibits the County from making changes 
to the Agreement is not an ultra vires act. Because the Development Agreement 
is treated like a contract, it is an appropriate term of the contract that one party 
cannot unilaterally alter the contract. As such, this portion of Section 2.4 will 
remain. 
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However, the portion of Section 2.4 that limits any Board-initiated request 
a change or modification to the zoning designation effective only upon 
Intervenor's written consent is a limit of future Board's ability to exercise their 
police power vis a vis land use planning. As discussed above, there may come a 
time when it is no longer in the best interest of the County to leave the zone 
designation as 1-2 and future Boards must have the ability to make that 
determination without being limited to the consent of the interested party. As 
such, the words "or the zoning designation applicable to the Property" shall be 
struck from Section 2.4. 
6. The Development Agreement Does Not Grant Rights And Privileges To 
Intervenor To Demand That The County Do And Perform Certain Acts Such 
As The Acquisition Of Road Right-Of-Way, Installation Of Public Infrastructure 
And Expenditure Of County Resources In Support Of Intervenor's 
Development Plans 
The Petitioners misread the County's obligation pursuant to this section. 
Although Petitioners argue that this section requires the County to do and perform 
certain acts, Petitioners are incorrect. The County's obligations as it relates to section 
2. 7 of the Development Agreement are as follows: 
2.7 No requirement for expenditures by County. Nothing 
herein contained shall require County to expend funds to acquire right 
of way, improve roads or improve any Public Infrastructure in 
connection with the development of the Project. In the event 
development of the Project requires County to make improvements to 
Public Infrastructure, AEHI shall provide all funding necessary to 
achieve those improvements. County, as necessary to implement the 
installation of Public Infrastructure, shall cooperate reasonably with 
AEHI. It shall be the obligation of the then-sitting Board to determine the 
ievel of cooperation that is reasonable under the circumstances. 
(R., pp. 4107-4108.) All this section requires is that the County reasonably cooperate, 
as defined by future Boards, with Intervenor. There is nothing here that requires the 
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Board to acquire road right-of-way or install public infrastructure or expend County 
funds; the language is clear that Intervenor is to provide the funding, not the Board. As 
such, this does not impermissibly restrict future Board exercises of its police power. 
7. The Agreement Does Not Unlawfully Require The County To Defend 
Intervenor In Legal Actions That May Be Brought Challenging The Validity Of 
Any County Action Related To Intervenor's Application 
This section does not illegally restrict or limit an exercise of police power by a 
future Board. In fact, this provision has nothing to do with the exercise of police powers, 
but rather, represents the bargaining of legitimate contractual terms. 
3.2 Agreement to Cooperate. In the event of any legal or equitable 
action or other proceeding instituted by a non-government third-party 
challenging the validity of any County action and/or this Agreement, the 
Parties hereby agree to cooperate in defending such action or proceeding. 
County and AEHI may agree to select mutually agreeable legal counsel to 
defend such action or proceeding with the Parties sharing equally in the 
cost of such joint counsel, or each Party may select its own legal counsel 
at each Party's separate expense. All other costs of such defense(s) shall 
be shared equally by the Parties. Each Party shall retain the right to 
pursue such Party's own independent legal defense. 
(R., p. 4108.) This section does not require the Board to defend Intervenor in future 
legal actions. While this section requires cooperation, that cooperation is relatively 
benign, where each party can obtain its own attorney and pursue an independent 
defense. It does not restrict a future Board from acting in its own best interest since 
each party can pursue its own defense with its own counsel. Since the Board can 
legally enter into contracts, I.C. § 31-604(3), the determination of how much cooperation 
and the sharing in the costs of counsel is an appropriate exercise of the Board's 
contracting authority and therefore, does not unlawfully bind future Board actions. 
In sum, the Court is striking paragraph 2(b )(i) in its entirety, section 2(b )(v) in its 
entirety, the first sentence of the second paragraph in section 2.3 and the language, "or 
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the zoning designation applicable to the property" from section 2.4. All other terms of 
the Development Agreement shall remain. 
IX. 
The Development Agreement and Rezone Were Properly Adopted 
Petitioners argue the rezone and the Development Agreement are void and 
unenforceable because no ordinance was ever adopted authorizing the Development 
Agreement and therefore, the Development Agreement has never been authorized by 
I.C. § 67-6509. Respondent and Intervenor argue that rather than requiring an 
ordinance to be passed each time a development agreement is requested, the statute 
simply allows local governing agencies to enact ordinances that permit a development 
agreement. 
In a recent case, the Idaho Supreme Court reiterated the standards for statutory 
interpretation: 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review." Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist., 142 Idaho 
804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006). "The interpretation of a statute 'must 
begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their 
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as 
a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, 
but simply follows the law as written."' Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'/ 
Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,893,265 P.3d 502,506 {2011) (quoting State v. 
Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003)). "A statute is 
ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable 
construction." Porter v. Bd. of Trustees, Preston School Dist. No. 201, 141 
Idaho 11, 14, 105 P.3d 671, 674 (2004). 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney v. 2007 Legendary Motorcycle, 2013 Opinion No. 33 
(March 26, 2013). 
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Idaho Code§ 67-6511A provides: 
Each governing board may, by ordinance adopted or amended in 
accordance with the notice and hearing provisions provided under section 
67-6509, Idaho Code, require or permit as a condition of rezoning that an 
owner or developer make a written commitment concerning the use or 
development of the subject parcel. The governing board shall adopt 
ordinance provisions governing the creation, form, recording, modification, 
enforcement and termination of conditional commitments. Such 
commitments shall be recorded in the office of the county recorder and 
shall take effect upon the adoption of the amendment to the zoning 
ordinance. 
The plain language of the statute allows a Board to pass an ordinance that allows 
written commitments to be made. The statute requires that the ordinance apply to 
commitments (plural) rather than a commitment (singular). Thus, the plain 
language of the statute indicates that local Boards may enact ordinances that would 
create a uniform process by which all commitments could be considered, not that a 
separate ordinance is required each time a Development Agreement is entered. 
This Court does not read the statute such that it would require a Board to enact a 
new development-agreement-specific ordinance each time a Development 
Agreement was accepted. To read the statute as Petitioner would wish would 
require this Court to ignore the plain meaning of the statute and would also require 
this Court to read into the statute an unwieldy and impractical result, which this 
Court is unwilling to do. Additionally, the statute is clear that the commitment is 
effective once the rezone is completed, not by the passage of an ordinance related 
specifically to the Development Agreement. 
As such, the Court finds that there was no separate ordinance required that 
relates to the Development Agreement at issue in this case. Instead, the Board 
was required to pass an ordinance that governs written commitments. Here, the 
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Board has passed PCC section 8-5-11.G and therefore, has complied with the 
statutory requirement. Because no separate ordinance was required, the 
Development Agreement was, subject to the above discussion, properly adopted 
and will not be set aside on the grounds proffered by Petitioners on this issue. 
X. 
The Board Provided Adequate Notice Of The Hearing And An Adequate Opportunity To 
Present And Rebut Evidence 
While failing to comply with due process considerations can be a violation of 
fundamental rights, in planning and zoning decisions, due process requires:" (a) notice 
of the proceedings; (b) a transcribable verbatim record of the proceedings; (c) specific, 
written findings of fact; and (d) an opportunity to present and rebut evidence." Neighbors 
for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 127, 176 P.3d 126, 132 (2007) 
citing Cowan v. Board of Commissioners of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 510, 148 
P.3d 1247, 1256. (2006). Of these, Petitioner argues that there was inadequate notice 
of the proceedings, they had a limited opportunity to present and rebut evidence, and 
that there are not specific written findings of fact. As such, the other bases will not be 
discussed. 
A. The Board Provided Sufficient Notice Of The Proceedings 
Petitioners argue that the notice they received was insufficient. Respondent and 
Intervenor argues that the Board provided more notice than was required by statute. 
The issue for this appeal is whether Petitioners had notice and an opportunity to be 
heard on Intervenor's request for a rezone. 
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Procedural due process requires some process to ensure that the 
individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his or her rights in violation of the 
state or federal constitutions. This requirement is met when the defendant 
is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard. The opportunity to 
be heard must occur at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner in 
order to satisfy the due process requirement. 
Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 127-28, 176 P.3d 
126, 132-33 (2007) citing Cowan, 143 Idaho at 512, 148 P.3d at 1258. Payette County 
Code§ 8-11-6 requires that: 
Notice Of Hearing: 
A. Notice of time, place and purpose of each public hearing held by the 
planning and zoning commission shall be given by publication in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the county at least fifteen (15) days 
prior to such hearing. 
B. Written Notice By Mail: When the public hearing is before the planning and 
zoning commission on a proposed change, modification or reclassification 
and the enlargement, expansion and amplification thereof, notice shall be 
given by the applicant to the planning and zoning administrator who shall 
deliver said notice by regular U.S. mail to each property owner whose 
name and address appears on the list accompanying such application. 
C. Notice To Over Two Hundred Property Owners: When notice is required to 
two hundred (200) or more property owners or residents, alternate forms 
of procedures which would provide adequate notice may be provided in 
lieu of mailed notice. 
Section 8-11-8 provides that: 
A. Report Of Planning And Zoning Commission: At every hearing before the 
commission, the commission shall hear all persons interested in the 
subject matter. Not later than sixty (60) working days after the conclusion 
of the hearing, the commission shall file a report stating the action taken 
by the commission at such hearing or its recommendation to the board of 
county commissioners. 
B. Aciion By Board Of County Commissioners: The board of county 
commissioners shall either approve, disapprove or modify the 
recommendations of the planning and zoning commission. The board shall 
hold a public hearing, in accordance with section 8-11-6 of this chapter. 
(Ord. 57, 4-18-1988) 
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Pursuant to statute, any notice must be submitted to the official newspaper of the city or 
county at least 15 days prior to the hearing date. I.C. § 67-6511(b). 
Petitioners concede that "a copy of both the published and mailed notice of the 
P&Z Commission's December 9, 2010 hearing on AEHl's rezone application is found in 
the record at pages 1342 and 1343." (Petitioner's Brief, p. 40.) Although Petitioner 
claims "the record does not indicate in which newspaper the notice was published or to 
which property owners and residents it was mailed," the Record indicates to whom the 
notice was mailed (R., pp.3923-3927,) and that the notice was mailed to adjoining 
property owners, the owner of the land under consideration, and those property owners 
within 300 feet of the land being considered. (R., pp. 184-187; 3923-3927.) The 
Record further indicates the notice was delivered to the newspaper on November 9, 
2010, and mailed to the neighbors on November 10, 2010, well in advance of the 15-
day notice requirement. Thus, the Record supports finding both that the appropriate 
parties were given notice of the hearing and that the notice was submitted to a 
newspaper within the time standards set forth in Payette County and Idaho Code. 
The Record also establishes that the notice for the June 6, 2011 hearing was 
submitted to the Independent-Enterprise, a Payette, Idaho, newspaper on May 17, 
2011, and to the "neighbors" on May 19, 2011; the notice was published on May 18, 
2011 (R., pp.4081-4084.) None of the Petitioners contend they did not have notice of 
this hearing, therefore, the Record supports a finding that the notice was delivered to 
the newspaper on November 9, 2010. 
Similarly, Petitioner concedes that a notice was timely sent for the June 6, 2011 
hearing (R., pp. 4081-4083.) Further, the Notice provided that information regarding the 
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rezone application was available in the Commission's office and included a link to 
access the documents for those parties interested in seeing exactly which documents 
were at issue. (R., pp.1342; 4081-4084.) The hearing was set for June 6, 2011, and the 
material was published May 18, 2011. (R., pp.4082-4084.) Thus, the material 
regarding the variance was available 15 days before the scheduled hearing and was 
available to the public. As such, the County provided sufficient notice pursuant to the 
state and county code requirements. 
The Record reflects that the application for the rezone and variance were posted 
to the Payette County website with copies available in hard copy or on computer disk 
and several individuals, including one of the Petitioners, purchased either printed or 
electronic versions of the documents. (R., pp. 1291-1305, 2537-2538.) Thus, the 
Petitioners had timely notice of the rezone application and the date on which it would be 
addressed by the Commission, thus satisfying any due process concerns. 
Even if Petitioners received timely notice, the notice still must be sufficiently 
specific so as to give them meaningful information about the content of the notice. 
Idaho Code§ 67-6511(b) requires that 
Any property owner entitled to specific notice pursuant to the provisions of 
this subsection shall have a right to participate in public hearings before a 
planning commission, planning and zoning commission or governing 
board subject to applicable procedures." prior to granting a variance, 
notice and an opportunity to be heard shall be provided to property owners 
adjoining the parcel under consideration. 
Petitioners argue that the content of the notice was insufficient because it did 
adequately summarize the nature of the hearing. {Petitioner's Brief, pp.40-43.) The first 
notice stated: 
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The purpose of the hearing is to establish a recommendation to the 
Board of County Commissioners regarding an application for a 
REZONE (AG TO IND-2), CONCEPTUAL PLAN, DEVELOPMENT 
AGREEMENT & VARIANCE by Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. for 
properties located off of Big Willow Rd. and Stone Quarry Rd., Payette, 
ID and owned by JG Schwarz. 
The Properties are described more specifically: A portion of land in 
Section 08 &17, T.8N., R.3W., Boise Meridian, Payette County ID. 
(R., p.1342.) The second notice stated, in part: 
Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. requests a rezone from Agriculture to 
lndustrial-2, Conceptual Plan and Development Agreement regarding 
property located at Township 8 North, Range 3 West, Section 8 and 
Section 17, of the Boise Meridian, Payette County, Idaho, which is 
comprised of a portion of properties identified as Tax Parcel 
Identification Numbers 08N03W080000 and 08N03W170000 (more 
particularly described in Exhibit A). 
The application and a more particular description of the subject property 
and the proceedings related to this application are on file in the office of 
the Payette County Planning and Zoning Administrator, 1130 3rd Ave. 
N., Room #107, Payette, Idaho 83661. These documents are also 
available online at pnz.claypeak.com. 
(R., p.4084.) 
Petitioners argue that notice is insufficient to apprise interested parties that the 
rezone was for building a nuclear power plant but none of them, individually, claim they 
were unaware of the rezone request or the reason for the rezone. The Petitioners were 
already aware of Intervenor's proposed use of the property, as there had been 
community meeting notifications distributed by Intervenor (R., pp.63-64, 115, 182-188,) 
and public hearings on the amendments to the Comprehensive Plan, at which several of 
the Petitioners were sworn in and testified, as early as February, 2010. {R., pp. 98-131; 
3823-3908); Petitioners had also participated in a hearing for the variance. (Tr., 12/2/10 
and 12/9/10; see also, Record, generally.) Thus, Petitioners had actual notice of the 
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use to which the property would be put and cannot demonstrate that they did not have 
knowledge. 
Nor can Petitioners assert fundamental harm on behalf of others. Cowan v. 
Board of Comm'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 512, 148 P.3d 1247, 1258 
(2006). Therefore, because Petitioners have not established a violation of their 
individual fundamental rights, they have not sufficiently established harm. 
This Court also finds that the Notice provided a general description of the issues 
and provided more specific information for interested parties via the link to digital 
copies. Thus, anyone with access to the internet could access, download, and review 
the rezone application and the documents in support of the application. If a party did 
not have access to the Internet, printed copies were available. This provides even more 
information than the summary Petitioners believe should have been included. 
Therefore, this Court finds that the summary of the Notice was sufficient. 
B. The Notice Was Sufficiently Specific 
Petitioners further argue that the notice did not specify with particularity the land at 
issue. (Petitioner's Brief, p.41.) This argument is without merit. Petitioners have cited 
no authority that the description be more specific than that which was given. As noted 
above, none of the Petitioners are claiming they were unaware of the land at issue 
either generally or specifically. In fact, the Record is clear that the Petitioners had 
actual knowledge of the land at issue because of their involvement in the amendment to 
the Comprehensive Plan and the variance application. Therefore, Petitioners have not 
established any due process violations relating to the notice given and have not 
established a violation of their fundamental rights on this ground. 
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Even if the notice had been defective, because Petitioner's participated in the 
public hearings, that participation cured any defect in the notice. Ciszek v. Kootenai 
County Bd. of Com'rs, 151 Idaho 123, 133, 254 P.3d 24, 34 (2011 citing Gay v. County 
Com'rs of Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626, 631, 651 P.2d 560, 565 (Ct.App.1982). 
Where a citizen is able to attend a public hearing that has been properly noticed, and a 
transcribable record of the proceeding is maintained, there is no denial of due process. 
Id. Because there is no allegation by any individual Petitioner that he or she was unable 
to attend the public hearing, the Court finds there were no due process violations on this 
ground. 
C. Petitioners Have Not Established They Were Denied The Ability to Present or 
Respond to Evidence 
Petitioners argue that because they were required to submit written materials in 
advance and were limited to five (5) minutes to speak, they were not provided a 
"meaningful opportunity'' to be heard on the issue of the rezone. The first published 
notice contained the following: 
The hearing officer shall be authorized to impose a 5 minute limitation on 
any oral testimony. If testimony is anticipated to exceed that 5 minute limit, 
it may be submitted in writing in advance to the Planning and Zoning office 
to be part of the record. Any written testimony, any exhibits or any written 
documentation that a witness would like to have made a part of the 
hearing record, must be submitted to the Planning and Zoning office 
before 5:00 p.m. on November 26, 2010. Written information presented at 
the hearing will be placed in a sealed envelope and will not be considered. 
(R., p.1342.) The published notice for the June 6, 2011 hearing stated: 
Th p hPafino nffici:>r c:ha!I hi:> :::iuthnri7od tn imnnc,o ,::, i:; min, 1te l'1mit,::,tir.n ,...,; ...... •••:::::, _,., """'" .....,,, -- 'I....: 1.11.._, IL-'-' '-'--' llllf-''--''-''-" \.AV 11111 U\. I Ill ULIVII 
on any oral testimony. If testimony is anticipated to exceed that 5 minute 
limit, it may be submitted in writing in advance to the Planning and 
Zoning Administrator to be part of the record. The record will be open 
for public viewing at the Planning and Zoning Office located at the 
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Payette County Courthouse, Payette, Idaho during regular business 
hours. 
, p.4084.) 
The relevant portions of Payette County Code 1-7-2 provide: 
A Testimony: At a hearing, a party requesting relief from the Board of 
County Commissioners or Planning and Zoning Commission shall be 
allowed the opportunity to present oral testimony and such exhibits as the 
hearing officer may deem appropriate. Any affected party shall be allowed 
to produce information either orally or in a written form which the hearing 
officer deems appropriate. 
D. Time Limit: The hearing officer may set a time limit on presentations, 
but not less than three (3) minutes. 
Nothing in Payette County code § 1-7-2(a) limits the hearing officer's ability to 
provide a procedure by which exhibits shall be submitted. The plain language of the 
code states that the opportunity to present oral testimony and exhibits is "as the hearing 
officer may deem appropriate." PCC § 1-7-2(A). In this case, given what he believed 
would be the submission of voluminous exhibits, the hearing officer deemed it 
appropriate to have those exhibits submitted in advance. Petitioners were not restricted 
from submitting exhibits in advance, nor were they limited from referencing or relying on 
those exhibits during their oral statements. (See, Transcript, 12/2/10 and Tr., 6/6/11, 
generally). The Record further indicates that written submissions were accepted after 
the November 26, 2010 deadline. (R., pp. 3313-3319, 3324). 
In Cowan v. Bd. Of Com'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 508, 148 P.3d 
1247, 1254 (2006), the Court held the Commission's action did not violate Cowan's due 
process rights where Cowan had a meaningful opportunity to be heard even though the 
planning and zoning commission limited public comment on the issue to two minutes 
because Cowan had an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 
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meaningful manner, his attorney spoke at length and presented evidence during the 
initial hearing and during the appeals. Id, see also, Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. 
Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 127-28, 176 P.3d 126, 132-33 (2007). 
Petitioners have not claimed that there was additional written material they 
wished to submit and they cannot claim a violation of fundamental rights on behalf of 
others. As Petitioners make no claim they wished to submit additional documentation 
and they cannot point to any written documents they were not allowed to submit, they 
have failed to show how this limitation prevented them from participating in the hearing 
in a meaningful way. Similarly, Petitioners have not established that any one of them, 
individually, was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to make a statement, despite 
being limited to five (5) minutes. Nothing in the Record indicates that any of the 
Petitioners were prevented from making any statement or that they were not allowed to 
complete their statements. This Court's review of the transcripts indicates only one (1) 
instance, where one of the Petitioners, Jeff Weber, was told he was approaching the 
time limit. (Tr. 12/2/10, p. 142, Ls. 6-25.) Nothing in the transcript indicates that the 
Petitioner Weber believed that to be unreasonable, that he had more to say that he 
could not say, or that he was otherwise prejudiced in making his statement. Thus, it 
appears that Petitioners were permitted to be heard in a meaningful way, which is what 
is required by due process. See Cowan, 143 Idaho at 512-513, 148 P.3d at 1258-59. 
Although Petitioners argue that Intervenor got additional time, they have not 
alleged they needed more time or that they wished to provide more statements. In light 
of the number of individuals who testified against the rezone application, providing 
Intervenor the opportunity to respond to some of the concerns was not unreasonable 
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and granting Intervenor 15 minutes, as compared to the total number of minutes of 
statements of those opposed to the rezone, was not unreasonable. Therefore, based 
on the above, the Court finds there were no Due Process violations in the manner in 
which the hearing was conducted and the Petitioners have not established any violation 
of a fundamental right on this basis to establish harm. 
IX. 
The Board Issued Specific, Written Findings Of Fact Except In Regards to 
Payette County Code Section 8-10-7 
Petitioner has alleged that the Board did not satisfy the requirements of Idaho 
Code§ 67-6535 because its Findings and Facts and Conclusions of Law are deficient. 
Idaho Code§ 67-6535(2) provides: 
The approval or denial of any application required or authorized pursuant 
to this chapter shall be in writing and accompanied by a reasoned 
statement that explains the criteria and standards considered relevant, 
states the relevant contested facts relied upon, and explains the rationale 
for the decision based on the applicable provisions of the comprehensive 
plan, relevant ordinance and statutory provisions, pertinent constitutional 
principles and factual information contained in the record. 
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed a district court's decision that the Board's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law did not amount to a reasoned statement as 
required by I.C. § 67-6535 in Jasso v. Camas County, 151 Idaho 790, 792, 264 P.3d 
897, 899 (2011). There, the Court noted that the required findings must be more than 
"recitations of portions of the record" and must include "determinations of the facts 
disputed by the parties." Id. at 794, 264 P.3d at 901. Citing other cases, the Court 
noted that "conclusions that do not reveal the underlying facts or poiicies that were 
considered were inadequate, as was a Board's Findings that were supplemented by a 
staff report." Id. In sum, the Commission and Board's Findings "must plainly state the 
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resolution of factual disputes, identify the evidence supporting that factual 
determination, and explain the basis for legal conclusions, including identification of the 
pertinent laws and/or regulations upon which the legal conclusions rest." Id. 
The decision issued by the Board is 23 pages long. (R., pp.4137-4160.) The 
second page indicates what evidence the Board considered: 
In making its decision, the Board considered the written application of 
AEHI, along with all attachments, all letters and documents submitted by 
the public, all documents and exhibits presented, the staff report, the 
findings of fact and favorable recommendation from the Payette County 
Planning and Zoning [sic], the written responses of any local, state or 
federal agencies which were given notice pursuant to Idaho Code, and 
the testimony at the public hearing, including the following: 
(R., p. 4138.) The next 17 pages summarize the statements made by each individual at 
the June 6, 2011 hearing. The next half page is a list of the applicable factors the Board 
believed it must consider when deciding whether to grant or deny an application for a 
rezone. (R., p. 4155.) The Board then analyzes each of the factors set out in Payette 
County Code Section 8-11-7. (R., pp. 4156-4159.) The statements as summarized on 
pages 4156-4159 of the Record by the Commission and Board can fairly be 
characterized as factual findings as contemplated by the case law. See Jasso, infra. 
In its analysis, the Board recognizes there are contested facts, for example, 
whether there would be sufficient water, evaluates the information it received, and 
reached a reasoned conclusion. (R., p.4156.) Another contested fact was the 
capability of the roads to adequately handle the increased traffic. (R., pp.4157-4158.) 
The Board indicated it had considered all the evidence that had been submitted and 
cited to the information on which it relied to render its decision. (R., pp. 4157-4158.) 
Just because the Board did not say it was a contested fact does not render the decision 
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it reached invalid. The Board further recognized that many local landowners opposed 
the project and listed the reasons for the opposition. (R., p.4159.) The Board again 
referenced the evidence it considered. The Board's conclusion, based on analyzing all 
the factors, was, "The proposed rezone is not in conflict with the comprehensive plan." 
(R., p.4159.) This Court finds that in light of the deference provided a Board's zoning 
decision, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions meet the requirements of Idaho Code§ 
67-6535. 
Despite Petitioner's assertion, the Board did not just summarize the testimony 
and then issue a summary decision. Instead, the Board indicated the evidence it 
considered and applied that evidence to each of the facts. Despite Petitioner's 
contention to the contrary, there is mention of the pages of evidence submitted to the 
Board, as the Board identified that it considered, "all letters and documents submitted 
by the public, all documents and exhibits presented." (R., p.4138.) However, the 
Board was free to consider, weigh and reject any evidence, including the evidence 
submitted by the Petitioners. Despite Petitioner's contention, Idaho Code § 67-6535 
does not require Boards to "articulate the rationale for rejecting factual information 
presented." Instead, the statute requires that the Board, "states the relevant contested 
facts relied upon, and explains the rationale for the decision based on the applicable 
provisions of the comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and statutory provisions, 
pertinent constitutional principles and factual information contained in the record." I.C. 
§67-6535(2). Ultimately, the Board determined the weight of the evidence supported 
the finding that the conditional rezone was in accordance with the Comprehensive Plan. 
This finding is supported by substantial, competent, although conflicting, evidence in the 
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record and, therefore, must be affirmed. See Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley 
County, 137 Idaho 192, 196, 46 P.3d 9, 13 (2002). Taylor v. Canyon County Bd. of 
Com'rs, 147 Idaho 424,437, 210 P.3d 532, 545 (2009). Thus, the Board has done what 
was statutorily required of it in all respects except with regard to Payette County Code 
section 8-10-7. 
Payette County Code 8-10-7 provides: 
No land or building in any zone shall be used or occupied in any manner 
creating dangerous, injurious, noxious or otherwise objectionable 
conditions which could adversely affect the surrounding areas or adjoining 
premises, except that any use permitted by this title may be undertaken 
and maintained if acceptable measures and safeguards to reduce 
dangerous and objectionable conditions to acceptable limits as 
established by the following performance requirements: 
C. Radioactivity Or Electrical Disturbance: No activity shall emit harmful 
radioactivity at any point, or electrical disturbance adversely affecting the 
operation of any equipment at any point, other than at the source of such 
disturbance; 
Petitioner contends that the Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
invalid because they don't address the above county ordinance. Although the Board 
cites to Payette County Code sections 8-11-1 through 8-11-10, it does not cite to and 
does not appear to have considered section 8-10-7, although it is required by statute to 
consider "relevant ordinance provisions." I.C. § 67-6535(2). 
As discussed in Section VII, supra, and incorporated herein by reference, if that 
section of the Payette County Code is invalid, the Board did not err in failing to 
reference or discuss the statute. However, the issue of whether that section of the 
Code is valid is not properly before this Court on appeal. Because Petitioner's 
concession at oral argument would result in a denial of this claim and because the 
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validity of Payette County Ordinance § 8-10-7 is not at issue in this appeal, the Court 
declines to address this issue. 
VL 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined above, this case is HEREBY REMANDED for action 
consistent with this opinion. 
Dated this --~l ~ __ day of May, 2013. 
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TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF 
PAYETTE COUNTY, AND ITS ATTORNEY, ANNE MARlE KELSO, AND THE CLERK OF 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
I. The following named Appellants, John (Jack) Burlile, H-Hook, LLC, Clifford Morgan and 
Mary Morgan, Thomas Pence, Irene Roland, Tom Roland and Marcia Roland, James Underwood, 
Jr., and Jeffery Weber, appeal against the above-named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court 
from the Order on Appeal and Order of Remand entered in the above-entitled action on the 2nd day 
of May, 2013, Honorable Judge Molly Huskey presiding. 
2. That Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or 
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (f) I.AR. 
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3. preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants intend to assert in the 
appeal follows; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellants from 
asserting other issues on appeal: 
(a) Whether the District Court erred in determining that there was no testimony of any 
Petitioners in the hearings held by the Planning and Zoning Commission and the Board of County 
Commissioners because no individual oath or affirmation was given to any of the speakers. 
(b) Whether the District Court erred in determining that certain Appellants lacked standing 
to pursue their Petition for Judicial Review. 
( c) Whether the District Court erred in refusing to take judicial notice of and considering 
the Affidavits of certain Appellants and other witnesses submitted in support of Appellants' standing 
to pursue their Petition for Judicial Review. 
( d) Whether the District Court erred in determining that certain Appellants failed to 
establish substantial harm pursuant to LC. § 67-5279(4). 
( e) Whether the District Court erred in dete1mining that the Board of County 
Commissioners' decision to approve the conditional rezone was not invalid for the reason that it was 
based on an invalid comprehensive plan. 
(f) Whether the District Court erred in determining that the Board of County 
Commissioners' decision to approve the conditional rezone did not constitute illegal spot zoning. 
(g) Whether the District Court erred in determining that the Board of County 
Commissioners did not exceed its statutory authority in approving the development agreement in 
connection with the conditional rezone. 
(h) Whether the District Court erred in determining that the Board of County 
Commissioners properly adopted the development agreement in connection with the conditional 
rezone pursuant to the requirements on LC.§ 67-651 lA. 
(i) \Vhether the District Court erred in determining that the Board of County 
Commissioners decision to approve the conditional rezone did not violate the notice and hearing 
requirements of the Payette County Code, the Local Land Use Planning Act, and Appellants' due 
process rights. 
G) \Vhether the District Court erred in determining that the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law issued by the Board of County Commissioners satisfied the requirements of 
I.C. § 67-6535 and therefore did not prejudice Appellants' substantial right to due process. 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No. 
5.(a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? No. 
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(b) The Appellants request the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript: IS 
6. The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. 
(a) Petitioners' Brief and Appendices. 
(b) Petitioners' Reply Brief and Appendices. 
( c) Motion by Petitioners for Leave to File Brief in Excess of 50 Pages. 
, ( d) Memorandum in Support of Motion by Petitioners for Leave to File Brief in Excess of 
50 Pages. 
( e) Memorandum in Response to Intervenor Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc.' s Objection to 
Petitioners' Reply Brief. 
(f) Order Re: Motion for Leave to File Brief 
In requesting the foregoing additional documents to be included in the clerk's record, 
Appellants anticipate that the entirety of the record and transcripts of the proceedings of the Payette 
County Planning and Zoning Commission and Payette County Board of County Commissioners, as 
filed or lodged with the District Court, will be lodged with the Supreme Court in accordance with 
Rule 31, I.A.R. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Name and address: N/ A 
Name and address: -----------------------------
Name and address: -----------------------------
(b) (1) [ ] That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the 
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(2) [X] That the Appellants are exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because 
no reporter's transcript has been requested. 
(c) (1) [X] That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
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(2) [ ] That Appellants are exempt from paying the estimated fee for preparation of the 
record because 
( d) ( 1) [X] That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(2) [ ] That Appellants are exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20 
( and the attorney general ofldaho pursuant to § 67-1401 (1 ), Idaho Code). 
iv-
DATED: This / f" day of June, 2013. 
Attorney for the Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
--fV"'. 
I hereby certify that on this Iv day of June, 2013, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Anne Marie Kelso 
Payette County Prosecutor 
1115 1st Avenue North 





251 E. Front St., Ste. 200 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax: 208.388.1001 
E-mail: jbutler@spinkbutler.com 
Attorneys for Alternate Energy Holdings, 
Inc. 
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Enrique Ybarra, Jr. 
6850 Little Willow Road 
Payette, ID 83661 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN ~.ND FOR THE COUNTY 
*************** 
NEIGHBORS FOR THE 
PRESERVATION OF THE BIG AND 
LITTLE CREEK COMMUNITY, an 
unincorporated corporation; CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
PEOPLE FOR PAYETTE'S FUTURE 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit 
Corporation; JOSEPH BERCIK and 
BETTY BERCIK; CODY BURLILE and Payette County Case No. 
CHRISTINA BURLILE; DE BURLILE and CV-2011-000959 
LORI PRATT; LINDA BURLILE; JORDAN 
CARY and HARMONY CARY; LARRY DAHNKE 
and SUSAN DAHNKE; DALE DELLINGER; Supreme Court #41113-2013 
RAY DENIG and JACKIE DENIG; RICHARD 
EVEY and SUSAN EVEY; KANE HUDDLESTON 
and JOYCE HUDDLESTON; LUKE HUDDLESTON; 
JOHN JEFFRIES and JO ANN JEFFRIES; 
JERRY KORN; LEON KORN; CAMERON MAHLER; 
KIMBERLY CHRISTENSEN; CYRIL ROLAND; 
GREG SEMON and TERRI SEMON; ROGER 
SMITH and MARY VIVIAN SMITH; 
ELIZABETH STEPHENS; DICK TOWNER and 
SUE TOWNER; JOHN WALGENBACH and 
DENISE MORGAN; DEBORAH WEBER; and 
ENRIQUE YBARRA, JR. , 
Petitioners, 
And 
JOHN(JACK)BURLILE; HH-HOOK,LLC, an 
Idaho limited liablilty company; 
CLIFFORD MORGAN and MARY MORGAN; 
THOMAS PENCE; IRENE ROLAND; TOM 
ROLAND and MARCIA ROLAND; JAMES 
UNDERWOOD, JR. ; and JEFFERY WEBER, 
Petitioners-Appellants, 
-vs-
BOARD OF PAYETTE COJ:.!IMISSIONERS 
OF PAYETTE COUNTY, 
Respondent, 
and 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 1 -
ALTERNATE ENERGY HOLDINGS INC., 
Applicant/Intervenor. 
Appeal from: Third Judicial District, Payette County, Honorable 
Molly Huskey, presiding. 
Case Number from Court: District Court: CV-2011 000959. 
Order or Judgment appealed from: ORDER ON APPEAL AND ORDER OF 
REMAND, filed May 2, 2013. 
Attorney for Appellant: Stephen Bradbury and Thomas A. Banducci 
Attorney for Respondent: Anne Marie Kelso 
Appealed by: John (Jack) Burlile, etal. 
Appealed Against: Respondents: Board of Payette Com.missioners of 
Payette County 
Notice of Appeal Filed: June 12, 2013 
Notice of Cross-Appeal Filed: -------------
Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal Filed: ------------
Appellate Fee Paid: Yes 
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional record 
filed: 
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional 
Reporter's Transcript filed: --------------------
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested? No 
If so Name of Reporter: N/A. 
DATE: June 18, 2013 
Betty J. Dressen 
Clerk of the District Court 
~ \ 
By __ ~_--P!d-'-p_u_t_y---,-C~l_e_r~k---
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 2 -
2013- 10:24 s Butler 1 208 388 1001 ette County Pros P 2/4 
Anne-Marie Kelso 
Payette County Attorney's Office 
1130 Third A venue North, Room 




THIRD JUDICIAL DiSTRICT COURT 
PAYETTE C.OUNTY, !DAHO 
2 
Attorneys for Respondent Board of County Commissioners of P.1yette County 
JoAnn C. Butler, ISB No. 4170 
T. Hethe Clark. ISB No. 7265 
SPINK BUTLER. LLP 
251 E. Front Street. Suite 200 
Boise, ID 83702 
P.O. Box 639 
Boise. ID 83701 
Telephone: 208-388-1000 
Facsimile: 208-388-1001 
Attorneys for Intervenor Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
NEIGHBORS FOR THE PRESERVATION ) 
OF THE BIG AND LITTLE CREEK ) 
COMMUNITY, an unincorporated ) 
association, et al., ) 
Petitioners-Appellants. 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF PAYETTE COUNTY, 
Respondent-Respondent, 
and 
ALTERNATE EI\1ERGY HOLDI.t~GS INC .• 
a Nevada corporation, 
Applicant/Intervenor. 

















Case No. CV 2011-959 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD 
2013-06- 10:24 s Butler 1 208 388 1001 ette County Pros P 3/4 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED APPELLANTS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS, Stephen A. 
Bradbury of Williams Bradbury, P.C .• 1015 West.Hays Street, Boise. [daho 83702. and 
Thomas A. Banducci, Wade Woodard, and Dara L. Parker of Andersen Banducci 
PLLC, 101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600, Boise. Idaho 83702, AND THE CLERK 
AND REPORTER OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT the Respondent. Board of County Commissioners 
of Payette County, and the Intervenor, Alternate Energy Holdings Inc .• in the above-entitled 
ptocecding hereby request pursuant to Ruie 19. I.AR., the inclusion of the following material in 
the clerk's record in addition to that requil'ed to be included by the I.AR. and the Notice of 
Appeal. 
1, Clerk's Record: 
a. Respondent and Intervenor's Btief (dated November 15, 2012). 
b. Objection to Petitioners' Reply Brief and Response to Motion for Leave to 
File Brief in Excess of 50 Pages (dated December 12, 2012). 
2. 1 certify a copy of this Request for Additional Record has been served on e 
Clerk of the District Court and upon all parties re 
/' 
DATED this 26th day of June 2013. ( 





\ Atto eys for Board · County 
\~om issioners of P ette County 
SPINK BUTLER. LLP 
B~~~=====--
T. Hethe Clark 
Attorneys for Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. 
2013- 10: s Butler 1 208 388 1001 et County Pros P 4/4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of June 2013, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the above REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD to be served upon the following 
individuals in the manner indicated below: 
Stephen A. Bradbury 
Williams Bradbury, P.C. 
1015 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Facsimile: 208/344-0077 
s1evc@williamshradhu1:~ .. com 
Thomas A. Banducci 
Wade L Woodard 
Dara L. Parker 
Andersen Banducci PLLC 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard. Suite 1600 





Payette County Clerk of the District Court 
Payette County Courthouse 
1130 3rd Avenue No1th, Room 104 
Payette, ID 83661 
Facsimile: 208/642-601 I 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD .. 3 
] U.S. Mail 
J Hand-Delivery 
[ ] Federal Express 
w·via Facsimile 
[ J Via E-Mail 
[ J U.S. Mail 
l J Hand-Delivery 
[ J FcderaJ Express 
~ Via Facsimile 
[ l Via E-Mail 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
_J.d7Hand-Dclivery 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ J Via Facsimile 
[ ] Via E-Mail 
Anne-Marie Kelso, Prosecuting Attorney 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
NEIGHBORS FOR THE 
PRESERVATION OF THE BIG AND 
LITTLE CREEK COMMUNITY, an 
unincorporated corporation; CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
PEOPLE FOR PAYETTE'S FUTURE 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit 
Corporation; JOSEPH BERCIK and 
BETTY BERCIK; CODY BURLILE and Payette County Case No. 
CHRISTINA BURLILE; DE BURLILE and CV-2011-000959 
LORI PRATT; LINDA BURLILE; JORDAN 
CARY and HARMONY CARY; LARRY DAHNKE 
and SUSAN DAHNKE; DALE DELLINGER; Supreme Court #41113-2013 
RAY DENIG and JACKIE DENIG; RICHARD 
EVEY and SUSAN EVEY; KANE HUDDLESTON 
and JOYCE HUDDLESTON; LUKE HUDDLESTON; 
JOHN JEFFRIES and JO ANN JEFFRIES; 
JERRY KORN; LEON KORN; CAMERON MAHLER; 
KIMBERLY CHRISTENSEN; CYRIL ROLAND; 
GREG SEMON and TERRI SEMON; ROGER 
SMITH and MARY VIVIAN SMITH; 
ELIZABETH STEPHENS; DICK TOWNER and 
SUE TOWNER; JOHN WALGENBACH and 
DENISE MORGAN; DEBORAH WEBER; and 
ENRIQUE YBARRA, JR. , 
Petitioners, 
And 
JOHN(JACK)BURLILE; H-HOOK,LLC, an 
Idaho limited liablilty company; 
CLIFFORD MORGAN and MARY MORGAN; 
THOMAS PENCE; IRENE ROLAND; TOM 
ROLAND and MARCIA ROLAND; JAMES 
UNDERWOOD, JR. ; and JEFFERY WEBER, 
Petitioners-Appellants, 
-vs-
BOARD OF PAYETTE COMMISSIONERS 
OF PAYETTE COUNTY, 
Respondent, 
and 
ALTERNATE ENERGY HOLDINGS INC., 
Applicant/Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS -1 
I, Betty J. Dressen, Clerk of the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Payette do hereby certify that the following is a list of the 
exhibits, offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the 
Supreme Court or retained as indicated: 
EXHIBIT LIST 
Exhibit No. Description Admitted Ruling Reserved 
Electronic Consolidated Agency Record 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the 
said Court at Payette, Idaho, this-----""'- day of 
2013. 
Betty J. Dressen 
Clerk of the District Court 
s/i~ 
Dep~k 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS -t 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
NEIGHBORS FOR THE 
PRESERVATION OF THE BIG AND 
LITTLE CREEK COMMUNITY, an 
unincorporated corporation; 
PEOPLE FOR PAYETTE'S FUTURE 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit 
Corporation; JOSEPH BERCIK and 
BETTY BERCIK; CODY BURLILE and Payette County Case No. 
CHRISTINA BURLILE; DE BURLILE and CV-2011-000959 
LORI PRATT; LINDA BURLILE; JORDAN 
CARY and HARMONY CARY; LARRY DAHNKE 
and SUSAN DAHNKE; DALE DELLINGER; Supreme Court #41113-2013 
RAY DENIG and JACKIE DENIG; RICHARD 
EVEY and SUSAN EVEY; KANE HUDDLESTON 
and JOYCE HUDDLESTON; LUKE HUDDLESTON; 
JOHN JEFFRIES and JO ANN JEFFRIES; CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
JERRY KORN; LEON KORN; CAMERON MAHLER; 
KI:MBERLY CHRISTENSEN; CYRIL ROLAND; 
GREG SEMON and TERRI SEMON; ROGER 
SMITH and MARY VIVIAN SMITH; 
ELIZABETH STEPHENS; DICK TOWNER and 
SUE TOWNER; JOHN WALGENBACH and 
DENISE MORGAN; DEBORAH WEBER; and 
ENRIQUE YBARRA, JR. , 
Petitioners, 
And 
JOHN(JACK)BURLILE; H-HOOK,LLC, an 
Idaho limited liablilty company; 
CLIFFORD MORGAN and MARY MORGAN; 
THOMAS PENCE; IRENE ROLAND; TOM 
ROLAND and MARCIA ROLAND; JAMES 
UNDERWOOD, JR. ; and JEFFERY WEBER, 
Petitioners-Appellants, 
-vs-
BOARD OF PAYETTE COMMISSIONERS 
OF PAYETTE COUNTY, 
Respondent, 
and 
ALTERNATE ENERGY HOLDINGS INC., 
Applicant/Intervenor. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 1 
I, Betty J. Dressen, Clerk of the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Payette do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under 
my direction and is a true, full and correct Record of, the 
pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
I do further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and 
pictures offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause will be 
duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the 
Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record. 
I further certify that, in addition to the exhibits 
identified in the Reporter's Transcript, the following will be 
submitted as a confidential exhibit to the Record on Appeal: 
(1) NONE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of said Court at Payette Idaho, this ~ 3 day of 
A~ , 20~. 
Betty J. Dressen 
Clerk of the District Court 
By i>iputy Clerk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE-~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
NEIGHBORS FOR THE 
PRESERVATION OF THE BIG AND 
LITTLE CREEK CO:MMUNITY, an 
unincorporated corporation; 
PEOPLE FOR PAYETTE'$ FUTURE 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit 
Corporation; JOSEPH BERCIK and 
BETTY BERCIK; CODY BURLILE and Payette County Case No. 
CHRISTINA BURLILE; DE BURLILE and CV-2011-000959 
LORI PRATT; LINDA BURLILE; JORDAN 
CARY and HARMONY CARY; LARRY DAHNKE 
and SUSAN DAHNKE; DALE DELLINGER; Supreme Court #41113-2013 
RAY DENIG and JACKIE DENIG; RICHARD 
EVEY and SUSAN EVEY; KANE HUDDLESTON 
and JOYCE HUDDLESTON; LUKE HUDDLESTON; 
JOHN JEFFRIES and JO ANN JEFFRIES; 
JERRY KORN; LEON KORN; CAMERON MAHLER; 
KIMBERLY CHRISTENSEN; CYRIL ROLAND; 
GREG SEMON and TERRI SEMON; ROGER 
SMITH and MARY VIVIAN SMITH; 
ELIZABETH STEPHENS; DICK TOWNER and 
SUE TOWNER; JOHN WALGENBACH and 
DENISE MORGAN; DEBORAH WEBER; and 
ENRIQUE YBARRA, JR., 
Petitioners, 
And 
JOHN(JACK)BURLILE; 'H-HOOK,LLC, an 
Idaho limited liablilty company; 
CLIFFORD MORGAN and MARY MORGAN; 
THOMAS PENCE; IRENE ROLAND; TOM 
ROLAND and MARCIA ROLAND; JAMES 
UNDERWOOD, JR. ; and JEFFERY WEBER, 
Petitioners-Appellants, 
-vs-
BOARD OF PAYETTE COMMISSIONERS 
OF PAYETTE COUNTY, 
Respondent, 
and 
ALTERNATE ENERGY HOLDINGS INC., 
Applicant/Intervenor. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE-1 
I, Betty J. Dressen, Clerk of the District Court of the 
rd Judicial strict of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Payette do hereby certify that I have personally served 
or mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of 
the Clerk's Record and any Reporter's Transcript to each of the 






Attorney for Intervenor 
251 E Front St. Ste 200 
Boise ID 83702 
Attorney for: 
Intervenor 
ANNE MARIE KELSO 




The parties shall have twenty-eight (28) days from the date 
of service of the appeal record to file any objections, together 
with a Notice of Hearing, with the District Court. If no 
objection is filed, the record will be deemed settled and will be 
filed with the Supreme Court. 
If there are multiple (Appellants) (Respondents), I will 
serve the record, and any transcript, upon the parties upon 
receipt of a stipulation of the parties, or court order stating 
which party shall be served. If no stipulation or order is filed 
in seven (7) days, I will serve the party whose name appears 
first in the case title. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of said Court at Payette Idaho, this ~ day of 
/-41v½3 lAl)f: , 2 0 B. 
Betty J. Dressen 
Clerk t 1 strict Court 
By_'f-.-.y__.9,,""IZl'-~~-,----
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE-~ 
